Don’t let the bastards get you down. Umberto Eco’s “The Name of the Rose.” A Medieval Mystery with a Metaphysical Moral for our Time.

Don’t let the bastards get you down.

Umberto Eco’s The Name of the Rose.

A Medieval Mystery with a Metaphysical Moral for our Time.

Burton Weltman

“[Humanity] has unquestionably one really effective weapon, laughter.

Power, money, persuasion, supplication, persecution…

Against the assault of laughter nothing can stand.”

Mark Twain.

The Calamitous Fourteenth Century: A Distant Mirror?

“Often the step between ecstatic vision and sinful frenzy is very brief.”                                    William of Baskerville.  The Name of the Rose.

The past is prologue according to Antonio in Shakespeare’s The Tempest.  Fourteenth century Europe was a tempestuous prologue to modern history according to Barbara Tuchman in her seminal book A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 14th Century.[1] Calamity abounded as what we call the Middle Ages ended and the Modern Era began, with most people suffering from “plague, war, taxes, brigandage, bad government, and schism in the Church.”[2]

Politics in the fourteenth century were dominated by two arrogant and grasping powers, the Holy Roman Emperor and the Roman Catholic Pope, each claiming global hegemony over men’s minds as well as their lands.[3]  Each sought dictatorial and even totalitarian control over the peoples of Europe.  Cold wars and hot wars were fought between them, and each employed institutionalized corruption to get their ways.[4]

Partisans of the Church and the Empire were divided by rigid ideology and theological frenzy. Both sides persecuted and executed opponents for their beliefs.  The Pope’s Inquisition routinely charged nonconformists with heresy and burned them at the stake.  The Emperor similarly enforced his will.  Both sides stoked fears of witchcraft on the part of the other, and charging opponents with witchcraft “became a common means to bring down an enemy.” Accusation was tantamount to condemnation because denial was deemed to be proof of guilt, since that is what a witch would do, and because both the temporal and religious authorities “achieved proof by confession rather than evidence, and confession was routinely gained by torture.”  Fear of being denounced by the authorities or even one’s neighbors was pervasive and socially destructive.[5]

In Tuchman’s rendering, fourteenth century Europe was not a happy time and place.  But does the situation sound familiar?  Substitute the Soviet Union and the United States for the Holy Roman Empire and the Roman Catholic Church, and you seem to have something of a mirror of the last half of the twentieth century when the Cold War raged around the world, anti-Communist witch hunts turned citizens against each other in the United States, and stoking fear and hatred brought demagogues to power.  That was Tuchman’s point.  Published in 1978, Tuchman’s book was intended as a warning about what happens when society is pervaded with demagoguery and dominated by fear.

In 1980, Umberto Eco published The Name of the Rose, a novel about politics and religion during the early fourteenth century.[6]  It is a mystery story wrapped in theological, political and philosophical debates, and it is effectively a fictionalization of themes discussed in Tuchman’s history.  Like Tuchman’s book, it is also a warning about what happens when society is dominated by ideological rigidity, theological zealotry, public corruption, demagoguery and fear.

The warnings of Tuchman and Eco are still relevant today.  Substitute President Putin and President Trump for the Emperor and the Pope, substitute Russia and the United States for the Holy Roman Empire and the Roman Catholic Church, and both books contain a warning about what might be happening to us today.  Eco might, however, also be trying in his novel to point us to a way of combating the pretensions of the Trumps, Putins and other would-be despots, and of helping to restore sanity and civility to what has been an increasingly insane and uncivil world.  And that way is through the universal propensity of people to laugh coupled with a pragmatic common sensibleness of which people seem capable no matter their cultural differences.  The purpose of this essay is to explain that interpretation of the book.

The Story: Irony and Agony in a Benedictine Monastery.

The Name of the Rose has been an international best-selling novel since its first publication in 1980 – over fifty million copies sold and counting.  It is widely considered an unusual novel to have become a best-seller.[7]  It is a hefty book, some five hundred pages long.  It is also an intellectually heavy book.  The story takes place in a fictional Benedictine monastery during the 1320’s and almost all of the characters are monks.  It is filled with abstruse theological discourse on issues that were of interest to fourteenth century Roman Catholic clergymen. There is a small amount of sex in the book, but very little, only just enough to highlight some of the theological arguments.  This does not seem to be the stuff of which best-selling novels are generally made.

The Name of the Rose is, nonetheless, a compelling book and I think that is because of the unstinting and unswerving reasonableness and good humor of the main character, William of Baskerville.  William is a Franciscan Friar who is a sleuth, scientist and philosopher rolled into one.  He is a pragmatist caught in the midst of extremists who push their ideas and actions to the point of absurdity, and beyond to disaster.  He is a rational man among zealots, and we identify with him and root for him as he lobs witticisms at the fanatics and tries to make sense of the mess around him, just as most of us hope to do in our own lives.

It is an extremely erudite and dense book.  It sets us down in an alien world full of ideas and things of which we have never heard, with people arguing passionately over obscure points equivalent to the question of how many angels can dance on the end of a pin.[8]  As a result, the novel is commonly seen as a sort of doomsday book and a postmodern portrayal of the futility of finding common ground with other people and engaging in meaningful communication with them. [9]  But, I disagree.  I think the book is actually a paean to pragmatism and good humor and, through William, it has an optimistic message, albeit wrapped in disorder, death and destruction.

The story is in the form of a long-lost manuscript purportedly written by a medieval monk named Adso which has been found, translated and published by an unnamed fictional editor.  Adso was ostensibly William of Baskerville’s sidekick and amanuensis during a trip they made to the Benedictine monastery for a meeting between representatives of the Pope and the Franciscan Order.  The purpose of the meeting was to discuss whether the Franciscans should be allowed to live in absolute poverty as they contended Jesus and his disciples had done.  The manuscript consists of Adso’s notes and reconstructions of what transpired and, especially, what William said and did.  In the manuscript, Adso admits that he often did not understand the purport of William’s philosophical ideas, and it is clear to us that he didn’t.[10]

But Adso is still able to communicate William’s words to us so that we can fathom what William was saying.  That we can understand William seems to exemplify one of Eco’s points in the book that although we see each other and the world through a glass darkly, we can still see clearly enough to make pragmatic sense of things if we try.  There is a faux preface to the book by the faux editor in which he clearly does not understand the import of the book he is publishing and completely misses any comparison of the fourteenth century with today, and this seems to make the same point because we readers can see the comparison.

The Name of the Rose is complex and complicated.  It has several plot lines and many themes. It is abstruse and hard to penetrate, which I think is consistent with the idea that we see through a glass darkly.  I think, however, that one can identify three main plot lines and two main themes in the story.  The plot lines follow William’s investigation of a series of murders at the monastery, William’s theological debates with other monks at the monastery and his disquisitions with Adso, and William’s participation in the meeting between the Pope’s delegates and the Franciscan leadership.  The themes focus on the morality of laughter and the nature of the nomenclature we use to understand things and communicate with each other.

William is at the center of each of the plot lines.  He has come to the monastery to help mediate the meeting between the Franciscans and the Pope’s representatives.  But, no sooner does he get there than the Abbot of the monastery ropes him into investigating a death that had occurred just prior to William’s arrival, and which is suspected to be a murder.  Consistent with the idea that things are not always what they seem to be, the death is eventually found to be a suicide.

William’s investigation of that death seems, nonetheless, to trigger a series of murders that are not directly connected with either the suicide or with the subject of the forthcoming meeting, but which William is now called upon to investigate.  The murders seem to follow a pattern from the Book of Revelation in the Bible and are possibly intended to signal the second coming of Jesus Christ.  This pattern is eventually found to be a red herring intended by the murderer to lead William’s investigations astray, but it is this plot line that keeps the pot boiling in the book.

In the course of his investigations, William increasingly finds a fanatical blind Benedictine monk named Jorge in his way, and the second plot line consists of theological debates among various monks but especially between William and Jorge.  The Benedictines were historically known for their scholarship, and the book’s fictional Benedictine monastery is supposedly a major repository of ancient texts.  Many of the texts were written by Greeks and Romans who were not Christians, and these texts are jealously guarded by the monks lest they get into the hands of lay people who might misinterpret them in ostensibly heretical ways.

Jorge is an arch-Benedictine who espouses Church orthodoxy and upholds the authority of Authority.  And he does so vehemently.  To Jorge, the Church is constituted by its hierarchy, not its adherents, and the truth is in Church documents, not scientific discoveries.  He claims that the purpose of scholarship should be to preserve knowledge, not to discover or invent it. He derides the quest for new knowledge as sinful “pride” that is subversive of the established Church.  Jorge accepts the literal truth of Scripture and claims it says “everything that is needed to be known.”  To him, science is evil.  “Before we looked to heaven,” he complains, “now we look to earth.”[11]

Soon after William arrives at the monastery, he encounters Jorge in a workroom in which monks were copying and illuminating holy books, and they begin their debating.  When William enters, Jorge is berating one of the illustrators for drawing on the sacred manuscripts absurdly humorous caricatures of humans and other animals which make the other monks laugh.  Jorge condemns the illustrations as distortions that denigrate God’s creation and warp men’s minds.  And he condemns their laughter as inconsistent with the seriousness of a monk’s work.

William defends the drawings as a means of contrasting what is false with what is true and, thereby, highlighting the truth.  “God can be named only through the most distorted things,” William claims, and “He shows Himself more in that which is not than in that which is.”  In turn, laughter, William contends, can be an aid to understanding.  Jorge replies that in the Gospels “Our Lord did not have to employ such things to point out the straight and narrow path to us.  Nothing in his parables arouses laughter.”  And “Christ never laughed,” Jorge concludes.  But he could have, William counters, “nothing in his human nature forbade it.”[12]

And despite Jorge’s claim that Jesus’ parables don’t provoke outright laughter, many of them were certainly witty.  This includes sayings such as “It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to get into heaven” and “Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and unto God the things that are God’s.”  The former saying disparages riches and indicates that it would be absurd to think a rich man can be good enough to get into heaven.  The latter saying turns on the fact that to a Jew such as Jesus and to the Christian followers of Jesus, everything is owed to God and there is, in effect, nothing owed to Caesar.  It would be absurd to think otherwise when dealing with a Supreme Being.  This was an irony lost on Jesus’ audience and many others since.  Both sayings are quite humorous and were historically used by Franciscans to support their position that Jesus favored Church poverty.

As their initial interchange illustrates, Jorge and William held antithetical views of scholarship and the Church.  Jorge stands for the upholding the past, William for the progressing in the present.  As an erstwhile scientist, William especially promotes the questioning of authority.  Doctrines are merely hypotheses, subject to being proved, disproved, and modified as circumstances change and different evidence emerges.  Institutions are also made to evolve as circumstances change. “Books are not made to be believed,” William explains, “but to be subject to inquiry” and that, he insists to an astonished Adso, includes even Scripture.  Knowledge can, in turn, come from many sources. The Koran, he contends, is “A book containing wisdom different from ours” but there are many things Christians can learn from Muslims.[13]

The third plot line concerns an actual conflict during the 1320’s between the Franciscan Order backed by the Emperor and the Dominican Order that administered the Inquisition for the Pope.  The story in the book is fictional but the dispute is historical.  Historically, the Franciscans were known for their relatively relaxed rules of behavior and liberal theological interpretations, and for ministering to the poor and to social outcasts.  The Dominicans were known for their theological purity and for harshly administering the Inquisition against alleged heretics. During the first part of the fourteenth century, the Franciscans and the Pope were engaged in a virulent and sometimes violent debate about whether Jesus and his disciples had lived in poverty and owned nothing, and whether monks and maybe the Church as a whole should do likewise.

The Benedictine monastery in the story is ostensibly neutral territory and is hosting a meeting between the Franciscan leadership and some representatives of the Pope on the question of whether Franciscans should be allowed to practice the poverty they attributed to Jesus.  The Pope has denied them that right, seemingly because he fears it would reflect badly on the wealth of the Church and the lavishness of his own lifestyle.  The Emperor is supporting the Franciscans merely in order to gall the Pope.  The Pope’s delegation is headed by a zealous and bloodthirsty Dominican Inquisitor named Bernard Gui, who was an actual historical person.  At the fictional meeting, William jousts with Bernard over questions of what constitutes heresy and what should be done with people who are accused of heresy.

Bernard essentially takes the position that it is better to burn a slew of innocent people at the stake than to let one guilty heretic get away.  He seems to want to execute anyone who is accused by any reputable authority of heresy, no matter what the accused has actually said or done.  He claims that the authority and integrity of the Church as an eternal institution are at stake.  To him, anything that calls the Church into question does the work of the Devil.  And Bernard implies that Franciscans who support the poverty movement might be in that number.  William responds with questions that he hopes will demonstrate the absurdity of Bernard’s position but does not directly attack Bernard for fear of getting his colleagues into trouble.  The meeting soon breaks down into shouting among the participants and nothing is resolved.

Later, speaking to Adso, William claims that people become heretics and outcasts because the Church does not address their problems of poverty, disease, and oppression.  The goal should be to reincorporate rebels back into the Church, rather than slaughtering them.  But, he continues, “The recovery of the outcasts demanded the reduction of the privileges of the powerful,” which is why the powers-that-be in the Church prefer to kill rebels as heretics.  When Adso remarks that it seems the Church “accuses all its adversaries of heresy,” William replies that the Church also “recognizes as orthodoxy any heresy it can bring under its control.” Cynicism, William claims, lays behind the faith proclaimed by the Church.  In the holy scheme of things, William contends, “The faith a movement proclaims doesn’t count; what counts is the hope it offers.”  And that is where the Church is failing, he concludes.[14]

It turns out in the end that Jorge is behind the murders. He has been attempting to keep anyone from reading a long-lost book on comedy and laughter that Aristotle had written.  Among medieval theologians and philosophers, Aristotle was a revered pre-Christian philosopher, widely known as The Philosopher.  Jorge was afraid that if Aristotle’s book became public knowledge, it would place a stamp of approval on laughter and humor, which he believes are tools of the Devil.  Jorge arranges things so that any monk who even briefly possesses the book dies almost immediately.  Tellingly, although Jorge thinks the book is evil, he has been too much of a scholar to simply destroy it.

William discovers the truth about the murders but it is too late to avoid further tragedy.  Jorge gains a Pyrrhic victory over William when he destroys the book and the whole monastery in a fire that kills most of the learned monks, destroys all of the other precious books, and also kills himself.  William and Adso escape the inferno.

The Morality of Mirth: Laughter is not a Laughing Matter.

“The Devil is the arrogance of the Spirit, faith without a smile, truth that is never seized by doubt.” William of Baskerville. The Name of the Rose.

The Name of the Rose is a dense book with many themes.  I think, however, that one can identify two main interrelated themes that run through the book.  They can be characterized as the morality of mirth – whether laughter is a moral or immoral act — and the metaphysical nuances of nomenclature – what we mean when we call something by a name.

The Name of the Rose is not a funny book. It tells a grim story set in a particularly vicious time and place in history. The story mainly consists of serious philosophical discussions that are periodically punctuated by gruesome murders.  The book is, nonetheless, dominated by laughter, laughter as a subject of theological dispute and laughter at the wit and witticisms of the author Eco and the main character William of Baskerville.  William is a proponent and exemplar of laughter whose name is itself a witty reference by Eco to Sherlock Holmes.

Laughter is a common response to disorder.  When things are not what they are supposed to be, it may be distressing but it can also be humorous.  Laughing can be a way of distancing yourself from the pain of an undesirable person or unwanted event by seeing the situation as ridiculous and, therefore, less threatening.  Self-awareness is a key to laughter.  In laughing at a situation, you can see yourself as both in but not of the situation.  That is, you must be able to rise above the situation and see yourself in the midst of others but also apart from them.

Aristotle, whose philosophy dominated the Middle Ages and is at the center of the philosophical discussions in The Name of the Rose, defined humans as animals that can laugh.  Until recently, we humans generally thought that we were the only ones who could laugh.  Aristotle and most people believed that other animals were merely automatons and were creatures of instinct and blind causality.  They were supposedly without self-awareness and, therefore, without laughter.  We now know differently, that other animals are aware of themselves as individuals, can make choices about their lives, and seemingly can laugh.  But laughter is still a universal human characteristic.  People everywhere laugh.

Laughter is a moral issue because it can be an expression either of smug certainty and pride or of doubt and humility.  In its former form, it is often seen as immoral.  In its latter form, it is often seen as a moral virtue.  Philosophers have differed through the ages on the relative virtues and viciousness of laughter, a debate that is played out by William and Jorge in Eco’s novel.

Philosophers and psychologists have categorized laughter in various ways but two theories seem to stand out as most commonly used, the Superiority Theory and the Incongruity Theory.[15]  The Superiority Theory was promoted by Plato, Descartes, Hobbes and others who denounced laughter as immoral.  In this view, laughter is a means of denigrating a person and asserting superiority over him.  Comedy is laughing at a fool and making him feel bad.

Plato rejected laughter as an emotional outburst in which the laugher loses rational control of himself and both the laugher and the target of the laughter are denigrated. Among Christians, Saints Jerome, Ambrose and John of Chrysostom rejected laughter as proudful, uncharitable and unholy.  Saint Benedict, who composed the rules by which most medieval monasteries operated, banned laughter among monks as inconsistent with the seriousness of their vocation.

The Incongruity Theory was promoted by Aristotle, Kant and Kierkegaard among others.  It emphasizes laughter that is about something, rather than aimed at someone.  In this theory, laughter is an expression of surprise and wonder at some unexpected or inconsistent turn of events.  In contradistinction to Plato’s Superiority Theory, Aristotle defined funny as “a mistake or unseemliness that is not painful or destructive.” In this theory, comedy is laughing at foolishness, to which we are all potentially prone, and laughter is a recognition of the absurd contradictions in ourselves, life and the universe.[16]  Summarizing this position, the philosopher John Morreall claims that “Comedy embodies an anti-heroic, pragmatic attitude toward life’s incongruities.”[17]  In this theory, laughter is benign, useful, and a source of humility, not pride.

What are we to make of the incongruity between these two theories?  Laugh, I suppose, but maybe also see them as complementary rather than contradictory.  Instead of focusing on whether the joke is on someone or is about something, we might focus instead on the power relations between the laugher and the target of his laughing.  In particular, we might distinguish between laughter that is intended to afflict the oppressed while comforting the oppressor, and laughter that is intended to comfort the oppressed while afflicting the oppressor.  That is, we can distinguish between the laughter of the bully who seeks to put down someone weaker than himself from the laughter of the downtrodden who seek to take down the bully. It is a difference between the laughter of repression versus the laughter of rebellion.

Based on this distinction, laughter can lay at the root of morality because it can help enforce the Golden Rule.  Some version of what we call the Golden Rule – the admonition to love thy neighbor as thyself and do unto others as you would have them do unto you – is part of virtually every culture in world history.  Rejecting the laughter of bullies while encouraging laughter at them can help promote the Golden Rule ideal of treating others fairly and as family.  As the philosopher Jacqueline Bissel puts it: “Laughter can interrupt the banality of evil.”[18]  William represents this position in The Name of the Rose.

It is, of course, not merely dour philosophers who disparage and discourage laughter.  History is full of powerful people who fear the subversive nature of laughter and try to discourage it.  There are also people who would suppress the self-awareness in others that makes laughter possible.  Ideologues, fanatics and megalomaniacs often seek to overwhelm the selves of their followers and absorb them into whatever causes they are promoting.  Religious cults and revolutionary political parties are notorious examples.  They try to root out independent thinking and feeling in their adherents, and generally oppose laughter as inconsistent with the deadly seriousness of their causes.  Many would disparage the Golden Rule in the name of zero-sum competition in what they see as a dog-eat-dog world or in the name of battling heretics and sinners in what they see as a world full of evil.  Jorge and Bernard Gui represent this position in the book.

The Absurdity Test and Speaking Humor to Power: You laughing at me?

“Perhaps the mission of those who love mankind is to make people laugh at the truth, to make truth laugh, because the only truth lies in learning to free ourselves from the passion for truth.” William of Baskerville. The Name of the Rose.

In The Name of the Rose, the case for laughter is espoused and exemplified by William of Baskerville who contrasts with the ideologues, fanatics and megalomaniacs he mixes with at the monastery.  In the course of his investigations of the murders, his debates with Jorge, and his involvement in the meetings between the Franciscans and the emperor’s representatives, he practices what might be called an absurdity test.

An absurdity test is a way of evaluating your own ideas and actions and those of others in order to decide whether they are laughable.  It requires you to conduct thought experiments about the potential results of a belief or action in the event it was extended to its practical and logical limits.  If the long-term results of extending it are practically or logically absurd, that is, if they are laughable, then the results are unacceptable, and you must modify or limit your belief or action.  It is a pragmatic test of the workability of an idea or action, and it tends you toward Aristotle’s Golden Mean which is a middle way of thinking and acting.

A premise of the absurdity test is that people, and especially powerful people, do not like to be laughed at.  The test is an appeal to their humility – maybe I could be wrong — but also to their vanity – I don’t want to look like a fool.  The hope is that people, and especially those in positions of power, will apply the absurdity test to themselves.  William applies this test to himself in his investigation of the murders when he realizes he has fallen for the red herring left by the murderer and laughs at himself for being fooled.

But if powerful people don’t apply the test to themselves, the test should be applied to them by others.  If the Emperor has no clothes, or the Pope has too many, people have a moral obligation to laugh at them, or at least snicker.  That is what William does in the story as he tries to demonstrate to people around him, and especially to the theological and political powers-that-be, the absurdity of their fixed and narrow-minded ideas.

The Metaphysical Nuances of Nomenclature: What’s in a name?

The dispute between Jorge and William about laughter relates to the medieval debate about universals, which was one of the biggest issues in philosophy during the fourteenth century.  A universal is that which particular things have in common.  It is a general idea that groups or connects particular things.  White things, for example, have whiteness in common.  Humans have humanness in common.  Nearby things have closeness in common.  The nature of universals is a question that occupies William in his debates with Jorge and Bernard.

The philosophical question was about the metaphysical status of general ideas.  The question was whether universals exist as things in their own right or are merely names that are arbitrarily given to groups of things.  Does the general idea of things precede the particular things that are covered by that general idea, or do the particular things precede the general idea that they have in common?  On its face, this question seems to have the unsolvable quality of “What came first, the chicken or the egg?”   But it is, in fact, solvable, albeit in different ways that have significant theological, social and moral ramifications, including on the meaning and morality of laughter.

The debate over the metaphysical status of general ideas goes back to ancient times and continues in the present day. There were three main ways in which universals were considered during the fourteenth century.  These ways were what are called ontological realism, nominalism, and conceptualism.[19]

To try to simplify a very complicated debate, ontological realism holds that universals are things in themselves that precede the particular instances of those things.  The idea of whiteness, for example, ostensibly came first, white things came second.  And the idea of man came before any actual men.  Among the ancients, Plato claimed that “There is a heavenly realm of greater reality consisting in forms, ideals, or ideas.” He promoted an extreme version of ontological realism in which universals were ostensibly abstract objects that existed in a world of their own.

Nominalism holds that universals are merely arbitrary names that we give to groups of things.  White things came first, the word whiteness is an arbitrary term that we apply to them.  Heraclitus, who famously claimed that “You cannot step in the same river twice,” held an extreme form of nominalism that bordered on nihilism.

Conceptualism holds that universals are names that we give to groups of things, but the names are not arbitrary and, in fact, conform to the reality of those things.  White things came first, but the term whiteness is not arbitrary and conforms with concrete reality of whiteness.  Aristotle, who proclaimed that “Virtue is found in the Golden Mean,” took a characteristically middle position between nominalism and realism.  Aristotle believed in the reality of universals but insisted that they be supported by concrete evidence.

Aristotle’s was a pragmatic and scientific approach to universals.  In this approach, you can subject general ideas to an absurdity test and laugh if the results are absurd. General ideas that work are acceptable.  Those that don’t work aren’t.  During the early Middle Ages, Aristotle was generally thought in Europe to be an ontological realist, but by the fourteenth century, with an infusion of new knowledge of him from the Arabs, he was frequently being cited as a conceptualist.[20]

Interpreters of The Name of the Rose have differed in whether they think Eco is opting in the book in favor of nominalism or conceptualism through the character of William of Baskerville.  And they have differed in where they think the name of the book comes from and what it means.  Eco was characteristically cryptic and ambiguous about the origins of the book’s name.  Among critics, the two leading candidates seem to be Gertrude Stein’s “Rose is a rose is a rose” and Juliette’s “What’s in a name? That which we call a rose by any other word would smell as sweet.”[21]  I don’t think that either of these sayings captures the meaning of the book.

Stein said that her phrase was a reference to the language of the fourteenth century poet Chaucer and to his times when, she claimed, if you had a word for a thing or said the word for a thing, you concluded that the thing must really exist.  Stein was, in effect, saying that her phrase was an exercise in ontological realism, the orthodox metaphysics of the fourteenth century.  As such, I don’t think her phrase reflects the meaning of the book because I think it is clear that Eco is not promoting and William is not espousing ontological realism.

Shakespeare’s Juliette is a thirteen-year-old girl who is in the first stages of infatuation with Romeo, a young man from the wrong family background.  She is not a philosopher and she is almost certainly wrong in what she proposes.  Her statement about the smell of roses is preceded by a plea for Romeo to “Deny thy father and refuse thy name.” And he responds “Henceforth I never will be Romeo.”  Taken together, their statements about the name of Romeo and the smell of roses reflect an extreme nominalism that is wrong-headed on at least three counts.

First, Juliette seems to think that if Romeo changed his name, he would somehow be purged of his family background.  And he thinks likewise.  That is clearly not the case.  By any name, he would still be a person with the wrong family background.  Second, if Romeo were to reject his family background by changing his name, he would effectively be changing himself.  He would be saying to himself as well as others that he does not want to be the person he was when he was named Romeo, and he would no longer smell as he had when Juliette fell for him.  Third, if Romeo rejected his name and family background, he would be rejecting the form of himself that she fell in love with, which is the rose that she thinks is so sweet. Names make a difference both as to what a thing is and to how we respond to it.  If Romeo’s name had been Satan, wouldn’t it have made a difference in him if he had been forced to grow up with the name of Satan and mightn’t she have reacted differently to him?  Just think of the song “A boy named Sue.”

I think a better candidate for the meaning of the book’s name is a poem by Robert Frost called “The Rose Family.”  It goes: “The rose is a rose, and always was a rose.  But the theory goes that the apple’s a rose, and the pear, and so’s the plum.  The dear only knows what will next prove a rose.  You, of course, are a rose – But were always a rose.”  The factual point of the poem is that fruit such as apples are in the botanical family of rose plants.  The ontological point seems to be that the name “rose” is a tool with which we make sense of the world.  But it does not have a fixed meaning.  Its meaning changes as we discover new things that botanically fall within the category.  Frost’s is a conceptualist view that fits with a pragmatic philosophy, and that fosters humility – we can never know everything or adhere to fixed categories – and a sense of humor – what we say today may seem absurd tomorrow.  This is, I think, the view that is being promoted in the book by Eco and espoused by William.

In addition to evidence provided by the book’s name, the arc of the book’s narrative seems to tend toward conceptualism.  Adso begins his narrative with the opening words of the Gospel of St. John: “In the beginning was the Word; the Word was with God and the Word was God.”  This statement can be characterized as the ontological realist’s credo.  Words come first, concrete reality comes after.

But Adso ends his narrative with a Latin phrase that translates as “The ancient rose remains by its name, naked names are all that we have.”  This is a conceptualist conclusion as well as another potential source of the book’s title.  The phrase seems to mean that words are a function of concrete reality, but when the reality is gone, we still have the words and we can try to gain meaning from them.  Adso has said in the lines just before this closing phrase that “I leave this manuscript, I do not know for whom; I no longer know what it is about.”  The pragmatic and conceptualist point is that he has left the manuscript for posterity and that is us, and we can understand it and make use of it as best we can.[22]

Nominally nominalist; conceptually conceptualist; pragmatically pragmatist.

“The only truths that are useful are instruments to be thrown away.”                                       William of Baskerville. The Name of the Rose.

Ontological realism was the metaphysical and theological orthodoxy in the fourteenth century.  As a general rule, ontological realism tends to support any orthodoxy at any time because it holds to a fixed and immutable set of general categories.  The world is the way it is because it was made that way.  Whatever is, is right.  This is the position of Jorge in the novel.  In this view, if anyone questions any of the conventional categories or orthodox ideas, that person is guilty of both heresy – undermining the Truth – and treason – undermining established institutions.  Laughter and even irony are forbidden because they are inherently subversive.  And there is no absurdity test because extremism in defense of orthodoxy is no vice.  A deadly seriousness is the ideal attitude.  This is the position of the Inquisitor Bernard Gui.

William of Baskerville disagrees with the ontological realists.  And in his debates with the other monks and his discussions with Adso, William espouses the views of many of the most progressive thinkers of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries in Europe who opposed ontological realism, in particular the scientist Roger Bacon, the metaphysician William of Ockham, and the political philosopher Marsilius of Padua.  William is a fictional character but he expresses the views of actual people who figured prominently in the intellectual life of that time, and who figured especially in opposition to the scientific, political, theological, and philosophical orthodoxies of the day.  The book is a mixture of the factual and the fictional but it is the facts that constitute the main point behind the fiction.

William says that he is particularly indebted to Bacon, Ockham, and Marsilius.  Each of them was a Franciscan, as ostensibly is William.  Franciscans and people who used the Franciscan name as cover were often involved in many unorthodox movements during this time, including the Franciscans’ poverty movement.  Bacon, Ockham, and Marsilius, in turn, acknowledged deep intellectual debts to ancient Greek and Roman thinkers, especially Aristotle, as well as to contemporary Arab Muslim scholars from whom they got much of their knowledge about Aristotle.  This cultural interchange and indebtedness is highlighted by William in the novel and seems intended by Eco to promote the idea that there is a pragmatic commonality among the best thinkers from different cultures.

Bacon, Ockham, and Marsilius all operated within the assumptions of the Catholic Middle Ages, which included adherence to the one and only Roman Catholic Church and its Scriptures. Nonetheless, they promoted ideas that point towards the Renaissance and the Reformation, which are widely considered by historians to mark the beginning of modern history. The fact that these men could intellectually look backwards to ancient cultures, look sideways to contemporary Arabic cultures, and point forwards to modern culture so that we can understand, argue and agree with them today, seems again to support the idea that a common pragmatic reasonableness can emerge from many different cultural frameworks. This is an idea that underlies what I think is the optimism of the book despite its tragic events.

Roger Bacon, who William considers his intellectual forefather, was a late thirteenth century Franciscan whose work as an alchemist and scientist emphasized proving hypotheses through empirical evidence.[23]  Conventional medieval science was based on ontological realism and the reality of universal general ideas. Given this foundation, medieval scientists often arrived at conclusions that were based on deductions from mere assumptions, assumptions drawn from the realists’ storehouse of universals.  Bacon rejected this methodology as absurd. He insisted that propositions be proven through evidence.  Assumptions were mere hypotheses, not reality. And reality was physical evidence, not mere ideas.

Based on new translations from Arabic of Aristotle’s works on science, Bacon rejected ontological realism and leaned toward nominalism.  “A universal,” Bacon claimed, “is nothing but the agreement of many individuals,” that is, general ideas are derived from individual experiences and must be supported by a mass of evidence to prove them.  General ideas don’t precede individual experiences and don’t exist in a world of their own.  Bacon’s scientific and ontological ideas flew in the face of Church orthodoxy.  In addition, he was sympathetic with the poverty movement within the Franciscan Order. As a consequence, Bacon was frequently chastised by the Church hierarchy and even imprisoned for his views.[24]

William also considers William of Ockham to be a mentor and a friend.[25] Ockham was a Franciscan of the early fourteenth century whose ontological theories went even further than Bacon’s in rejecting universals and moving toward nominalism.  In the debates of his time, Ockham frequently bested his opponents through performing the sort of thought experiments that I have called absurdity tests, and thereby hoisting them on their own petards.

In objecting to ontological realism, Ockham argued, for example, that the idea of an all-powerful God in which all Catholics believed was inconsistent with the orthodox idea of universals.  Ontological realism, he said, holds that the general idea of a thing has a real existence of its own, that the general idea precedes any individual examples of the thing, and that the general idea exists irrespective of any individual examples of the thing.  So, he said, according this theory, if we were to posit the general idea of “man” as a universal, an all-powerful God could abolish all individual and actual men but the universal idea of “man” would still exist as a real thing. This, he said, was absurd.  Either God cannot do this because He is not really all-powerful, or the universal idea of “man” does not exist as a real thing.  Since the former conclusion is blasphemous, the latter must be the case.  In the alternative, Ockham added, God could abolish the universal idea of “man” but leave intact all the individual men without any general idea of what is a man, which is also absurd.  The only reasonable conclusion, Ockham claimed, is that general ideas are mental concepts constructed out of actual experiences, which is nominalism.

Ockham was also unorthodox on other theological and moral issues that are reflected in William’s positions in the book.  Ockham argued, for example, that intent determined the morality of an action, not the action itself.  This position put him at odds with orthodox Catholic doctrine which held that various sacramental acts, such as baptism, confession, and others, were keys to morality.  The intent to do these things was not sufficient if they weren’t actually done.  Ockham’s view that intent was sufficient was considered heretical.

Even more significantly, Ockham rejected the Pope’s claim to hegemony over the Christian world.  Ockham claimed that Church and State should be separate but equal domains, and that no one man, not even God’s vicar the Pope, should rule over all things. The Pope is, after all, only a man and there should be checks and balances on the power of men.  Ockham was, in addition, at odds with the Pope in supporting the poverty movement within the Franciscan Order.  Given the radicalism of his views, Ockham was frequently chastised by the Pope and was eventually excommunicated and persecuted as a heretic.[26]

Finally, William is portrayed as a colleague of Marsilius of Padua. Marsilius was a Franciscan who took even further Ockham’s ideas that Church and State should be separate and that no one man should have absolute power.  He claimed that the Church consisted of the body of believers and was not constituted by the Pope and the Church hierarchy.  The Church was not a universal that existed on its own and that somehow preceded its members but was a concept created in the minds of its members and constituted by their persons.

Subjecting orthodox Church doctrine to what I have termed an absurdity test, Marsilius claimed that if the Church was constituted by its hierarchy, then theoretically it could exist without members, which is absurd.  The Church is an idea and institution that is conceptualized and realized by its members.  Marsilius similarly insisted that the State consisted of its citizens and was not constituted by the Emperor and the aristocracy. Even more radically, he believed that the government of both the Church and the State should consist of councils of ordinary people, which was a fundamentally democratic idea.  Like Ockham, Marsilius was excommunicated and persecuted as a heretic.[27]

In The Name of the Rose, Umberto Eco brings the ideas of Bacon, Ockham and Marsilius together through the character of William of Baskerville.  William repeatedly references them or paraphrases their arguments in his statements.  Mirroring Ockham, William rejects universals because they “would imply that God is their prisoner,” which is absurd.  He insists that everything must be open to questioning and reinterpreting, even the Holy Scriptures.  No one, not even the Pope, had the absolute truth or the last word on Scripture.  And William subjects Scripture to what I have termed an absurdity test and concludes that “the freedom of God is our condemnation, or at least the condemnation of our pride.”  Scripture is couched in human words.  If God is restricted to our words and our interpretation of those words, then even if they were inspired by God, we are saying that we can define and restrict God and that we are more powerful than God.  That is either blasphemous or foolishness.[28]

At the same time, William rejected as absurd the extreme positions of people, including some of his fellow Franciscans, who took nominalism to the point of anarchism and even nihilism, which some in the book do.  Extreme nominalism in which everything has its own name, and there are no general ideas, is unworkable because it “creates an infinity of new entities,” which is absurd.  Like Ockham, his solution to the problem of universals is a conceptualism in which individual things are mentally grouped into general ideas.  Like Bacon, he proposes to start his analysis of any problem with hypotheses — “Imagine many general laws” — and then follow the facts to his conclusions.  And like Marsilius, William concludes “That for the management of human affairs it is not the Church that should legislate but the assembly of the people.” [29]

Reformers and Reactionaries: The Empire invariably strikes back, but don’t panic.

“If you find it hard to laugh at yourself, I would be happy to do it for you.”             Groucho Marx.

It seems that it is always the best of times and worst of times, only sometimes the best are better and the worst are worse.  I am writing this essay during July, 2018.  Right now, it seems to be a worst of times in many places in the world.  But, who knows?  The events in The Name of the Rose ostensibly took place during the 1320’s and things looked as though they couldn’t get much worse.  But they did.  The Black Plague hit in the 1340’s and killed off a third of Europe’s people.  It seemed then as though things would never get better and the world would go out with a whimper. But it didn’t. The Renaissance happened instead.  And so on and on, back and forth between reformers and reactionaries, and between better and worse times to the present day.

Our hero William was defeated in the book.  His mentors Bacon, Ockham, and Marsilius were defeated in their time.  Bernard Gui, the Inquisitor, was triumphant both in fact and in the fiction.  But who today remembers, let alone celebrates, Bernard Gui?  Meanwhile, Bacon, Ockham and Marsilius are widely known and highly celebrated.  And that, I think, is the ultimate point of the novel.  The pragmatic and common sensible ideas that those thinkers gleaned from the ancients and developed further within their own medieval culture have been passed down to modern times and developed further within ours.  Those ideas bucked the conventional wisdom and faced opposition from emperors and fanatics in ancient times, then again in medieval times, and still again in our modern times.  But the ideas have survived.  And although these same pragmatic ideas and common sensible attitudes are under assault today by a host of would-be emperors with the support of modern day fanatics, we cannot let the bastards get us down.

When we find ourselves on a downward slope, we should remember that every slope isn’t slippery, and that laughter can check a free fall. History repeats itself, “the first time as tragedy, the second as farce,” Karl Marx intoned in 1852 when comparing the newly crowned French Emperor Napoleon III with his celebrated ancestor the Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte. Applying what I have called an absurdity test to Napoleon III, Marx proceeded to heap serious ridicule on the buffoonish erstwhile emperor, and that is largely how he is remembered today.  Napoleon III was pathetic and might have been an object of pity if he had not been doing so much harm that he became an object of sarcasm and scorn instead.[30]  It is the same with Donald Trump today.  How awful it must be to be him.  Nonetheless, when dealing with the would-be emperor Trump, we should proceed as Marx did with Napoleon III, and maybe Stephen Colbert and Jimmy Kimmel can show us the way to help bring him down.

B.W. 7/2018

Footnotes:

[1] Barbara Tuchman. A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 14th Century. New York: Ballantine Books, 1978.

[2] Ibid. p.XIII.

[3] Ibid. p.306.

[4] Ibid. p.26-30.

[5] Ibid. p.43.

[6] Umberto Eco. The Name of the Rose. New York: Harcourt Brace & Jovanovich, 1980.  

[7]  Ted Gioia. “The Nature of the Rose.”  New Angles on an Old Genre.  postmodernmystery.com

[8] Kenneth Atchity. “’The Times’ 1983 review of Umberto Eco’s The Name of the Rose: An intriguing detective story.” The Los Angeles Times, 2/20/2016.

[9] “The Name of the Rose.” Wikipedia.org.

[10] Eco. op. cit. p.11.

[11] Eco. op. cit. pp.400, 472.

[12] Eco. op. cit. pp.77-81, 95..

[13] Eco. op. cit. pp.116, 315 -316.

[14] Eco. op. cit. 202-204.

[15] John Morreall. “Philosophy of Humor.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 9/28/2016.

[16] Jessica Wahrman.  Quoting Santayana in “’We Are All Mad Here’: Santayana and the Significance of Humor.” Contemporary Pragmatism, Vol.2, No.2. 12/2005.

[17] John Morreall. “Philosophy of Humor.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 9/28/2016.

[18] Susannah Laramee Kidd.  Quoting Jacqueline Bissel in “Review of The Laughter of the Oppressed by Jacqueline Bissell.” Practicalmatters.journal.org April, 2009.

[19] Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra. “Nominalism in Metaphysics.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2015.

[20] Jonathan Barnes. Aristotle: A Very Short Introduction.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.pp.71-74.

[21] “The Name of the Rose.” Wikipedia.org

[22] Eco. op. cit. pp.11, 502.

[23] Eco. op. cit. p.17.

[24] Jeremiah Hackett. “Roger Bacon.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Spring, 2015.

[25] Eco. op. cit. p.18.

[26] Rondo Keele. Ockham Explained: From Razor to Rebellion. Chicago: Open Court Pub. Co., 2010.

[27] Bertrand Russell. A History of Western Philosophy. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1943.

[28] Eco. op. cit. pp.207, 493.

[29] Eco. op. cit. pp.206-208, 262-263, 304.

[30] Karl Marx. The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. New York: International Publishers, 1963. p.15.

Idealism as Egoism in Joseph Conrad’s “Nostromo.” The Contradictions in a Depressive’s Dystopian World View. Things fall apart and apart and apart…

Idealism as Egoism in Joseph Conrad’s Nostromo.

The Contradictions in a Depressive’s Dystopian World View.

Things fall apart and apart and apart…

“I’ll let you be in my dream if I can be in yours.”

Bob Dylan

Burton Weltman

A. Prologue and Warning.

Joseph Conrad’s Nostromo is one of the most highly regarded novels that is least read.  This is a dubious distinction that it shares with such novels as Thomas Mann’s The Magic Mountain and Herman Melville’s Moby Dick.  Each of these novels is long, with a complicated narrative structure, lengthy descriptions of scenes and things, and abstract philosophical interludes. Each is full of soliloquys, speechifying, and long internal monologues that can seem stilted and unrealistic.  They are challenging reads.

First published in 1904, Nostromo has been called “a novel that one cannot read unless one has read it before.”[1]  It is chock full of characters, and the plot would be complex enough if it was narrated in a linear fashion, which it isn’t.  Conrad repeatedly switches from the novel’s present to the past and then to the future, and he gives the reader little clue when he has done so.  He also repeatedly switches the perspective on events, with different narrators presenting differing pictures of the same events.  There is no clear master narrative to the book, and not even common ground among the narrators or between the narrators and other characters.  The result is that the reader can never find a secure footing.  Staying with the book is an effort.  Many have questioned whether it is worth the effort, and decided that it isn’t.

I first read Nostromo some forty years ago.  I remember finding it exciting but disconcerting, and I wasn’t sure why.  I recently read Maya Jasanoff’s new biography of Conrad, The Dawn Watch: Joseph Conrad in a Global World,[2] which inspired me to reread Nostromo.  Once again, I found it exciting and exacting, but still disconcerting.  I think, however, that I now know why the book disturbs me.  I have also concluded that it is well worth the effort.  It is a beautiful, inciteful and haunting book about ideals, idealism, and ideas that forces you to rethink your own principles.  But I must add the warning that taking this book out of context could be hazardous to your mental health, and to your political and intellectual will.  I hope, herein, to explain what I mean.

B. The Plot: Making a Long Story as Short as I Can.

Nostromo is the story of a political revolution in the imaginary South American country of Costaguana (coast of bird dung).  The country is caught in a seemingly endless cycle of violent upheavals in which brutal dictatorships alternate with inept republics, over and over again, so that nothing ever really changes.  The current disorders revolve around a silver mine which is coveted by both would-be dictators and erstwhile republicans.  The republicans are portrayed in the book as the good guys, the dictators as bad guys.

In my reading, Nostromo is a story about the futility and fatality of idealism.  Jasanoff claims that Conrad believed that “force will crush ideals – and that ideals have victims,” a theme that “recurred throughout his writing” and particularly in Nostromo.[3]  The story is full of idealists, the bad guys as well as the good, who idealize all sorts of things that they think will make for a better world, but whose dreams invariably become nightmares.

The conflicts and contradictions among the characters’ ideals, and the egoism that lies behind them and pushes them forward, is the substance of the story.  It is not an uplifting tale. Conrad opines in his own voice that “A man haunted by a fixed idea is insane.  He is dangerous even if that idea is an idea of justice.”[4]  Idealism, according to Conrad, is a form of egoism, and idealists are pitiless in pursuit of their respective ideals. That is what repeatedly happens in the book.

Nostromo, the book’s namesake, is an ostensibly incorruptible employee of the shipping company that serves the silver mine.  He idealizes himself and lives only for the purity of his reputation.  He is a sympathetic character, but one who is clearly defined by egoism, and it is his egoism that leads to his downfall.  Other characters are not so openly egoistic, but egoism still underlies Conrad’s descriptions of their idealism.

Charles Gould is the owner of the mine.  He is an upright and universally respected man, whose materialism – his belief that money makes the world go around – is the basis for his idealism.  He believes his mine will provide the material foundation for a peaceful Costaguanan republic, and he openly speaks of himself as the savior of the country.  His efforts to develop the mine are backed by an American financier who also seeks to do good, so long as it is profitable.

Don Jose Avellanos is an aristocratic republican who was tortured almost to death by the previous dictator.  He upholds the ideal of noblesse oblige.  Antonia, his daughter, idealizes and supports her father.  Martin Decoud idealizes and pursues Antonia.  Giorgio Viola is a former follower of Garibaldi in Italy who idealizes heroic leaders, including Gould and Nostromo.

Mrs. Gould, Charles Gould’s wife, is a self-consciously saintly woman who idealizes humanity, and cares for the misfits and outcasts of Costaguanan society.  She is the exception that seemingly proves the rule in the book, as she is the one idealist who is not an egotist.

There are many other good guys in the book, and variations on the idealist theme.  There are also bad guys who are idealists, albeit idealists of evil.  They are exemplified by Guzman Bento, the previous tyrant who had tortured Don Jose Avellanos, and by General Montero and his brother Pedro Montero, would-be dictators in the current crisis.

In Conrad’s view, evil can be idealized.  He says, for example, of Guzman Bento that “The power of Supreme Government had been in his dull mind an object of strange worship, as if it were some cruel deity and it was incarnated in himself.”[5]  Bento is an idealist.  Each of these bad guys has an ideal of an orderly society in which he is the dictator.  And the fact is that the dictatorship of Guzman Bento brought peace to Costaguana, even if it was temporary and bought at a high cost in human suffering and death.

In the midst of the competing egos and ideals of the would-be saviors of Costaguana, the masses of ordinary people are rarely in evidence and invariably described in disparaging terms by the various narrators, including the voice of Conrad himself.  Conrad is no democrat.  The people are “the mob,” and victims of their own “mental darkness.”  He opines that “The popular mind is incapable of skepticism; and that incapacity delivers their helpless strength to the wiles of swindlers and to the pitiless enthusiasm of leaders inspired by visions of a high destiny” which, in turn, leads invariably to violence, brutality and oppression.[6]

None of the idealistic hopes of any of the characters is fulfilled, and this outcome is foredoomed by the fact that the idealism of each is essentially a form of egoism.  Each holds fast to an idea of an ideal world in which he/she rules and his/her ideas reign.  There is very little connection between and among these people or their ideas.  To each of them, it is “my way or the gallows.”

The book ends with the defeat of the Monteros and the installation of a weak and seemingly temporary republican regime.  More upheavals are inevitably in the offing.  The conclusion of most of the characters, and the book itself, is disillusionment.  Mrs. Gould speaks for most of the characters, and seemingly for Conrad, when she bemoans “Is it this we worked for, then?”[7]  Symbolizing the moral of the story, Nostromo performs heroically and righteously on behalf of the republican forces throughout three quarters of the book but dies ignominiously at the end after having compromised his integrity by stealing a consignment of silver from the mine.

C. Interpretations: Capitalist, Socialist, Imperialist, Anti-Imperialist, Racist, Humanist, Nihilist…You name it.

Nostromo has almost as many differing interpretations as it has interpreters. Commenting on this, Jasanoff says that “Conrad’s characters whisper in the ears of new generations of antiglobalization protesters and champions of free trade, liberal interventionists and radical terrorists, social justice activists and xenophobic nativists,” just to name a few.[8]  I think this diversity of interpretation is largely a function of there being so many narrators with different perspectives in the book.  They all take turns in being the voice of the book, even the bad guys.  Depending on which narrator you think that Conrad is favoring, you are likely to come up with an interpretation along the lines of that narrator’s perspective.

Some critics, for example, claim that the central message of the book is Gould’s argument that “material interests” will be the means of civilizing Costaguana, specifically in the form of his silver mine.  This ostensibly makes the book an encomium to capitalism.  Others claim that Nostromo’s affiliation with the workers in the book and his support for their wage and other claims makes the book an argument in favor of socialism.[9]

Some argue that the book is an apology for imperialism because the main voices in the book are those of Gould, Mrs. Gould, Decoud, and Nostromo, all of whom grew up and lived in Europe and who, thereby, represent a Western imperialist view of Costaguana.  These Europeans plus some European engineers and seamen are also the only competent people in the book.  Native Costaguanans are almost invariably portrayed as incompetent.  This argument is bolstered by the fact that Gould’s mine is dependent on the investment of an American financier who openly proclaims that America will one day rule Costaguana.  At the same time, other interpreters claim the book is effectively an anti-imperialist story because it portrays the futility of these Europeans to establish their republican government and civil society in Costaguana.  Costaguana is, after all, in as big a mess at the end of the book as it was at the beginning.[10]

Since native Costaguanans in the book are invariably portrayed as ignorant, incompetent, and irrational, mostly appearing in the form of rioting mobs, Nostromo has been condemned as racist.  At the same time, since the book repeatedly portrays ordinary Costaguanans as being exploited and oppressed by elites from all political parties, European and Costaguanan alike, the book has been praised as humanistic and humanitarian.  Finally, with all of the confusion and contradiction among the characters and their points of view, and with an overall picture of Costaguana as a worst of all possible worlds, Nostromo has been characterized as an exposition of nihilism and an example of post-modernism before its time.[11]

I think that each of these interpretations is plausible.  But their differences leave us readers as confused as the characters in the book.  What are we to think?  I think we can safely say that Conrad’s descriptions of things in the book are beautiful, even stunning.  His characters are brilliantly etched, and his transcriptions of their internal monologues are moving and convincing.  His portrayal of the action is riveting.  And Conrad’s discussion of social and political issues is incisive. Finally, I think we can say that the book is disconcerting.  This is in part because the book’s characters are uniformly depressed and the plot is thoroughly depressing.  But, even more, I think it is disconcerting because Conrad’s view of the world is a contradiction in terms.

D. The Dangers of a Disillusioned Idealist.

Conrad’s world views, according to Jasanoff, were derived from his personal experiences which were filled with hardships and disappointments.  Conrad was a Polish refugee from Russian oppression who had difficulty finding a country in which to settle.  He was from a self-styled aristocratic family but had to work as a young man in menial jobs and as an ordinary seaman.  He began his literary career writing popular sea stories, and had trouble being taken seriously when he began writing more serious fiction.[12]  He also suffered most of his life from clinical depression.  Jasanoff opines that Conrad had a “blighted childhood” that “inspired a fatalistic sense of the world as a realm where, no matter how hard you tried to make your own way, you might never slip the tracks of destiny.”[13]

Conrad’s parents were idealistic activists for Polish independence from Russia.  His antipathy to idealism seemingly was initially derived from the futility of their idealism.  His parents fought, and they and he suffered, as the Russians persecuted his parents for their activism.  Conrad’s anti-idealism also stemmed from his disappointment that what he remembered as the brotherly community of seamen on the ships on which he sailed did not prevail on land.  Conrad idealized merchant ships as cooperative societies in which superior authority was respected.  Based on his shipboard memories, Jasanoff claims, “he treasured a misty ideal of personal honor, commitment to duty, a community of people willing to sacrifice themselves for something bigger.”[14] Conrad’s dismay that he did not find this ideal being honored on land, especially among erstwhile idealists, was acute.

As a result, Conrad disdained idealism and saw himself as a realist.  Most critics have agreed, but I do not.[15]  I think that in Nostromo he is a disillusioned idealist who has become a pessimist but is still an idealist.  Conrad rejects idealism but still judges the world in idealistic terms.  What he is really condemning is idealism that takes the form of ideology, as opposed to idealism that stems from an ethical ideal.  While condemning idealism in toto, he applies an ethical ideal to those he is condemning.  This contradiction between what he preaches about the world and what he practices in his judgments of the world leads him to a view that is solipsistic, dystopian, and hopeless.  It is a view that is unrealistic, unhelpful, and unnecessarily demoralizing.  It is inherently inconsistent, and I think Conrad does not really believe in it.  Its inconsistencies undermine the book’s credibility, and they are disconcerting to readers trying to make sense of it.

I will elaborate on this argument and make some comparisons of Nostromo with Chinua Achebe’s novel Things Fall Apart which, like Nostromo, is a story about a third-world society in crisis.  In Achebe’s book, what had been a fairly stable and well-functioning African peasant society is disrupted and ultimately destroyed by an invasion of Europeans, many of whom are idealists of one sort or another intent on civilizing the natives according to Western standards.[16]

E. Idealism as Ideology and Ethics: Give Peace a Chance.

Conrad makes a sustained attack on idealism in Nostromo, blaming the mess in Costaguana primarily on idealistic politicians blinded by egoism.  He then, however, applies to the behavior of these misguided idealists an ethical ideal even as he condemns the idealism in them.  This contradiction between what Conrad preaches and what he practices is disconcerting.

Idealism is commonly defined as the pursuit of perfection.  “Pursuit” is the operative term in the definition.  Perfection is to be perpetually sought after but is never expected to be achieved.  One can, however, distinguish between conceiving idealism ideologically and conceiving it ethically.

An ideology is a body of doctrines, a set of fixed ideas with definite meanings and boundaries.  It is something to be followed and tends to be exclusive.  It defines right versus wrong, and good versus bad.  Those who don’t agree with your ideas become the opposition, and even the enemy.  In Nostromo, Conrad portrays ideals as ideologies and idealists as people who seek to impose their fixed ideas on the world.  These people all too easily become fanatics in their single-minded idealism, and it is a fanaticism rooted in egoism.  The ideologue insists that reality must fit into the Procrustean bed of his/her ideas.

Idealistic ideologies in Nostromo include Charles Gould’s ideal of a capitalist society in which peace and prosperity would be ensured by the mutual interests of all people in the free flow of commerce.  This was a favorite ideal among the upper classes in Western Europe during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Guzman Bento’s ideal was an authoritarian society in which peace and prosperity were ensured by the iron fist of a dictator, himself.  This was, and still is, a favorite ideal among the upper classes in Eastern Europe, among other places.

Idealism is for Conrad the insanity of the man with a fixed idea who will destroy anything in the way of his ideal of perfection, and who will slaughter people to save the world from their imperfections.  In this conception, idealism almost invariably generates the fear, hatred and vengeance it is supposed to eliminate.[17]

An ethic can be described as a set of principles and a process of applying those principles.  An ethic can be seen as an image of perfection which has core values but can be fuzzy around the edges.  Images can be more flexible in form and substance than ideas. An ethic can be more inclusive than an ideology, and an image can be seen as overlapping with those of others, or at least not inconsistent with them.  People’s ethical principles don’t have to match exactly for them to cooperate with each other, and the way ethical principles are applied can depend on the situation.  Idealism can then respond creatively to changes in circumstances, rather than ignore or deny them.  It can be pragmatically inclusive, rather than ideologically exclusive.

The Golden Rule of “doing unto others as you would have them do unto you if you were in their situation” is an example of such an ideal.  The Golden Rule is flexible, inclusive, and its operation depends on the circumstances in which it is applied.  And it is the antithesis of egoism, requiring empathy, the acceptance of differences among people, and cooperation with others in devising the solution to a problem.  There is a version of the Golden Rule in almost every religious and philosophical system in the world, which makes it a potentially unifying ethic.

The Golden Rule is the sort of “one for all and all for one” ethic that often arises spontaneously among people working on a project together.  If Conrad had been interested in exploring the ways of life of ordinary people in Costaguana, he could probably have conceived it in operation, at least to some extent, among the Costaguanan peasants and workers.  Chinua Achebe portrays this sort of cooperation among ordinary people in Things Fall Apart and it cushions some of the pessimism in his book.

With the exception of Mrs. Gould, Conrad does not explore this concept of idealism in Nostromo or imagine how it might have played out among ordinary people.  If he had, the book might have had a different outlook.  Of course, it is not for a reader to tell an author what book to write.  The author gets to make that choice.  It is ironic, however, that the Golden Rule ethic exemplified by Mrs. Gould is the ideal to which I think Conrad himself holds, and by which he judges the book’s characters.  With the exception of Mrs. Gould, they all fail to be empathetic, inclusive, cooperative or pragmatic.  Each and every one of them runs off on his own tangent, insisting on his way is the only way.  And Conrad condemns them for failing to practice what I am describing as the Golden Rule ideal.  This generates a disconcerting contradiction between the anti-idealism he preaches in his narrative and the idealism he practices in his judgments.

Bob Dylan expressed something of the Golden Rule ethical ideal in his “Talking World War III Blues.”  The song is a dystopian dream of the world following a nuclear war.  In his dream, the narrator of the song sees himself as the only person left in the world.  He is lonely and does not see the purpose in living.  The narrator then goes on to say that he is finding more and more people who are having dreams of nuclear war in which they are the only ones left.  So, he concludes his song with a proposal to everyone who is having such dreams that he will let them be in his dream if he can be in theirs.  The song is an ironic expression of hope in the midst of dystopian fears.  It is a minimalist hope, but still something to build upon.

F. A Fall from Grace without Grace: Humpty Dumpty at least had a wall.

The society Conrad portrays in Nostromo is ostensibly a fallen world of the sort we would today call a dystopia.  Almost everything that can go wrong in the book goes wrong.  There are no good options from which characters can choose.  They are continuously faced with trying to choose between the lesser of two evils, making that choice, and then having the greater evil come to pass.  Things fall apart and apart in an endless dissolution.

The problem with this picture is that you cannot fall if there is nowhere to fall from, and things cannot fall apart if they were never together.  That is what is missing from the story.  There is no starting point or reference point in the book that is not dystopian, and seemingly no time when things were not dystopian.  There is, therefore, no benchmark by which you could say that society has fallen.  This is not merely an analytical problem — about how to measure the amount the society has fallen – it is a disqualifier.  You cannot describe a situation as a mess if you have no conception of what a non-messy situation would be like, or from whence the mess derived.

In Things Fall Apart, for example, Achebe begins the book with a description of Nigerian society before the Europeans arrived, and then proceeds to describe how the advent of the Europeans brought down the hero of the book and his society.  One thing led to another, and things fell apart.  This is the way most stories work, even those that like Nostromo begin in media res, that is, in the middle of things.  Things cannot fall apart if they were never together.  A story either begins with a “Once upon a time” description of an original status quo or refers to some prior time and situation that constitutes a reference point for the story’s action.

Not so with Nostromo.  We are apparently supposed to believe that chaos reigned eternally in Costaguana.  That cannot be, and Conrad knows it.  He also knows that his readers will inevitably try to make sense of the Costaguanan situation by imagining some sort of normalcy that preceded the cycle of crises in which Costaguana is caught.  In failing to provide an explicit normalcy reference point, Conrad is, in effect, cheating.  He is counting on the fact that humans will instinctively and intuitively fill in the gaps in a story, so that we readers will imagine a benchmark with which to describe Costaguanan society as fallen.

Conrad seemingly does not want to admit that ordinary Costaguanans were ever able to exist peaceably and productively.  Conrad thinks the masses are irrationally emotional   He is not a democrat, and the word democrat is repeatedly used disparagingly in the book.  In Nostromo, brutes who disguise themselves as populist leaders mesmerize the masses.  Claiming to idealize “the People,” they sell dictatorship as democracy, and this ersatz democracy inevitably succumbs to “Caeserism.”[18]  Conrad prefers an aristocratic republic for Costaguana, but he cannot see how such a government can survive the idiocy of the masses and the malevolence of the demagogues.  The result is the vicious cycle of crises that he describes in the book.

But the reality is that the current state of chaos in Costaguana that Conrad describes could not exist without there having been some past state of relative normality, some functioning society of ordinary people, that underlies the present crisis and sustains the country even in the midst of the chaos. And Conrad knows this and knows better than he is letting on.  Conrad’s unwillingness to describe a past state of normality seems to be a function of his disdain for the Costaguanan natives who would, after all, be the ones who created and supported any such state of normalcy, and who he repeatedly describes as ignorant, incompetent and idiotic.

Conrad’s disdain of native Costaguanans in Nostromo, and his disregard of natives in his other books as well, has been described as racism by Chinua Achebe, among others.  I do not agree.  I think his disparagement of native peoples is primarily a function of Conrad’s class-ism, his disdain for the working classes.  Conrad was himself from an aristocratic family that fell on hard times.  His elitism and ignorance of how ordinary people live is evident in Nostromo.

Conrad is unwilling or unable to recognize that normality is a result of ordinary people doing ordinary things – growing food, making things, transporting stuff around, and providing necessary services, which are the foundation of any society.  Without this foundation, the elite classes could not engage in the shenanigans that he portrays in his book.  And as a reader, it is disconcerting trying to figure out how a society can be fallen from nowhere, and how an elite class can exist without a functioning underclass and a social system that supports it.

G. Solipsism without Sincerity: You talkin’ to me?

The world Conrad portrays in Nostromo is peopled with characters who are unable to make meaningful intellectual and emotional contact with each other.  It is a solipsistic world in which people essentially talk to themselves even as they talk to others, without making a real impression on each other.  Conrad seems to be saying that people cannot meaningfully understand each other, even if they try very hard.

In Nostromo, the Europeanized political elite, both the good guys and the bad, talk past each other, caught up in their respective egoistic ideals.  They also talk over the heads of the masses and there is nothing the ordinary people have to say to them.  In contrast, in Achebe’s Things Fall Apart, the European colonists often talk past each other, and there is very little meaningful contact between the Europeans and the Nigerian natives, but there is meaningful communication among the natives.  Conrad does not portray this sort of thing and, so, we are left with a picture of almost complete dysfunctionality.

The problem with this view is that in writing and publishing this book, Conrad seems to be assuming that he and his readers can make meaningful contact.  As such, he seemingly contradicts his book’s thesis in writing the book.  We have become used over the last century or so to writers who are intent on expressing themselves irrespective of their legibility to the reader.  But this was not the case with Conrad.  Nostromo is not a book that he just tossed off without caring if anyone read it or understood it.  Conrad was not a proponent of art for art’s sake, or an expressionist writer.  Nostromo is a complex book, but it is essentially a conventional narrative.  It is also a passionately written book, and Conrad cared very much about reviews of the book and readers’ responses to it.[19]

As such, Conrad’s conclusion that people cannot make meaningful contact seems to be contradicted by his premise in writing the book, and Conrad’s message does not seem consistent with his medium.  It can be disconcerting for readers to try to understand a complex narrative that seems to be saying that we cannot understand each other anyway.

H. The Moral of the Story: What can we say and do?

Nostromo is a depressing book that almost saps the reader’s will to work for progressive social change.  Conrad would seemingly have us believe that the situation in Costaguana, and seemingly in the world at large, is hopeless, what with inevitably egotistic people invariably talking past each other, and unable to act in meaningful consort.  But I don’t think he believes it.

Conrad refused to find hope or to imagine hopeful choices in the Costaguanan situation.  He proclaimed a reign of hopelessness.  But in so doing he contradicted himself.  For despite their depressing circumstances, the surviving characters in Nostromo were all planning for what they hoped would be a better future as the book ended. So, there must be at least some hope.

To be hopeless is to be without future prospects.  No one but a dead person is without future prospects.  You may feel hopeless, but it is instinctive to be continuously looking forward to the next moment.  That’s just part of the psychology and physiology of life.  Arthur Schopenhauer, for example, whose philosophy of hopelessness depressed generations of Germans during the nineteenth century, was something of a gourmet who, despite his philosophy, had no problem with looking forward to his next meal. That was a man with hope.

Since hope is inevitable, the better part of wisdom would seem to be to seek the best of all possible choices even in a worst of all possible worlds.  It does no harm to a truthful picture of a grim reality to look for possibilities of change for the better, even if they are slight.  We have no choice but to choose, so the reasonable thing is to choose what looks better, rather than pretend to give up but still go on looking forward to your next good meal, as Schopenhauer did, or your next book, as Conrad did.

Idealism is not necessarily a vehicle for egoism.  Mrs. Gould exemplifies this point, and while she is portrayed as an exception in Nostromo, this is not inevitably the case.  In Achebe’s Things Fall Apart, the main character is an egotistical idealist, whose egoism brings him down and significantly harms his community.  But Achebe also credibly portrays many people whose idealism is combined with a form of communitarianism, and who subordinate their egos to the needs of the community.  That idealism is a hopeful point in an otherwise dystopian picture.

Conrad described in Nostromo a situation in which political regimes rapidly succeeded each other and tried to overturn whatever the previous regime had done.  This scenario led him to despair of progressive social change.   But social change is a long-term game, and while progressives need to survive short term reversals of fortune, progress depends on long-term cultural and demographic changes, especially among ordinary people.

Conrad refused to focus on the ordinary people, and so he missed the underlying foundation of Costaguanan society.  In turn, he missed an opportunity to imaginatively explore the possibilities for long-term cultural and demographic changes in a country like Costaguana that might support progressive social changes.  In focusing his story solely on elite politicians whose primary goal was to overthrow each other and impose their own will on the world, Conrad, not surprisingly, came to a pessimistic conclusion about the possibilities of social reform.

We are seeing this sort of short-term political reversal in the United States today under the Trump presidency and with right-wing Republican ascendancy in Congress and on the Supreme Court.  These right-wing politicians are trying to overturn whatever had been achieved by the progressive presidency of Barack Obama and Democratic Congressional majorities.  A short-term focus on politicians and politics might lead progressives today to a pessimistic conclusion like Conrad’s.  But I think that would be a mistake.

As I write this essay in March, 2018, long-term underlying cultural and demographic changes seem to favor progressives in the United States, which perhaps helps explain the extremism and seeming desperation of the regressives in charge of our federal government and some of our so-called red-state governments.  Using something like the Golden Rule as our image of the ideal, and keeping our eyes and efforts on the long-term while seizing whatever short-term possibilities that present themselves, we can rescue hope from despair.  And while realizing what is missing from Nostromo – interest in ordinary people and on how things get done in everyday life – we can read the book for the beauty and insights it affords without losing our political and intellectual will.

[1] Kenneth Ligda. “Nostromo.” Yale Modernism Lab at modernism.coursepress.yale.edu

[2] Maya Jasanoff.  The Dawn Watch: Joseph Conrad in a Global World. New York: Penguin Press, 2017.

[3] Maya Jasanoff. The Dawn Watch: Joseph Conrad in a Global World. New York: Penguin Press, 2017. pp.82, 283.

[4] Joseph Conrad. Nostromo. New York: Barnes & Noble Classics, 2004. p.350.

[5] Joseph Conrad. Nostromo. New York: Barnes & Noble Classics, 2004. p.160.  Also p.357.

[6] Joseph Conrad. Nostromo. New York: Barnes & Noble Classics, 2004. pp.231, 357, 384.

[7] Joseph Conrad. Nostromo. New York: Barnes & Noble Classics, 2004. p.453.

[8] Maya Jasanoff. The Dawn Watch: Joseph Conrad in a Global World. New York: Penguin Press, 2017. p.9.

[9] Matthew Waller. “The Allegorical Nostromo.” nostromoonline.com

[10] Jacek Gutorow. “The Paradoxes of the European Narrative: Edward Said’s Reading of Joseph Conrad.” culture.place  4/22/08.   Kenneth Ligda “Nostromo.” Yale Modernism Lab. modernism.coursepress.yale.edu           M. Wilding. “The Politics of Nostromo.” openjournal.library.sydney.edu.au  2014.

[11] Kenneth Ligda “Nostromo.” Yale Modernism Lab. modernism.coursepress.yale.edu  Jacek Gutorow. “The Paradoxes of the European Narrative: Edward Said’s Reading of Joseph Conrad.” culture.place  4/22/08.

[12] Ironically, Conrad disdained Herman Melville as merely a writer of popular sea stories. The irony is that Melville faced the same prejudice as Conrad when Melville turned from writing adventure sea stories to more serious fiction such as Moby Dick. See Maya Jasanoff. The Dawn Watch: Joseph Conrad in a Global World. New York: Penguin Press, 2017. p.11.

[13] Maya Jasanoff. The Dawn Watch: Joseph Conrad in a Global World. New York: Penguin Press, 2017. p.53.

[14] Maya Jasanoff. The Dawn Watch: Joseph Conrad in a Global World. New York: Penguin Press, 2017. p.149.

[15] M. Wilding. “The Politics of Nostromo.” openjournal.library.sydney.edu.au  2014

[16] Chinua Achebe. Things Fall Apart. New York: Anchor Books, 1994.

[17] Joseph Conrad. Nostromo. New York: Barnes & Noble Classics, 2004. p.350.

[18] Joseph Conrad. Nostromo. New York: Barnes & Noble Classics, 2004. pp.372, 384.

[19] Maya Jasanoff. The Dawn Watch: Joseph Conrad in a Global World. New York: Penguin Press, 2017. p.305.

It’s like trying to tell a stranger ‘bout rock ‘n roll. The Magic in Thomas Mann’s “The Magic Mountain.”

It’s like trying to tell a stranger ‘bout rock ‘n roll.

The Magic in Thomas Mann’s The Magic Mountain.

Burton Weltman 

“If you believe in magic

Come along with me.”

Do You Believe in Magic?

The Lovin’ Spoonful.

Hans Castorp Faces Life in Death and Death in Life.

What is the magic in Thomas Mann’s The Magic Mountain?  It is a novel full of talking heads, abstruse debates, and abstract ideas.  There is almost no action in what passes for a story.  The story takes place in a tuberculosis sanatorium full of diseased people, many of whom exhibit disgusting symptoms, and who are dying right and left.  So, what makes readers avidly turn the pages of the book (all 854 of them in the Everyman’s Library edition), and leads many to return repeatedly to the book?[1]  What, in turn, made Hans Castorp, the main character of the novel, come to the hospital for a three-week visit, and then stay for seven years?  What is the magic in the mountain?

The Magic Mountain is a novel of ideas, in which tubercular patients and their caregivers engage in desperate debates about the meaning of life in the face of death.[2]  The unnamed sanitarium in the book is on a mountain top in Davos, Switzerland.  Davos is today the home of an annual gathering of the ultra-rich, super powerful, and internationally famous, who come together for meetings with each other and with star academics to try to figure out what is going on in the world, and what they can do about it.  Davos was in the early twentieth century the home of many sanitariums, its high altitude in the Alps and its weather conditions having been considered optimal for curing, or at least ameliorating, tuberculosis.

Patients in the sanitarium in The Magic Mountain are subject to a rigid regimen of eating large quantities of rich foods some half-dozen times a day, and then lying down for most of the rest of the day bundled up in blankets on reclining chairs on ice cold balconies.  Gorging on food, then digesting and resting are the basic principles of this cure, along with obsessively taking one’s temperature to gauge the state of one’s disease.  Most of the patients in the book succumb to the stultifying routine and the suffocating idleness of this regimen.  “Six months at most after they have come here, these young people – and they are mostly young people who come here – have lost every idea except flirtation and temperature.”[3]  Hans himself quickly settles into the deadening routine, obsessively taking his temperature, and becoming besotted with Madam Clavdia Chauchat, a female patient.

Every day is the same for most of the patients, so that time ceases to be meaningful.  Weeks seem like days, months like weeks, years like months.  They are mesmerized by the routine, and they focus so intensely on themselves that they can see, hear, and think of little outside of themselves.  “Disease makes men more physical,” claims one of the patients, “It leaves them nothing but body.”  The regimen becomes a fetish, a magical ritual, that patients think will keep them alive.  But they become like the living dead, for whom life has little meaning beyond physical survival.[4]

The book has been called “a narration about the passage of time” in which the structure of the novel mimics the experience of the patients.  The first couple of years that Hans is at the sanitarium occupy about three-quarters of the book, the next five years the rest.  That is, the period of time when things are new to Hans, and he is getting used to not getting used to being at the sanitarium, as he likes to say, seems to pass slowly.  But once he is acclimated, and falls into the routine of the place, time seems to fly by in a fog.[5]

This becalming effect is seemingly one the reasons that some readers of the book become repeated re-readers.  They get caught up in the comforting effects of the patients’ routine, and they find irresistible the book’s descriptions of lavish meals and snug rest periods.  The book has, in this regard, been hailed as “a work of sick-lit par excellence,” because it gives readers a chance to luxuriate in their own woes as they meander through the long novel.[6]

But the stasis established for patients by the sanitarium’s regimen is not stable.  Most of them are very sick, and denial of this fact cannot last.  Devastating turns for the worse, horrifying surgical procedures, and pathetic deaths repeatedly punctuate the routine of the sanitarium, and puncture the hermetic chambers of mind and body in which patients try to survive.  Despite the sanitarium’s best efforts to keep these events secret – dying patients are quarantined from the observation of other patients, and corpses are removed at night through underground passages — these events disrupt life at the sanitarium, and disrupt our vicarious enjoyment of the routine.  The book may be a work of “sick-lit,” but it’s comforting effects can be short-lived for readers.

Melodrama, Tragedy, and Comedy on the Magic Mountain.

If The Magic Mountain is one part sick-lit, it is two parts egghead-lit.  Not everyone at the sanitarium succumbs to the stupefying effects of the routine, or develops a self-centered focus of his or her illness.  There are patients and members of the staff at the sanitarium who struggle to find meaning outside of themselves, and who engage in intense theoretical debates with each other.  These characters seek to escape the insularity of illness, and the dullness of life at the sanitarium, through intellectual activities.  And the alternation of tedium and terror at the sanitarium, being surrounded by life and death in grievous struggle, seems to stimulate the creativity of these people.  They principally include the humanist scholar Settembrini, the sanitarium’s head physician Dr. Behrens, the sanitarium’s psychoanalyst Dr. Krokowski, the Jesuit scholar Naphta, and the colonial plantation owner Peeperkorn.

The ideas propounded by these characters constitute a compendium of the main theories of society and psychology that were extant in the early twentieth century.  Most of these theories, or variations of them, are still important in the present day.  The debates amongst these men are another reason why readers repeatedly return to The Magic Mountain, where “the characters who inhabit [the book] are such delightful company.”[7]  The book is intellectually stimulating even as it is emotionally comforting.  But the arguments of the debaters all ultimately fail, and the debates reach no viable conclusions.

Each of the debaters is a self-styled humanitarian who seeks the best for all of humankind, and seeks to convert others to his way of thinking toward that end.  But in the single-mindedness of their beliefs, and their insistent proselytizing, they invariably get caught up and carried away with their own ideas.  In fiercely debating with each other, each ends up carrying his arguments and actions to extreme conclusions, where they illogically turn around and contradict themselves.  In the end, each of these characters is dramatically defeated, and thrown back on his isolated self.

Drama has often been categorized into three types: melodrama, comedy, and tragedy.  Melodrama is generally characterized by a life-and-death struggle between good and evil, and good guys against bad guys.  A melodramatic resolution comes with the triumph of one side over the other, sometimes for good, other times for ill.  Comedy is generally characterized by a conflict between fools and wise people, with the laughter coming at the expense of the fools, and the resolution coming with the triumph of wisdom over foolishness.  Tragedy is generally characterized by a conflict within an otherwise good person which pushes the person to taken an extreme position, at which point things boomerang on the person and end up taking a turn for the bad.  That is, hubris, pride, or egoism lead the person to go too far, at which point the person’s best intended actions to turn back on themselves, contradicting the person’s original intentions, and snatching ill from the jaws of good.[8]

In The Magic Mountain, each of the main debaters tends to see himself as involved in a melodrama, with himself representing good and his opponents evil.  Each of them, however, is actually engaged in a self-generated tragedy in which he takes his good ideas to extremes where they end up being distorted into their opposites.  For the reader, who can see all of this happening, the book is a comedy in which the main characters foolishly undermine their own ideas, make fools of themselves, and place the reader in the position of wisely recognizing the happy medium the main characters have eschewed.

Hans Castorp is situated in the midst of the debates, with each arguer trying to convert Hans to his position.  Hans, for better and worse, is a cipher.  For better because that gives us readers the opportunity to hear a full exposition of each arguer’s position.  For worse because Hans doesn’t seem to learn anything significant in the course of the book, and ends up essentially unchanged.

Much Ado About Very Little to Do: The Less at Stake, the Greater the Ferocity.

The debates in The Magic Mountain seem to exemplify an old saying about arguments among academics, that the less there is at stake, the more ferocious the debaters.  The debates in the book can be divided into two parts.  In the first part of the book, the main arguers are Settembrini, Behrens, and Krokowski, and their main theme is the physical causes and effects of illness.  In the second part, the main disputants are Settembrini again, along with Naphta, and Peeperkorn.  Their focus is on moral, ethical, and spiritual themes.  Although convincing Hans is a main goal of the debaters, he is generally more interested in fantasizing romantically about Madam Chauchat, whose feline femininity bewitches him, than in considering their arguments.  The magic of her charms is more potent than their ideas.

Settembrini is the sentimental favorite of the book’s narrator, Hans, and us readers.  He has a sweet personality, a gently sardonic sense of humor, and his arguments in favor of democratic liberalism and humanitarian cooperation are designed to find favor with most of the people who are likely to read the book.  An honest reader is forced, however, to conclude that Settembrini rarely gets the better of the debate.  This is unnerving to us and is, I think, one of the reasons people re-read the book.  We hope that his arguments will appear stronger in the next reading.

Dr. Behrens represents modern medicine, and he promotes a philosophy based on the humane precept that we should not blame ourselves, or condemn our bodies, for getting sick.  In the course of the book, however, this precept evolves into the principle that life is itself a chronic illness.  Behrens claims that it is good to get sick because that provokes the body’s defenses against illness.  We must fight illness with illness, and find illness wherever we can.[9]  He has, thereby, taken a humane idea and stretched it to the turning point where it contradicts itself.

When Hans first arrives at the sanatorium, Settembrini warns Hans that he should leave immediately and, in any case, should have nothing to do with Behrens.  Settembrini claims that if Hans talks with Behrens, Hans will end up being convinced by the doctor that he is sick, and will get roped into a long stay as a patient at the sanitarium.  That is exactly what happens.  Hans develops a bit of a fever and a cough, ends up staying seven years, and when he leaves, it is doubtful that he ever was tubercular.  In the course of the book, our view of Behrens changes from benevolent healer to medical crank and bottom-line greedy businessman.

Dr. Krokowski represents modern psychology, and promotes a philosophy based on the humane precept that we should not blame ourselves, or condemn our bodies, for our natural feelings of love and lust.  In the course of the book, however, this precept evolves into the principle that love is the root of all illness, and that sexual repression leads to unease which leads to disease.  According to Krokowski, “Any symptom of illness was a masked form of love in action, and illness was merely transformed love.”[10]  Love is the problem for him, but what is the solution?

Krokowski seems at times to be prescribing free love as the cure for everything that ails us, but obfuscates his suggestions with gobbledy-gook language that ironically leaves his audience titillated but not fully satisfied.  His clearest recommendation is for patients to undertake an intensive, multi-year course of psychoanalytic talking sessions with him.  But Krokowski’s disclosures of the illicit secrets hidden in people’s psyches seems to hurt patients more than help them.  He has, thus, essentially taken a humane opposition to repression, and turned it into an advertisement for his very pricey and not very helpful services.

Settembrini decries Krokowski to Hans as a charlatan, and half-jokingly claims that Krokowski “has one thought in his head, and it is a filthy one.”[11]  Krokowski’s own relations with his female patients are somewhat ambiguous, as are Hans’ relations with women.  When Hans becomes infatuated with Madam Chauchat, and finds her bewitching, her hold on his mind is one of the main things that keeps him at the sanitarium.  When it eventually turns out that she reminds Hans of a boy with whom Hans was infatuated when he was in school, Han is disturbed, but remains enchanted by her.  Listening to Krokowski, however, only seems to upset him, making his views of himself and his sexuality even more confused and confusing.

Both Behrens and Krokowski promote what they claim are the findings of modern science about humans and human behavior, that humans are material creatures controlled by their physical instincts and material needs.  They both assert that humans invariably think and act irrationally.  People just mechanically respond to stimuli without any real forethought, and with rationalizing what they instinctively did as an afterthought.  These assertions are ironic, since they are based on the findings of humans rationally engaged in the rational pursuit of science.  The two doctors are, thereby, both caught in a contradiction in their own thinking that they don’t recognize.

Settembrini is a rationalist humanist.  He wants to rescue humankind from what he sees as the denigration of humanity promoted by the materialistic science advocated by Behrens and Krokowski.  He decries the idea that humans are ensnared in a cycle of physical stimuli and responses, and material causes and effects.  Whereas Behrens claims that “a stimulus is a stimulus, the body doesn’t give a damn about the meaning of a stimulus,” Settembrini wants to restore the spiritual dignity of humans by emphasizing the ability of people to exercise free will, make rational choices, and create meaning in their lives.  When Behrens claims that life is “perhaps only an infectious disease of matter,” Settembrini claims that “illness is a debasement” of life, and that mind can exercise its control over matter.  Settembrini proclaims the rule of mind over matter, not matter over mind as the science of Behrens and Krokowski would have it.[12]

But Settembrini takes this humane idea to its inhumane logical conclusion.  He ends up blaming our illnesses on ourselves, and claiming that people should be able to overcome illness through will power.  It is a moral weakness in people, he claims, to succumb to illness.  Settembrini has thereby taken a humane rationalism and turned it into a mean-spirited guilt trip.

One of the tragedies in the book is that Hans is able to comprehend the debaters’ criticisms of each other, and recognize the weaknesses in their ideas, but is generally unable to appreciate the strengths in their respective positions.  He goes through a vicious cycle of continually being convinced by the person who last speaks to him, and revolving from one position to the next, until he pretty much gives up on them all, and looks upon the debaters as merely showmen.

The second round of debate in the book, between Settembrini, Naphta, and Peeperkorn, focuses on moral and ethical issues, the nature of the self and human relations.  In this debate, Settembrini represents the Enlightenment, Naphta the European Middle Ages, and Peeperkorn the modern era.  Each of them claims to promote human dignity and social cooperation, but each has a very different idea of these things.

Settembrini is a humanist scholar who advocates progressive ideas of capitalist democracy and individual freedom.  He extolls cooperation among humans through a rational and equitable division of labor.  He promotes a cult of work.  Work is the means of individual fulfillment and social development.  Settembrini believes in human progress, and defines progress as an increasingly productive relationship among humans, and between humans and their environment.  He has as an optimistic view of human nature.   He believes that if only people would control their emotions, and avoid the lures of demagogues that appeal to the dark side of human nature, all would be well in the world.  Settembrini envisions progress as the eventual triumph of reason, and the attendant attainment of perpetual peace on earth and goodwill among humankind.[13]

Naphta is a Jesuit scholar who excoriates the Enlightenment, rejects popular democracy, and denigrates human reason, all in the name of what he calls freedom and equality.   Naphta claims to be a benevolent humanitarian, who sympathizes with the poor and ignorant majority of people in the world.  He contends that the hierarchical structure of the Catholic Church is a true democracy because it puts everyone in his and her proper place.  His idea of a good society is based on an ideal monastery, in which all are equal, albeit the heads of the monastery are more equal, and in which all are free to do what they are required to do.[14]

Naphta’s sympathy with humans is colored by a darkly pessimistic view of human nature.  People must be coerced into being good, he claims.  During the Middle Ages, they were good out of fear of God, and those who weren’t good were scourged.  With the declining influence of God in modern society, people must be coerced by government.  “What our age needs,” he proclaims, “what it demands, what it will create for itself, is terror.”  Naptha believes that a universal regimen of corporal and capital punishment is what is needed to set things right.[15]

Naphta predicts that wars among nations and within nations will inevitably bring about the dissolution of modern society and the decline of modern civilization.  The Enlightenment is doomed to implode.  Violence, starvation, and immorality will be rampant.  These disasters will, in turn, be the stimulus for a revolution in which a totalitarian monastic dictatorship will come to rule the world.  Then there will be peace on earth and goodness among humankind.

Naphta is a brilliant disputant.  He invariably reduces Settembrini to rage and almost to tears.  His redefinition of freedom as doing what one is told, equality as universal servitude, and peace as totalitarian suppression were intolerable to Settembrini.  Naphta is, however, able to push Settembrini into defending war in the name of peace, and thereby exposing a fatal contradiction in Settembrini’s position.  But Settembrini is also able to harass Naphta into bloodthirsty proclamations that contradict his humanitarian claims.  Settembrini also forces Naphta into acknowledging that Naphta’s God has made a mess of the world, and into implications that He is either cruel or incompetent.

The dispute between Settembrini and Naphta lasts for years.  It begins as an attempt by each to convert Hans to his position, seeming to see Hans as the everyman who they must be able to convince to save the world.  Although Hans is bewitched and besotted by Madam Chauchat, their disputing over Hans about abstruse philosophical issues becomes an addiction with Settembrini and Naphta.  Each seems to feel that his personal salvation and the salvation of the world depends on his winning the argument.  Hans eventually becomes inured to the sound and fury of arguments that he can barely understand and that, to him, signify very little.  “And on and on it went,” he comes to complain, “we knew the game.”[16]

On it goes until eventually they so grievously insult each other that Naptha insists on fighting a duel with pistols against Settembrini.  Although Settembrini abhors dueling as a vestige of barbarism, he agrees to the duel to avoid being considered a coward who won’t stand up for his principles.  At the duel, Settembrini fires first and shoots into the air, refusing as a matter of principle to aim at Naptha.  Naptha furiously shouts that Settembrini is a coward, and then shoots himself dead in the head.  This melodramatic conclusion of their debates seems to symbolize the sterility of their arguments.[17]

The appearance in the book of Herr Peeperkorn further highlights this futility.  Madam Chauchat has at one point left the sanatorium, much to Hans’ consternation.  When she returns – as most patients who leave the sanitarium seem eventually to do – she is living with Peeperkorn.  Hans is initially distraught, as he was hoping she might return to be with him.  He cannot understand what she sees in Peeperkorn.  Eventually, however, he comes to see what it is, and agrees with her preference for Peeperkorn over himself.  This acknowledgement by Hans of Peeperkorn’s superiority highlights how little the teachings of Settembrini and Naphta have taken root in Hans.

If Hans is an intellectual cipher, Peeperkorn is an intellectual nullity.  He is “a personality,” a charismatic character whom the narrator describes as not an “instigator of intellectual and pedagogic confusion,” but a source of “great confusion” of a moral kind.  He has personal charms that enable him to enthrall all but the most resistant intellectuals.  His magic does not work on Behrens and Settembrini, but it captivates Hans and almost all the other patients.  When Peeperkorn speaks, he first launches into “a series of linguistic gestures that riveted his listeners’ interest,” and then he delivers “one of his robustly prepared, but incomprehensible phrases.”  That is, the guy spoke gibberish, but captivated his audience.[18]

Peeperkorn makes a mockery of all the rationalizing and speechifying of Behrens, Krokowski, Naphta, and Settembrini.  His popularity seems pathetically but poignantly to point up the desire of the patients for something other than mere somnolence, but it also points to their inability to distinguish substance from mere showmanship.  Peeperkorn is able to rouse the patients to a frantic liveliness, mainly to party hearty, but it only leaves them with hangovers in the morning.  Peeperkorn’s philosophy, to the extent he is able to articulate anything, seems to be to eat, drink and be merry, and refuse to comply with the rest cure part of the sanitarium’s regimen.  The result is to make him and the other patients sicker than before.  He does not stimulate the patients to the sort of life that might compensate for the sickness and death all around them.

Peeperkorn is a colonial plantation owner who is used to having people obey him.  He seems to have a need to control others.  This leads him to host all-night feasts and gaming parties, as a means of seducing the other patients.  It also seems to lead him to commit suicide when he finds out that Hans and Madam Chauchat may have had a one-night sexual affair on Walpurgisnacht, or witches’ night, during her previous stay at the sanitarium.  And he suspects that they may still have romantic interests in each other.  Peeperkorn seemingly cannot stand the idea that he may have been preceded, and may be superseded, by someone as innocuous as Hans.  So, he kills himself out of pique and pride.[19]

Peeperkorn is an idiot, but he is not merely a comic fool in the story.  He represents the dangers of a demagogue, someone who may appear to intellectuals such as Settembrini and the readers of The Magic Mountain as a buffoon, but who appeals to the fears of desperate people and has a magical influence over them.  He is not evil, but he hints at the possibilities of evil.  Mann later explored this theme in prescient depth in the story of “Mario and the Magician,” a novella written in 1929 about an evil magician who can mesmerize the masses.  Mann’s fiction became a horrible fact of life in Adolf Hitler.  It is currently a disturbing fact of life in Donald Trump.

Intimations of Immortality on the Mountain: Keeping Hope Alive.

The Magic Mountain is not an optimistic book.  When it was published in 1924, Naphta seemed to be the better prophet.  There had arisen out of the horrors and destruction of World War I a series of authoritarian and potentially totalitarian regimes in Communist Russia, Fascist Italy, and Eastern Europe, all of them ostensibly established on behalf of the poor and downtrodden.  The threat posed by demagogues with Peeperkorn’s powers of persuasion was evident in the success of Mussolini in Italy and in the rise of Hitler in Germany, whose participation in the Beer Hall Putsch in 1924 made him a hero among German fascists.  The humanistic rationalism and humanitarianism of Settembrini was in retreat almost everywhere.  Hope seemed hopeless in 1924.  When the book ends, Hans is marching over a World War I battlefield, stepping on and over dead bodies.  The implication is that he probably won’t survive.  But maybe he will.

While a big part of the magic that draws people back to the book is the coziness of the sanitarium’s routine of eating and resting, and the stimulation of the debates among some of the sanitarium’s residents, I think another big part is the ambiguity of the book’s endings.  We are left with the thought that maybe things could have, and still might, end up differently.  Settembrini has lost the arguments, but maybe he hasn’t.  Maybe a second or third reading of the book will change the outcome.  Likewise, Hans may die a senseless death, but maybe he won’t.

In just about the middle of the story, Hans has an epiphany when he is caught in a blinding snow storm while out hiking by himself.  He is completely lost in the blizzard, and is almost ready to give himself up to death.  But even as he is physically defeated, he fights on mentally, and is caught up by words that come to him seemingly out of nowhere, that “because of charity and love, man should never allow death to rule one’s thoughts.” The italics are in the original, and this is the only italicized sentence in the book, thereby seeming to attest its importance.[20]  The power of these words uplifts Hans, even as the power of the storm subsides, and he is able to make it back to the sanitarium.  Much to the regret of the narrator and the reader, Hans immediately forgets having had this thought, and gets caught up again in the sanitarium’s death-centered regimen.

The story later ends with what is essentially an epitaph for Hans, that his adventures were “a dream of love.”  The narrator leaves us with the hope that “out of the worldwide festival of death, this ugly rutting fever that inflames the rainy evening sky all round – will love someday rise up out of this, too?”[21]  We readers of The Magic Mountain wish that Hans would have held onto his epiphany of love, and made a life of it.  Maybe next time we read the book, he will.

BW 4/20/17

[1] W.B. Gooderham.  “Winter Reads: The Magic Mountain by Thomas Mann.”  the guardian.  12/14/11.

[2] Tim O’Neil. “The Magic Mountain by Thomas Mann.” popmatters.  8/5/2005.

[3] Thomas Mann. The Magic Mountain. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995. p.

[4] Thomas Mann. The Magic Mountain. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995. p.

[5] Kara Schubenz. “The Magic Mountain.” Modernism Laboratory at Yale University.  1/13/2010.

[6]  W.B. Gooderham.  “Winter Reads: The Magic Mountain by Thomas Mann.”  the guardian.  12/14/2011.

[7] Fergis Berdewich. “Thomas Mann’s The Magic Mountain: The Vitality of Big Ideas.” The American Scholar. 11/16/2015.

[8] Aristotle. Aristotle’s Poetics. New York: Hill & Wang, 1961, pp.59, 61, 84-86.  Paul Goodman. The Structure of Literature. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954, pp.35, 82-100, 127-149, 172.

[9] Thomas Mann. The Magic Mountain. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995. p.216.

[10] Thomas Mann. The Magic Mountain. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995. p.151.

[11]  Thomas Mann. The Magic Mountain. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995. p.73.

[12] Thomas Mann. The Magic Mountain. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995. p.116.

[13]  Thomas Mann. The Magic Mountain. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995. p.

[14] Thomas Mann. The Magic Mountain. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995. p.699.

[15] Thomas Mann. The Magic Mountain. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995. p.

[16] Thomas Mann. The Magic Mountain. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995. p.701.

[17] Thomas Mann. The Magic Mountain. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995. p.841.

[18] Thomas Mann. The Magic Mountain. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995. pp.650, 652, 701.

[19] Thomas Mann. The Magic Mountain. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995. p.741.

[20] Thomas Mann. The Magic Mountain. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995. p.

[21]  Thomas Mann. The Magic Mountain. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995. p.854.

Resolving the Double-Entendres in “Hard Times”: Utopian Socialism in the Novels of Charles Dickens

Resolving the Double-Entendres in Hard Times:

Utopian Socialism in the Novels of Charles Dickens

Burton Weltman

 1.Introduction: Dickens and Socialism?

“The real objective of Socialism is human brotherhood.”  George Orwell. The Tribune, 1943.

Dickens a socialist?  Dickens a utopian?  Most readers of the novels of Charles Dickens would probably regard these questions with incredulity.  To many readers, Dickens’ novels are stories of cheerful folks regaling themselves with sumptuous repasts while reclining at a cozy fireside.  They read his books as fairy tales that do not significantly challenge readers intellectually, emotionally or ethically.  Dickens is said to have written kid stuff that also appeals to adults.  His stories involve easy criticism of unjust Victorian social institutions that are long gone, and invoke easy moral judgments against the neglect of impoverished children.  Rich philanthropists often save the day.  And the stories resolve in happy endings, usually with the marriage of some long suffering couple.  No socialism here, those readers would say.

Other readers see another side to Dickens’ works.  They read his books as dark tales that got darker as Dickens got older.  Murder, starvation, neglect, bankruptcy, cruelty and injustices of all sorts pervade his stories.  Public institutions of every sort are portrayed as corrupt, incompetent and cruel, with no hope for reformation.  Although most of his novels have superficially happy endings, in which a hero or heroine marries a long sought-after mate, disaster or death are the fate of most of Dickens’ characters along the way.  And there is usually a shadow over even the nuptials of the happy couple.  No utopianism here, those readers would say.

But there is a third side to Dickens.  Dickens was neither a Pollyanna nor a cynic and negativist.  In every one of his novels, there are examples of compassionate and cooperative communities of people who work and live together.  Idylls and blessed isles in a generally hard and hard-hearted world, they provide glimmers of hope for humanity, and for Dickens’ readers, in the midst of the bleak times and dark happenings that pervade his books.  Their configurations are various.  They can be families, friendship groups, formal organizations, informal collectives, taverns, commercial businesses, factories, neighborhoods, or towns.  They take different forms, but empathy and a “one for all, all for one” ethos is at the core of each.

These communities include Wemmick’s bower in Great Expectations, a tiny retreat for family and friends from the horrors of daily life.  George’s shooting gallery in Bleak House, a haven for the homeless and helpless.  Small family businesses such as the Bagnet’s music shop in Bleak House and Solomon Gills’ chandler shop in Dombey and Son.  Factories such as Daniel Doyce’s in Little Dorrit, George Rouncewell’s in Bleak House, and the paper mill in which Lizzie Hexam finds refuge in Our Mutual Friend.  Pickwick’s social club in The Pickwick Papers.  The Green Dragon tavern in Martin Chuzzlewit.  Mr. Crummles’ theatre group in Nicholas Nickleby.  Even Fagin’s gang of thieving boys in Oliver Twist.  And Sleary’s circus in Hard Times, an oasis of caring in an emotional desert.  In the midst of the hard realities that dominate the novels, these sites and situations can provide comfort and hope to readers.  And it is these compassionate communities that place Dickens in the company of the utopian socialists.

It is easy to overlook these communities in Dickens’ books and underestimate their influence on readers.  Almost all of them play a secondary role in the plots of the novels.  They are byways that the main characters pass through or sideshows that they encounter.  But that does not detract from their interest, their importance, or their effect on readers.  The main characters in Dickens’ books are often boring, bland, and just plain soppy.  It is his minor characters who are usually more interesting to readers, and seemingly to Dickens as well.  Similarly, these compassionate communities are secondary sites and situations in Dickens’ novels, but they often provide the most interesting scenes in his books, and the most important moral examples.

Dickens’ compassionate communities offer glimpses of collective good will that is distinct from the individual achievements of his main characters.  These communities are often idealized.  They are, nonetheless, often more realistic than the heroic deeds of the main characters, which are largely beyond the ken of ordinary people.  They exemplify collective achievement of the sort that ordinary people might envision accomplishing together.  And the compassionate communities stand in stark contrast to the dysfunctional families, the dystopian cities, and the other grim sites and situations that predominate in Dickens’ stories.

The thesis of this essay is that beneath the grimy surface of his novels, Charles Dickens was a utopian socialist of the heart.  That is, through his portrayal of compassionate communities, Dickens promoted ideas and ideals that reflected the neonate socialist movement of early to mid-nineteenth century England.  Because the movement was supposedly based on sentiment rather than science, and on vague hopes rather than precise predictions, it later came to be characterized and denigrated as “utopian” by ostensibly more realistic radicals.  But the movement provided a social and moral template to the era that influenced a broad swath of the population, especially the working class and intellectuals, including many who were not explicitly socialists.

Adherents of the so-called utopian socialist movement were dismayed by the social, economic, and environmental harm being wrought by industrial capitalism.  They complained that capitalist society was ugly, immoral, and inefficient.  Capitalism was a heartless economic system whose main product was hardhearted people.  Inspired by the ethical principle of “From each according to his/her abilities, to each according to his/her needs,” a formula that was created by the utopian socialist Louis Blanc, utopian socialists hoped to replace the dog-eat-dog competition of capitalism with cooperative communities.  They intended to do this one family, farm, factory, and town at a time.  It was a grass-roots, local-control, small-is-beautiful movement.

Prominent among the leadership of the utopian socialists were the Englishman Robert Owen, and the Frenchmen Charles Fourier and le Comte de Saint-Simon.  The word “socialism” was invented by followers of Saint-Simon during the 1820’s.  The ideas of these three men were widely discussed, and were the inspiration behind many cooperative ventures.  Each of them had detailed plans for how they thought a community should operate, and some of the specific proposals of Fourier and Saint-Simon were bizarre.  But the humanistic sentiment behind their proposals, and the general outline of their proposed communities — which can be characterized as cooperative hierarchies and hierarchical cooperatives — were a big part of the intellectual background of the era that Dickens absorbed and that his works reflect.

While Dickens did not identify himself as a socialist, and did not subscribe to the specific proposals of any of the prominent utopians, his writings bespeak an underlying utopian socialist sentiment and sentimentality that I believe was one of the reasons for his popularity during the nineteenth century, and is one of the reasons for his enduring popularity today.  His portraits of compassionate communities resonate with readers.  The novel Hard Times will be a focus of this essay.  It revolves around the stultifying effect that rote education has on students, and the devastating effect that industrial capitalism had on workers and the environment.  It is not one of Dickens’ most popular books, but it most clearly exemplifies his socialist sympathies.

2. Dickens and Capitalism: Critic or Apologist?

A Christmas Carol cannot be [considered] a story that promotes socialism because it is a story that depends upon capitalism.”  Jacqueline Issacs, Blog, 2012

The question of whether Charles Dickens should be considered a socialist has been a bone of contention from his time to the present.  When the novel Hard Times was published in 1854, times were hard in England, and the book is a scathing indictment of industrial capitalism as it was developing.  But is it socialism?

Some socialists have claimed Dickens as one of their own, others have eschewed him as an apologist for capitalism.  Karl Marx, for example, claimed that in Hard Times Dickens had “issued to the world more political and social truths than have been uttered by all the professional politicians, publicists and moralists put together.”  Other socialists, such as George Bernard Shaw, cited Dickens’ negative portrait of the labor leader Slackbridge in Hard Times as evidence that he was not a socialist.  Still other socialists claimed that Dickens was not only not a socialist, he was not even a social reformer, and was merely an apologist for the status quo.[1]

More sympathetic critics have countered that Dickens was portraying Slackbridge as merely the counterpart of the capitalist Bounderby, that is, as someone exploiting workers.  They have noted that Dickens publicly supported labor unions and frequently encouraged workers to organize themselves.[2]  In reporting on a labor strike that occurred during the time he was writing Hard Times, Dickens extolled one of the strike leaders for his emphasis on peacefully settling the dispute, and for raising the possibility of workers’ cooperatives.[3]  And in discussing Hard Times at a meeting of the Mechanics Institute in the industrial town of Birmingham, he exhorted the workers there to organize so as to “work for their own good and for the welfare of society.”[4]

Anti-socialists have, in turn, excoriated what they saw as Dickens’ socialist sympathies.  Thomas Macaulay, the preeminent English historian and literary critic of Dickens’ time, and an influential mainstream politician, condemned Hard Times as “sullen socialism.”  He claimed that Dickens was an ignoramus and did not know what he was writing about.  Other more sympathetic anti-socialists have argued that Dickens was not condoning socialism or condemning capitalism in the book, merely criticizing some of the excesses of industrialism in his era.[5]

The question of whether Dickens was a socialist becomes even more complicated when one peruses his other books.  Those who claim Dickens was not a socialist point to the large number of wealthy characters in his novels whose philanthropy and benevolence save the day.  These include Mr. Brownlow in Oliver Twist, John Jarndyce in Bleak House, Mr. Boffin in Our Mutual Friend, and the reformed Scrooge in A Christmas Carol.  Without their capitalist wealth, these characters would not have been able to do good.  These commentators point also to Dickens’ fears of the rioting masses in Barnaby Rudge and A Tale of Two Cities, and the absence in his books of any call for central and centralized government intervention in the economy.

Those who claim Dickens was a socialist point to the large number of capitalists whom he portrays as heartless villains and greedy egotists.  These include the Ralph Nickleby in Nicholas Nickleby, Paul Dombey, Sr. in Dombey and Son, Anthony and Jonas Chuzzlewit in Martin Chuzzlewit, and Josiah Bounderby in Hard Times.  They also point to the sympathy Dickens extends to the poor in his books, and the scathing criticism he directs at governmental institutions that uphold the capitalist status quo. These institutions include the Courts of Chancery in Bleak House, the patent system in Little Dorrit, the criminal justice system in Great Expectations, the welfare/workhouse system in Our Mutual Friend, and the orphanages in Oliver Twist.  Each of them is cruel and incompetent.

So, which is it?  Was or was not Dickens a socialist?  His books seem to provide evidence on both sides of the question.  Are his social views coherent or a hodge-podge?  Can one resolve what seem to be contradictions, ambivalences, and double-entendres in his social ideas?

3.Dickens and Definitions of Socialism: Utopian and Scientific.

“For many a decade past, the history of industry and commerce is but the history of the revolt of modern productive forces against the property relations [of capitalism]…The conditions of bourgeois society are too narrow to comprise the wealth created by them.”  Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto.

The debate about Dickens’ political views has often been unnecessarily muddled because debaters were using different definitions of socialism.  The word socialism can mean many different things, and many a heated political argument has floundered on the fact that the combatants were assuming different definitions of the term.  In particular, the definitions of socialism that most people use today are quite different than the definition assumed by most people in Dickens’ time.  If one uses definitions of socialism that have been generally accepted since the late nineteenth century, Dickens was no socialist.  But if one uses the definition that was most prominent in his time, he seemingly was.  Using that definition also has the effect of clearing up what seem to be conflicts between his socialist sentiments and his portrayals of benevolent rich people and rioting masses.

Definitions of socialism since the late nineteenth century have usually focused on the role of the central government in a country’s economy.  This was not the case during the early nineteenth century when socialism usually meant decentralization.  The emphasis of more recent socialists on the central government and on centralized control of the economy seemed to follow logically from the huge concentrations of land, industry and wealth that developed during the mid to late nineteenth century, and that continue to the present.  In this context, socialism has generally been described as an economic system that is founded on the presumptions that businesses will be publicly owned, and that the central government will control the economy.  These are presumptions that for many socialists can be overcome if it can be shown that private ownership and/or free markets in particular businesses would be more efficient and fairer to the public.

Discussions of socialism since the late nineteenth century have usually been based on scientific analyses of hard facts and material factors, unlike the supposedly soft and sentimental, ethical and aesthetic approaches of the early nineteenth century utopians.  Following the lead of self-styled scientific socialists, such as Karl Marx, most socialists came to consider socialism to be a historically logical stage of social development.  They also claim it is development that must be embraced if liberty and democracy are to thrive, and even survive.  Most anti-socialists have rejected socialism on the supposedly scientific grounds that centralized control of a large-scale economy would not work, and that socialism would undermine economic progress.  They also contend that a socialist economy would present a fatal danger to democracy and freedom.

Discussions of socialism have been further complicated by the fact that socialists since the late nineteenth century have often differed as to how much control the central government should exercise, and how a socialist society can and should be achieved.  Socialists take a range of positions on the role of the public and private sectors in the economy.  Some insist on the goal of a highly centralized command economy.  They say that only if the government runs the economy according to a central plan can the system be considered socialist, and can it work.  Other socialists promote a less centralized and more market-based socialism.  Most of these would allow small private businesses, which could even constitute a majority of the economy, so long as they do not exploit their workers or do public harm.  Many would also allow some economic activities to be coordinated through a marketplace, so long as it operates in the public interest.

As to establishing socialism, some insist that it can be achieved only through revolution, and an immediate and complete takeover of the government and the economy.  They consider any attempt at social reform or a gradual move toward socialism to be a betrayal of the movement and a sell-out to capitalism.  Others claim, however, that socialism can best be achieved through social reforms, and a gradual socialization of the economy through political compromises and incremental changes.  These two groups have often fought each other as much as they have fought their pro-capitalist opponents.[6]

Using present-day definitions of socialism, Dickens was not a socialist.  He did not call for government control over the economy, whether centralized or decentralized, and whether by revolution or reform.   But neither does Dickens seem to have been a devotee of capitalism.  The point is that to most self-styled socialists in early to mid-nineteenth century England, socialism did not mean establishing government control over the economy.  And it did not primarily involve either political revolution or political reform.  It meant establishing cooperative farms, factories, communes and communities that operated on the principle of “From each according to his/her abilities; to each according to his/her needs.”  These radicals hoped to evolve a socialist society one cooperative communal group at a time.  And it is in this context that Dickens should be considered a socialist.

4.Utopian Socialism: Resolving the Double-Entendre of Radical Social Change.

“They [the utopian socialists] reject all political, and especially all revolutionary, action; they wish to attain their ends by peaceful means, and endeavor, by small experiments, necessarily doomed to failure, and by the force of example, to pave the way for the new social gospel.” Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto.

Utopian socialists did not promote either revolution or reform.  They believed that both were fraught with internal contradictions, and doomed to failure.  Utopians were also upset with the way conflicts between revolutionaries and reformers had seemingly divided and foiled movements for significant social change.  They hoped to overcome these contradictions and conflicts with their third way of achieving radical social change.

Utopians rejected revolution because revolutions seemed invariably to succumb to the logic of the ends justifying the means, and thereby enmeshed revolutionaries in evil actions that undermined their virtuous goals.  Revolutions also seemed to fail by either overdoing or under-doing social change.  Sometimes they completely demolished the old order, leaving intact none of the institutions that were needed as a foundation upon which to build a stable new regime.  The result was chaos and then dictatorship.  The French Revolution of 1789 was an example.

Other times revolutionaries left intact too much of the old order, and were undermined by institutional inertia and by people in power from the old regime who were committed to the old ways.  The result was generally regression back to the old order.  The French Revolution of 1830 was ostensibly an example of this.  The utopians believed that their cooperative communities could avoid these vicious cycles of revolutionary success and failure.

Utopians also rejected, for the most part, piecemeal reform movements because they seemed invariably to lead to the means overriding the ends, with reformers compromising their ideals, and making deals that sacrificed long-term goals for short-term gains.  British politics in the nineteenth century were notoriously stodgy and corrupt, so that social reform would invariably enmesh reformers in deals with the devil that would undermine their credibility as reformers.  Social reform would also involve reformers in so many small changes and small deals that their movement could be sidetracked, and they would lose sight of their radical goals.

Finally, the process of social reform would likely result in satisfying the needs of only some members of the movement for social change, or would pit the short-term gains of some against the short-term gains of others.  As a result, many of them might abandon the “all for one and one for all” ethic and the long-term goals of the movement.  The movement could, thereby, become divided against itself, and wither away.  The backroom deals that led to the electoral Reform Bill of 1832 and the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1844 exemplified these problems with reform.[7]

Utopian socialists hoped to avoid the contradictions and pitfalls of both reform and revolution through their community-building methods.  They were intent on establishing cooperative communities that would initiate a virtuous cycle and spiral toward a socialist society.   Theirs would be a bottom-up, grass roots movement, organizing people to build local institutions of civil society that could exemplify and sustain radical social change.

Utopians also hoped, thereby, to end the debate among social reformers since the Ancient Greeks about what came first, the Good Man or the Good Society.  Does one first have to make people good in order to have them make a good society?  Or does one first have to make society good which will then make people good?   Do people make society or does society make people?  Since the best answer to these questions is “Both,” it was a fruitless debate.  The utopians claimed their way would cut the Gordian knot that had for eons hogtied social reformers.

Cooperative communities would, on the one hand, provide their participants with a socialist experience and the immediacy of a socialist revolution, without the violence and turmoil of an actual revolution that can ruin the whole undertaking.  Cooperative communities would also, on the other hand, provide the world with working examples of socialism, and models for others to emulate.  The communities would provide a bit of the good society and good life here and now for their participants, and would also function as an advertisement for socialism to the world.  This would be a double-entendre that enlightened rather than baffled its auditors.

Cooperative communities would drive what could be called a Lamarckian form of social evolution, a form of survival of the fittest among social institutions.  Owen, Fourier, and Saint-Simon, each in his own way, proposed establishing experimental communities that they predicted would become successful mutations within the existing capitalist society, and would gradually take over the whole society.  Their communities could be incorporated just like any business corporation, but they would function as cooperative enterprises on behalf of their participants.  Utopian communities would, thereby, constitute a peaceful movement of gradual social change, an evolution to socialism one community at a time.

Although in branding the proposals of Owen, Fourier, and Saint-Simon as utopian, Marx and others of his time meant to disparage those proposals as impossible and even foolish, the ideas of the utopians did not seem utopian in early nineteenth century England or America.  And the fact that they did not succeed does not mean they were foolish.  In the era during which Dickens came of age and in which he set most of novels, businesses in England and America operated on a smaller scale than they did later in the century, a fact that made the utopians’ proposals feasible.

In the smaller businesses that predominated during this time, collaboration between owner and workers was usually possible, with the owner often personally involved in doing the day-to-day work alongside his employees.  This is the sort of thing Dickens portrayed in his descriptions of the factories of Daniel Doyce in Little Dorrit and George Rouncewell in Bleak House, and in the paper mill in which Lizzie Hexam finds refuge in Our Mutual Friend.  Given the collaborative nature of small businesses, small-scale and collaborative solutions to economic problems seemed practical to people then.  In turn, it seemed feasible to many that small-scale cooperative communities might establish socialist beachheads in the capitalist world.

The pattern of European immigration to America, a major phenomena during this period, also fitted with the utopians’ communitarian notions.  Most European immigrants to America during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did not come as individuals.  Most came as part of a group of people who had lived in the same locality in their old country, and then settled together in their new country.  They came as a community with the intention of remaining a community.  This was also the way in which most European-Americans moved westward across the continent.  They moved in communities, in part because it took a lot of cooperation to establish a society in newly settled lands, but also because they were communal people.  In sum, the communal pattern of immigration to the United States and migration within the country contributed to the plausibility of developing cooperative socialist communities here.[8]

Dickens recognized in his novels the possibilities for developing compassionate communities, but he was not a starry-eyed fool about these possibilities.  He clearly realized that utopian dreams can often provide the opportunity for conmen to take advantage of naive people, or for muddle-headed do-gooders to stumble into disaster.  In Martin Chuzzlewit, for example, he bitterly describes an emigrant settlement in the United States which is based on his visit to the country in 1842.  The fictional community, which is called Eden, has been promoted by its developers as heaven on earth but it is, in reality, a hellish swamp and a deadly swindle.  In Bleak House, Dickens ridicules the impossible plans of do-gooders such as Mrs. Jellyby, who proposes to develop an idyllic commune of emigrants in Africa.  She neglects her own family in favor of this foolish, and essentially egoistic, piece of pseudo-philanthropy.

Dickens was also aware that cooperative communities can be used for ill purposes, as with Fagin’s gang of young thieves in Oliver Twist.  And he was aware of the tenuousness of compassionate communities, which is exemplified by the collection of people who lived with Mr.Peggotty in his beached houseboat in David Copperfield, before the commune was shattered by evil intruding from the outside world.

Dickens was aware of the potential pitfalls and pratfalls of utopian promises, but he seemed to be impressed even more with what he portrayed as the inveterate impulse of people to create compassionate communities.  Even Todgers boarding house for clerks and salesmen in Martin Chuzzlewit, which Dickens describes in the most ridiculous and pathetic terms, exemplifies this theme.  Dickens makes great fun of the pretensions of the inhabitants, each of whom styles himself as a connoisseur of something.  There is the sporting gentleman, the literary gentleman, the fashionable gentleman, and so forth.  None of them has any real claim to expertise in anything, and they are continually teasing each other and competing for status.  But they also implicitly conspire to uphold each other’s pretensions, and each has a place in the house’s pecking order, which is a touching and telling testament to their comradeship.       

Dickens’ books are full of small-scale compassionate communities in which people take care of each other in the face of adversity and in the midst of hostile environs.  From the Pickwick Club to Fagin’s gang of boys, from the workers in Doyce’s factory to the performers in Sleary’s circus, these groups operate with the “One for all, and all for one” mentality of the utopian socialists.  The hope that compassionate and cooperative communities can survive, thrive and replicate themselves seems quietly to underlie Dickens’ works.

5.Owen, Fourier, and Saint-Simon: Capitalism, Utopian Socialism, and Elitism.

“Train any population rationally, and they will be rational. Furnish honest and useful employments to those so trained, and such employments they will greatly prefer to dishonest or injurious occupations.”  Robert Owen.  A New View of Society.

Robert Owen was a late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century British factory owner who was almost ubiquitous among British social activists during most of Dickens’ life.  He is considered the father in England of the cooperative movement, the socialist movement, the labor union movement, and the public education movement, all of which blossomed in the later nineteenth century.  Dickens’ critique of capitalist commercial and industrial practices, and the treatment of workers, women, and children in his society, was essentially similar to that of Owen.  His ideas of social change, especially regarding cooperation and education, also reflected Owens’.

Owen was an international celebrity, and highly regarded within both the working classes and the ruling classes.  He spoke several times to the English Parliament, and frequently met with high government officials, promoting his labor and cooperative schemes.  He spoke twice to Congress about the benefits of a cooperative economy during a visit to the United States during 1824-1825.  In the course of that visit, he established a cooperative socialist community at New Harmony, Indiana.  He was also well-received during this visit by then President John Quincy Adams and by past Presidents Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and James Monroe.

Owen was disgusted by what he saw as the evils, ugliness, and inefficiency of industrial capitalism as it was developing in England.  Workers were underpaid.  Children and women were overworked, and children were without educational opportunities.  Workers’ families lived in overcrowded and unsanitary conditions.  Industrial accidents were commonplace.  Demoralization was rampant.  Owen decided that this was not good for the factory owners and society as a whole, let alone the workers.  He was the un-Bounderby.

Owen concluded that paying his workers well and treating them as colleagues benefited both business and society.   He also claimed that laws to require higher wages and shorter working hours for workers, especially children and women, would be good for capital as well as labor.  And he argued that the establishment of free schools for children would develop better educated workers who could work more productively, and participate more responsibly in society.  He supported labor unions for workers but, significantly, opposed strikes of workers against their employers.  Finally, he organized and financed cooperative industrial and agricultural communities in England and America that he claimed could operate more efficiently and more fairly than capitalist enterprises.

Owen’s own factory at New Lanark in Scotland, where he put into effect many of his cooperative principles, was a magnet for social reformers.  Middle and upper class visitors were almost invariably enthralled by the humane way in which the workers and their families were treated, and impressed with the efficiency and profitability of the operation.  It was the antithesis of Coketown in Hard Times.  Owen’s books on moral improvement and human cooperation were best sellers and widely cited.  In addition to labor unions and cooperative communities, he founded several early childhood schools that were widely acclaimed as models of humane and effective education, the antithesis of Gradgrind’s school in Hard Times .

Owen promoted class cooperation rather than class conflict, and opposed labor strikes as a means of economic coercion against employers.  His proposals and projects were invariably coupled with paternalism and elitism.  He hoped for a more educated working class, but considered the workers of his day incapable of ruling society.  This was a common position among British liberals and radicals during the nineteenth century, among them the noted radical and eventual socialist John Stuart Mill, and Charles Dickens.[9]  That is, Owen combined socialism with elitism, interpreting the mantra of “From each according to his/her abilities” as a principle that required those with expertise and executive abilities to lead an enterprise or community, while those with abilities to do other tasks would work under the direction of their leaders.

The communitarian proposals of Fourier and Saint-Simon were also based on the principle of “From each according to his/her ability, to each according to his/her needs,” and they were also hierarchical.  Different abilities meant different positions in the power structure.  They likewise interpreted the Golden Rule — “Do unto others as you would have others do unto you if you were in their position.”– with an assumption that the working classes would naturally defer to the leadership of the educated and expert classes.  Hierarchy was consistent with the Golden Rule so long as workers were given due respect and their needs were duly met.

Fourierists and Saint-Simonians, as well as Owenites, were prominent in early to mid-nineteenth century England, France and America.  In the midst of the French Revolution of 1848, Louis Blanc, who was influenced by Owen and Saint-Simon, led a movement that got the French Assembly to establish a system of workers’ cooperatives that he hoped would be the beginnings of socialism in France.  Although the coops initially worked well, they were not sufficiently funded by the Assembly and eventually collapsed.

In the United States, Horace Greeley, the editor and publisher of the New-York Daily Tribune, which was the leading and largest American newspaper during the middle of the nineteenth century, was a follower of Fourier.  For many years, Greeley published a front-page column in his newspaper devoted to promoting Fourierism, and he helped establish several Fourierist communities.  Saint-Simon also inspired several communities in Europe and America.  Owenite, Fourierist and Saint-Simonian communities, and many others based on the ideas of other utopians, had mixed success.  Most lasted only a few years, but some lasted many decades.  The utopian socialist community at Amana, Iowa was so successful economically that it morphed into an appliance corporation that is still operating today.

Most important for Dickens’ social views, his mentor Thomas Carlyle, who provided most of the factual basis for A Tale of Two Cities and much of the critique of capitalism and utilitarian education for Hard Times, was a devotee of Saint-Simon.

6. Dickens and Carlyle: A Tale of Two Sentimentalities.

“No great man lives in vain.  The history of the world is but the biography of great men.”  Thomas Carlyle.

Thomas Carlyle was an influential intellectual in mid-nineteenth century England.  A philosopher, essayist, and scholar with a first class university education, he was intellectually everything Dickens was not, and Dickens adulated Carlyle for his academic knowledge and analytical skills.  Although Dickens was considered a literary giant at the time, and Carlyle was merely one among many noteworthy intellectuals, Dickens publicly and repeatedly paid homage to Carlyle.  Carlyle was noted for his scathing criticism of utilitarian philosophy and industrial capitalism.  He promoted, instead, German idealist philosophy and a stringent morality.  His mantra that “Egoism is the source and summary of all faults and miseries” is a sentiment that rang true for Dickens, and is a theme that runs through all of Dickens’ work.

Carlyle also promoted the ideas of the French utopian Saint-Simon, and especially Saint-Simon’s criticism of idle aristocrats and plutocrats.  They were freeloaders who got rich off the sweat of peasants’ and workers’ brows, and from the expertise of inventors and entrepreneurs, but who did nothing in return.  This is a view that can be called “a producers’ ethic.”  Like Saint-Simon, Carlyle believed that the interests of entrepreneurs and workers were the same.  They were the producers in society.  Their common enemies were the parasitic aristocrats who extracted unearned rents from peasants who worked their land, and the moneyed capitalists who extracted unearned profits from workers who operated their factories.  Carlyle included hypocritically wealthy clergy and demagogic labor leaders in his list of parasites.  This producers’ ethic that Carlyle derived from Saint-Simon is reflected in Dickens’ works.

But Dickens and Carlyle differed over their views of ordinary people, and these differences magnified over time.  Carlyle became increasingly anti-democratic over the course of his life, and increasingly idealized great men in society and history.  Abhorring the crassness, commercialism and confusion of English society, and fearing the masses as an inherently ignorant and destructive mob, Carlyle called for “captains of industry” to take control of society and bring order to the world.  Dickens did not follow Carlyle in taking refuge in great men, or in disdaining ordinary people.  While Dickens publicly acknowledged adopting from Carlyle the criticisms of utilitarianism and industrialism that are contained in Hard Times, and he dedicated the book to his mentor, Carlyle was not enthusiastic about the endorsement.  There are characters in the book, including the capitalist Bounderby and the circus operator Sleary, that clash with Carlyle’s worship of great men and scorn for ordinary people.

Dickens always considered himself a political radical.  The term radical did not have the same programmatic implications then that it has now — times and social problems change and what is considered a radical program changes with them — but it had the same social and emotional implications.  Even as he was gaining a vaunted place within the Establishment through the popularity of his writings, Dickens maintained an intellectual position outside the Establishment and a political position against much of it.

Although Dickens used Carlyle’s scholarly reputation to support his own ideas, the scorn between the two men became mutual.[10]  Carlyle thought that Dickens was too soft.  Dickens thought that Carlyle idol-worshipped the powerful.  It could be said that Dickens related to Carlyle in the same way he used the happy marriages at the end of his novels.  Dickens believed in happy endings and in the value of Carlyle’s scholarship, but his thoughts and feelings went beyond them both.

7. Double-Entendres in the Political Ideas and Ideals of Charles Dickens.

“Fact, fact, fact, everywhere in the material aspect of the town; fact, fact, fact, everywhere in the immaterial.  Charles Dickens.  Hard Times.

Dickens is famous for having written long novels full of short-hand verbal caricatures of his characters.  Many of these caricatures carry moral and political messages.  His description of Coketown in Hard Times as consisting only of dead and deadening facts is an example.  The political cartoon strip Doonesbury, by Gary Trudeau, has, similarly, been peopled by short-hand visual parodies of the strip’s characters.  President George W. Bush was, for example, represented by a Roman military helmet that covered an asterisk.  The asterisk referred to the questionable way in which he ascended to the Presidency in 2000, and the helmet referred to his pretensions of military glory in the invasion of Iraq.  President Bill Clinton was represented by a waffle, referring to his waffling on issues.  Doonesbury’s pictures spoke for themselves and in place of a thousand words.

Dickens did similar things with his characters, albeit using word pictures.  His method met with a mixed response.  Henry James, a hostile critic, faulted Dickens for creating what James thought were shallow characters who could be summarized in a simple caricature.  In contrast, G.K. Chesterton, an admirer, marveled at the moral and intellectual acuity of Dickens’ capsule characterizations.  E.M. Forster, another admirer, said that “Nearly every one [of Dickens’ characters] can be summed up in a sentence, and yet there is this wonderful feeling of human depth.”  Since most of Dickens’ novels go on at great length with a multitude of characters, he may have needed a shorthand way of referring to some of them.  He did this in several ways.

Sometimes Dickens pinpointed a person’s character through an image that stuck with the character throughout a book.   The moralizing hypocrite Pecksniff, a leading character in Martin Chuzzlewit, is described as like “a direction-post, which is always telling the way to a place, and never goes there.”  Pecksniff becomes, thereafter,  a synonym for double-dealing in the book.  The gluttonous hypocritical Reverend Chadband, a minor character in Bleak House, is described as “a large yellow man, with a fat smile, and a general appearance of having a good deal of train oil in his system.”  He sweats oil when he eats, and is thereafter denoted by his oleaginous appearance and oily speeches.

Other times Dickens denoted a character through some physical feature.  Carker, a villain in Dombey and Son, is described as having “two unbroken rows of glistening teeth, whose regularity and whiteness were quite distressing.  It was impossible to escape the observation of them, for he showed them whenever he spoke; and bore so wide a smile upon his countenance (a smile, however, very rarely, indeed, extending beyond his mouth), that there was something in it like the snarl of a cat.”  Thereafter, Dickens often referred to Carker through describing merely his teeth, and Carker’s teeth became almost a character in the book.

Rigaud, a villain in Little Dorrit, is similarly characterized by the fact that when he smiled “his mustache went up under his nose, and his nose came down over his mustache, in a very sinister and cruel manner.”  Thereafter, Dickens often describes merely the movements of a mustache upward and a nose downward in order to indicate to the reader that Rigaud is in the scene.  Pancks, a sympathetic character in Little Dorrit, is described as short and stout, and as making puffing and snorting sounds like a steam engine when he walked and talked.  Dickens frequently indicated Pancks’ presence in a scene through merely describing puffing and snorting sounds.

Finally, Dickens often pegged a character with a characteristic saying that thereafter stood in for the person.  Scrooge in A Christmas Carol is well-known for his exclamation “Bah, humbug.”  Micawber, an inveterate spendthrift and bankrupt in David Copperfield, is known for his epigram “Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditures nineteen pounds nineteen and six, result happiness.  Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditures twenty pounds naught and six, result misery.”  Uriah Heep, an underhanded villain in the same book, is known by his hypocritical mantra that “I’m ‘umble.”

In contrast to Heep, Mark Tapley, a genuinely self-deprecating hero in Martin Chuzzlewit, is characterized by the refrain “There ain’t much credit in that,” when he succeeds at something in less than trying circumstances.  He is always looking to “come out very jolly” when suffering under the most egregious circumstances.   Pleasant Riderhood, a minor character in Our Mutual Friend, is pegged with the saying “I do not wish to regard myself, nor yet to be regarded in that bony light,” when she repeatedly rejects offers of marriage from Mr. Venus, a taxidermist.

In Hard Times, Dickens provided most of the main characters, the ones whom he portrayed in a negative light, with characteristic sayings that are double-entendres, and that point up the hypocrisy and/or the contradictions of the character’s actions.  These hypocrisies and contradictions move the plot along to its unhappy conclusion, but it is a conclusion that contains the seeds of better things that might come.

8. Double-dealing with Double-Entendres in Hard Times.

Mr. McChoakumchild: “Now, this school room is a Nation.  And in this nation, there are fifty millions of money.  Isn’t this a prosperous nation?”

Sissy Jupe: “I couldn’t know whether it was a prosperous nation or not, and whether it was in a thriving state or not, unless I knew who had got the money.”  Charles Dickens.  Hard Times.

Unlike Dickens’ other novels, Hard Times is a short book with a condensed plot that is bluntly carried forward by a duel of double-entendres.  The title itself is a double-entendre.  The adjective “Hard” in the title implies that the times are difficult.  It also implies that the times are materialistic, something you could bang your head against and get nothing but a headache.  At the same time, “Times” is a word for multiplication, and implies that what is difficult about the present era will multiply if things are left to go on as they are.  This is on its face a bleak message.  But there is another meaning to the words in the title.  The word “Times” also implies that what is difficult about the present era could pass, that it is only these times that are hard, and that better times may come.  The book’s title thereby encapsulates the meaning and moral of the story.  Things are bad, they might get worse, but they could get better.   And we will see how.

“Now what I want is Facts” are the well-known opening words of Hard Times.  They are spoken by Thomas Gradgrind, a retired businessman turned philanthropic schoolmaster.  Gradgrind is the central character in the novel, and the only major character who changes his ways and views in the course of the book.  He seemingly represents the audience of upper and middle class people whom Dickens hoped to address with his book, and whom he hoped would be changed in their views and ways.  In the course of the book, Gradgrind is tripped up by the double meaning of his mantra that “In this life, we want nothing but Facts,” but ends up falling morally forward.

The ostensible meaning of Gradgrind’s mantra is that the world is best understood, and actions are best undertaken, through science and through the factual evidence with which scientific truths are established.  He eschews fanciful stories and sentimental dreams of any sort as unprovable and unworkable.   He believes that hard facts are the basis of peace, prosperity and progress.  This is, on its face, a seemingly hopeful and humane message.  He is, after all, a philanthropist and he is contributing his time and money in an effort to improve the world.

But there is a less sanguine underside to Gradgrind’s mantra.  The underlying meaning is a materialistic ethic in which only things like money and material success are important.  This is a hardhearted ethic, and Gradgrind learns through hard times of his own the lesson that he needs more than just facts in his life.  By the end of the book, “Faith, hope and charity” have become his new mantra, and he is no longer idolizing Bounderby the wealthy capitalist or idealizing competitive capitalism.  He comes, instead, to appreciate the sentimentality and creativity of the compassionate community that is the circus.  This is Dickens’ message in the book.

Hard Times is generally considered a simple, and by some a simplistic, book.[11]  The names that Dickens gave his main characters bluntly broadcast his meanings.  Gradgrind is a person who sees life as a grind, and who grinds others down.  Bounderby is a bounder and a fraud.  Mr. M’Choakumchild is a teacher who stifles children with rote drills.  Stephen Blackpool is an ignorant worker for whom life is a dark mystery.  But the book is, in fact, more complex than appears at first sight.  Gradgrind is not the only one who is caught in the toils of a double-entendre, and the book is full of double meanings that come unraveled as the story unwinds.

Hard Times is peopled with characters who represent a range of the social types one would find in a mid-nineteenth century English industrial town.  Most of the major characters have a characteristic saying that is attributed to them, and which contains a double meaning.  Some of the sayings illustrate the hypocrisy of a character.  Others represent the ambivalence, internal contradictions, or confusions of a character.  The sayings reflect different attitudes toward self and society, but all focus the characters in on themselves, rendering them self-centered and isolated.  They are all caught in the vicious cycles of their double-entendres, unable to free themselves from prisons that are their selves, and unable to form common bonds of caring with others.  The book is an exploration of the moral and behavioral consequences of their sayings.

“I don’t forget that I am J.B. of Coketown” is the repeated refrain of Josiah Bounderby.  He is the resident Coketown capitalist, and the owner of the factory, the bank, and almost everything else in town.  Bounderby claims to be a self-made man who has worked his way up after having been abandoned as a child in the gutter.  He continually cites his supposedly lowly origins in what he claims is a show of humility.  Bounderby seems to exemplify the individual self-reliance coupled with humility that Mr. Gradgrind is trying to teach the students in his school.  Self-reliance coupled with humility were seen as highly positive virtues in nineteenth century England.

But Bounderby’s is a false humility because the underlying meaning of his refrain that “I don’t forget that I am J.B. of Coketown” is a boast that he is Coketown and that Coketown is his, as when the French King Louis XIV said “L’Etat est moi.”  Bounderby is also a fraud in that he has, in fact, been raised in a middle-class family, attended a first class school, and got a boost in life from a loving mother.  His greed and pride, on the one hand, but also his insecurity and desire to be accepted as a peer of the realm, on the other hand, are prime movers of the book’s plot.  In the end, Bounderby is exposed as a fraud and his social-climbing schemes are quashed.

“What does it matter?” is the mantra of Louisa Gradgrind, Mr. Gradgrind’s daughter and the prize graduate of his school.  On its face, her saying is an extension of her father’s focus on facts.  She is saying that matter is the measure of all things.  Tell her the material makeup of a thing, and she will tell you its value.  This is a principle that her father would praise and promote.  But the underside of this saying is nihilism, and a total indifference to anyone and anything.  In a materialistic world, she is saying, there is no value.  Nothing and no one matters.  Consistent with both meanings of her mantra, and much to Gradgrind’s satisfaction, Louisa marries Bounderby because he is wealthy, even though she despises him.  Later, she leaves Bounderby, and seemingly has an affair with a hard-up aristocrat who has been hired by Bounderby to help him get into high society and Parliament.  That her behavior is scandalous does not matter to her.

“What will be, will be” is the refrain of James Harthouse, the hard-up aristocrat.  The refrain reflects the cynicism of a person who has given up trying, probably before he even started.  Harthouse has sold himself to Bounderby, whom he considers beneath him, and he feels demeaned.  Fatalism is his excuse for his denigration.  I am what I am and I do what I do because of circumstances beyond my control, he seems to be saying.  And the saying is his excuse for irresponsible and reprehensible actions.  But there is also another side to this saying.  It implies that what you will, will be. That is, we are creatures with an ability to will, and we cannot, therefore, dodge responsibility for what it is that we will.  Harthouse has some heart, and seems by the end of the book to understand he has responsibility for what he does, but his response is merely to clear out.

“Everything is a muddle” is the constant complaint of Stephen Blackpool, a warm-hearted but heartily ignorant worker in Bounderby’s factory.  Blackpool is unable to choose with whom to make common cause.  He is torn between his awful wife and his wonderful girlfriend.  He is shunned by his fellow workers because he will not support their strike against Bounderby, but then fired by Bounderby because he will not denounce his fellow workers.  Unable to choose between his wife and his girl friend, hounded by both sides in the strike, and accused of a robbery he did not commit, Blackpool flees from Coketown, only to fall into an abandoned mine shaft (a black pool).  He is rescued from the pit, but dies from his injuries.

Most important, however, to the underlying message of the book, Blackpool’s rescue is successfully undertaken by a group of Coketowners and others who organize themselves into an efficient rescue operation.  The organizing is done spontaneously, but with due deference paid to those with relevant expertise and to those with relevant status in the community.  This seems to  exemplify the sort of community that the utopian socialists were promoting.  It combines compassion, cooperation and hierarchy in ways that resolve what seem to be contradictions and ambivalences in Dickens attitude toward ordinary folks and well-to-do people.

Dickens abhors rich people and aristocrats who exploit others and oppress the poor.  He also fears unruly mobs of poor people who may have good cause for their grievances, but whose ill-conceived and rash actions can cause more harm than good.  But Dickens subscribes to the utopian socialist ideal of a cooperative hierarchy and a hierarchical cooperative, with cooperation among the higher and lower social classes.[12]

He admires successful people like the Cheeryble brothers in Nicholas Nickleby and John Jaryndice in Bleak House because they treat their employees as colleagues, not as servants, and they use their wealth to help others make their own way.  But he esteems even more ordinary people who can organize themselves to do good, such as the rescue party in Hard Times, Mr. Pancks and his cohorts who rescue William Dorrit from debtors prison in Little Dorrit, and the patrons of the Six Jolly Fellowship Porters tavern who rescue and revive Rogue Riderhood in Our Mutual Friend.  In Little Dorrit, Dickens compares England to a sinking ship whose Captain goes ashore to pursue his own self-interest and leaves the crew to save the ship, which they do.

Two key characters in Hard Times articulate the compassionate philosophy of the utopians, and speak without getting caught up in double-entendres. And unlike the other main characters, they are neither isolated nor self-centered.  The first is Sissy Jupe, whose English is often garbled but whose moral sense is impeccable.  She is the moral center of the book, and often functions in the novel like the boy in the Hans Christian Andersen story who proclaims that the emperor has no clothes.  She repeatedly speaks truth to power.

The other character is Mr. Sleary, the owner and operator of a circus, who talks with a lisp and whose sentences are largely gibberish, but whose humane actions speak more clearly than any words.  His circus is an exemplar of the credos “From each according to his/her ability, to each according to his/her needs,” and “One for all and all for one.”  The circus is a cooperative venture in which everyone has a place, albeit with a hierarchy and Sleary at its head.  It is also a compassionate community which takes care of every member.[13]

Sissy’s father, Mr Jupe, was a performer in Sleary’s circus.  She was raised in the circus community, from which she seemingly learned her high moral values.  When Mr. Jupe began to lose his performance skills, he mistakenly thought that he would be fired, and that Sissy would end up homeless and penniless.  Mr. Jupe thought that Sissy would be better off being raised in a school such as Gradgrind’s.  So, he ran off and left Sissy behind to hopefully find a place with the Gradgrinds.  He seems to have missed the fact that the circus people have “an untiring readiness to help and pity one another,” and that when people at the circus can no longer perform, Sleary found them other work to do so that they could stay part of the circus family.

Sissy does find a place as a servant in the Gradgrind household, and as a student at the school.  She is soon indispensible in the home, but performs very poorly in the school.  She cannot fathom facts without some human and humane connection.  She begins, however, to perform moral magic on the Gradgrind family.  “There is a wisdom of the head, and …there is a wisdom of the heart,” Dickens writes.  Sissy may not have what we would call a high Intelligence Quotient, but she has a high Emotional Quotient.  By the end of the book, she has essentially become a teacher of applied ethics to the Gradgrind family, and Gradgrind learns his lesson about the importance of “Faith, hope, and charity.”

As the book ends, it is not clear, but it is possible that Gradgrind might open a new school dedicated to the sort of moral lessons that Sissy learned at the circus and that he learned from Sissy.  If so, it would be an instance of one compassionate community, the circus, spawning another compassionate community, Gradgrind’s new school, and it would exemplify the evolutionary process of social change envisioned by the utopian socialists.

9. Dickens’ Enduring Popularity: Conventional and Unconventional Views.

“We need to read Dickens’ novels because they tell us,  in the grandest way possible, why we are what we are.”  A high school student of Jon Michael Varese, 2009.

One of the most perplexing of cultural questions is why some writers are popular in their own time but not with posterity, while the popularity of other writers endures.  Charles Dickens was the most popular English language novelist of the nineteenth century and, despite writing thick books that seem as though they will never end, his works remain popular today.  Why?

The conventional view is that Dickens remains popular because his stories can be read as fairy tales that do not significantly challenge readers intellectually, emotionally or ethically.  He is said to have written kid stuff that also appeals to adults.  The stories feature highly imaginative and colorful characters, and a charmingly anthropomorphic portrait of natural phenomena and inanimate objects.  Everything is alive and playful.  His stories involve easy criticism of unjust Victorian social institutions that are long gone, and invoke easy moral judgments against the neglect of impoverished children.  They generally revolve around the enlightenment of some individual, a naif who matures or a hard heart that is softened.  And they resolve in happy endings, usually with some long suffering couple getting married.  The conventional view is that he was and is popular because he was and is conventional.  I don’t agree.

The thesis of this essay is that Dickens’ views of social change were quite unconventional, and that critics who claim he wrote Pollyannish books are wrong.  Despite the inevitable marriage at the end, Dickens’ books are dark, and they are full of unhappy endings for most of the characters that overshadow the happy nuptials for the few.   In turn, Dickens’ views of social change were much more complex and subtle than merely the hope that each of us might go through a Scrooge-like conversion experience.  With characters such as Little Nell and Little Dorrit, Dickens was obviously trying to play on the heart strings and evoke the better angels of his readers.  But Dickens was also trying to appeal in more subtle ways to his readers’ longings for compassionate communities.

Dickens struggled with the means and methods of making social change.  He opposed revolution because of its violence, destructiveness and unpredictability.  He supported reform but had difficulty with the question of how to make a new society out of people molded by the old one.[14]  In not one of his books does he describe the successful reform of any major institution.  Chancery in Bleak House, the Circumlocution Office in Little Dorrit, the criminal justice system in Great Expectations, the parish workhouse system in Our Mutual Friend, the orphanage system in Oliver Twist, the school system in Nicholas Nickleby, and many other unjust and dysfunctional institutions that are featured in Dickens’ books are left standing in the end despite the best efforts of his protagonists.[15]  Compassionate communities seemed to be his only hope.

That Dickens included examples of compassionate communities in his novels is, I think, a major reason for his enduring popularity.  William Thackeray, a contemporary of Dickens, wrote what is considered one of the greatest novels in English literature, Vanity Fair.  Like Dickens’ books, it is long and convoluted, and full of the most interesting characters and situations.  But it is thoroughly cynical and contains not one redeeming character or social configuration.  Thackeray justified the dourness of his book with his belief that most people were “abominably foolish and selfish,” and he had no real hope for humanity.  And his book is not often read any more.

As with Thackeray, one of the main themes in Dickens’ novels was the perfidious effects of selfishness and self-centeredness.  From the pretentiousness of Winkle the self-styled sportsman and Snodgrass the wannabe poet in The Pickwick Papers, to the self-centeredness of Young and Old Martin in Martin Chuzzlewit, to the self-delusions and pompousness of Pip in Great Expectations, the warping effects of self were a central concern of Dickens.  He repeatedly portrays the self as a prison or a form of bondage from which people often are unable to escape, although they may long to do so.  And while most of the characters in his books are unwilling or unable to break the chains of self, some do, and not only as heroic individuals, but as members of cooperative communities.  It is this hopefulness in the midst of hopelessness, the possibility of existing within an ugly and unjust society but not succumbing to be part of the ugliness and injustice, that makes Dickens’ novels so appealing.  And this was also the appeal of the utopian socialists — building a compassionate community within a heartless capitalism.

The idea of building cooperative communities that are in but not of the existing society, with the hope that they might become models for society, has a long history among the English and among Americans.  The Puritans, for example, came to America from England during the seventeenth century to build “a city on a hill,” which they hoped would be a model commuity that would be emulated by their comrades in England.  From that time to the present, America and England have been fertile grounds for utopian communities and other experimental cooperatives.  There were dozens at any given time in America during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  During the twentieth century and twenty-first centuries, there have been hundreds of experimental communities and cooperatives in the United States at any time.  The hippie communes of the 1960’s were only the most highly publicized example of recent decades.  Communalism has deep roots in the American psyche.

It has been suggested that despite the ideological commitment of most Americans to self-centered individualism and competitive capitalism, most Americans are really socialists at heart.  Public opinion surveys over the last one hundred years have consistently shown that when Americans are asked ideologically tinged questions, such as do you support welfare payments or higher taxes, large majorities answer “No.”  Competitive capitalism and self-centered individualism get a vote of confidence.  But when people are asked empathetic questions, such as should the government feed hungry children, and would you be willing to pay higher taxes to fund public works, safeguard the environment, and guarantee a decent life to everyone, large majorities answer “Yes.”   They vote for a compassionate community.

I have some personal experience with this conflict between ideology and empathy.  I was a teacher of history and education for some twenty-five years.  I taught at some time or other each of the grade levels from middle school through graduate school, and students from all sorts of backgrounds.  In almost all of my classes, I began the school year by dividing students into groups of five each, and having them play a game in which they envisioned a utopian society.  The goal of the exercise was to reveal some of the values the students were bringing into the course, which would help in our discussions of history and teaching methods.  I oversaw this game hundreds of times.  Not one of the times did students suggest competitive capitalism as their ideal society.  In every case, students suggested some sort of cooperative society as their utopia.  Many of these same students identified themselves as conservatives, and espoused a free enterprise capitalist ideology.

It seems that most Americans have gone to Gradgrind’s elementary school, and have been drilled by Mr. McChoakumchild in the ideology and ethos of selfish individualism.  But it seems also that most have retained a capacity for empathy with others, and an underlying desire for cooperation and community.  One of the reasons that Dickens’ books remain popular is because they touch in a subtle way on the underlying aspirations of most people to escape the prison of their self and their selfish society, and be part of a compassionate cooperative community.  The books appeal to utopian socialists of the heart looking for a way to realize their hopes.  For those of us who wish for a more compassionate and cooperative society, the continued popularity of Dickens’ books is a hopeful sign.

[1] Williams, Raymond. Culture and Society, 1780-1950. New York: Harper & Row, 1958. pp.94-95.

[2] Johnson, Edgar. Charles Dickens: His Tragedy and Triumph. New York: Viking Press, 1977. p.413.

[3] Slater, Michael. Charles Dickens. New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2009. pp.370-371.  Teachout, Jeffrey. The Importance of Charles Dickens in Victorian Social Reform. Wichita State University, 2006. soar.wichita.edu p.38

[4] Ackroyd, Peter. Dickens. New York: Harper & Collins, 1990. p.684.

[5] Tomalin, Claire. Charles Dickens: A Life. New York: Penguin Press, 2011. pp.157, 249.

[6] Lichtheim, George. The Origins of Socialism. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969.

[7] Gay, Peter. The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism. New York: Collier Books, 1962.

[8] Bestor, Arthur, Jr. Backwoods Utopias. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1950.

[9] Ackroyd, Peter. Dickens. New York: Harper Collins, 1990. p.684.

[10] Teachout, Jeffrey. The Importance of Charles Dickens in Victorian Social Reform. Wichita State University, 2006. soar.wichita.edu  pp.56, 64.

[11] Tomalin, Claire. Charles Dickens: A Life. New York: Penguin Press, 2011. p.249.

[12] Slater, Michael. Charles Dickens. New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2009. p.367.

[13] Miller, J. Hillis. Charles Dickens: The World of His Novels. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1958. p.220. Young, Lillian. “The Circus in Hard Times.” Trinity College Digital Repository. 4/1/2013. pp.10-11.

[14] Robert Douglass-Fairhurst. Becoming Dickens: The Invention of a Novelist. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011. p.78.

[15] Hibbert, Christopher. Charles Dickens: The Making of a Literary Giant. New York: Macmillan Press,2009. p.301.

Strangers in an Estranged Land: A Reexamination of Camus’ “The Stranger” and Review of Daoud’s “The Meursault Investigation.”

Strangers in an Estranged Land.
A Reexamination of Camus’ The Stranger
                  and Review of Daoud’s The Meursault Investigation               

Burton Weltman

Do not mistreat or oppress a stranger,

for you were strangers in Egypt.

Exodus 22:21

 A.  Dead Men Talking: Albert Camus’ Meursault and Kamel Daoud’s Musa.

“If the world were clear, art would not exist.”

Albert Camus. The Myth of Sisyphus.[1]

Does it matter if a literary work is widely misread in a way that is contrary to the intentions of its author and/or the plain meaning of the text?  It clearly matters if a legal text is misread.  The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution, for example, has recently been misread by a majority of the Justices on the United States Supreme Court to function as a guarantee of the right of people to keep guns in their homes and carry guns with them almost anywhere they want.  This is a misunderstanding of the intentions of the Second Amendment’s authors and a misreading of the plain language of the Amendment’s text that is so unreasonable and so contrary to the facts of the Amendment’s adoption as to be absurd.[2]  It is a misreading that has, however, contributed to the proliferation of guns and the epidemic of gun violence in the United States, and people are dying because of it.  It clearly matters.  But what about the misreading of a literary text?  Does that matter?

The premise of Kamel Daoud’s recent novel The Meursault Investigation[3] is that the misreading of a literary text does matter, and the narrator of Daoud’s book claims that Albert Camus’ novel The Stranger has almost invariably been misread for over seventy years since its publication in 1942.  The Stranger is the story of the murder of an Arab by a Frenchman in colonial Algeria.  The murderer’s name is Meursault and he is the narrator of the book.  Meursault has, much to his surprise, been found guilty of premeditated murder and sentenced to death for shooting the Arab.  He had assumed that he would be found guilty of the lesser offense of unpremeditated manslaughter or not guilty by reason of self-defense.  Although an appeal of his sentence is pending, Meursault tells his story while facing possible execution, and death envelops the book.  It opens with the death of Meursault’s mother, is punctuated by the Arab’s death, and closes with the prospect of Meursault’s death.  Meursault tells his story in deadpanned language, and portrays himself as an emotionally deadened person who has endured life in a chronically depressed state.

For many reviewers over the years, Meursault has been seen as the ideal of an honest and dispassionate man, and an existentialist or absurdist hero.[4]  This seems also to be the view of the general reading public, based on comments provided on popular websites that can be taken as reflecting mainstream public opinion.  These websites include Wikipedia (Meursault is “often cited as an exemplar of Camus’ philosophy of the absurd and existentialism.”)[5] and Sparknotes (Meursault represents “Camus’ philosophical notion of absurdity.”).[6]  Amazon reports that The Stranger remains a best seller to the present day, as it is “a staple of U.S. high school literature courses.”[7]  It is, thus, a widely read and potentially influential book.

The narrator of The Meursault Investigation is an old man named Harun who seeks to dispel Meursault’s heroic image.  His argument is based on a critical rereading of The Stranger, and on providing a side-story to Meursault’s narrative, as well as a sequel to the events in the book up to the present day.  Harun is ostensibly the brother of the Arab murdered by Meursault, and he claims to speak for his dead brother.  Harun complains that decades of readers have failed to react to the fact that his brother (whose name is Musa) is not even named in The Stranger (he is merely called “the Arab”) and that nothing is told in the book about Musa or his family.

Since no one has previously spoken for Musa, Harun claims that readers have missed the underlying meaning of the events in The Stranger.  Only Meursault’s side of the story has been told, and Musa’s death has been seen only in the light of Meursault’s brilliant portrayal of his own pathetic life.  As a result, Harun argues, Meursault has effectively gotten away with murder in the public mind, and Meursault’s account of the killing has both trivialized murder and perpetuated racist views of Arab Algerians.  Although the story dates from 1942, Harun contends that people are still dying today because of the attitudes toward murder and toward Algerians presented by Meursault in the book.  In Harun’s mind, the public’s misunderstanding of the story clearly matters.

History is full of dead men talking, and the meaning of what they said and did is often important to us.  They help us to figure out who we are and what we ought to do.  That is why historians and Supreme Court Justices continually review and revise what they think the Founders meant to say in the Constitution.  The thesis of Daoud’s book is that it is also important to set the record straight as to the meaning and message of fictional dead men.  Fiction can influence people as fully as facts can.  There are, for example, lots of young people today who cite the wisdom of Professor Dumbledore from the Harry Potter books as though he is a real person.  Daoud has provided us with the novel case of a fictional character calling out another fictional character in order to get a fictional situation right.

Getting things right in a work of fiction is not, however, always easy.  It has been said that great books are those that can be reread over and over again with the reader getting something different each time.[8]  Great books, such as The Stranger, can legitimately be interpreted many different ways.  The same can be said for the United States Constitution.  One of the things that makes the Constitution great is that it is a living document that can be interpreted in different ways as circumstances change.  However, there are some interpretations of the Constitution that are just plain wrong, such as the Supreme Court’s recent ruling on the Second Amendment.  Similarly, there are some interpretations of a novel that are just wrong, and they can have consequences.

Both The Stranger and The Meursault Investigation are written with first-person narrators. Interpretation is particularly tricky with first-person narration because it raises hard questions about to what extent and in what ways does and does not the narrator speak for the author.  It also raises questions as to the reliability of the narrator.   Conflating a first-person narrator with a book’s author, or assuming that the narrator is reliable, can lead to misunderstanding of a book.  In the cases of The Stranger and The Meursault Investigation, this problem has been exacerbated by the tendency of reviewers to focus on what they see as Camus’ philosophical views and Daoud’s social and religious views, and to ignore the psychological nuances and character development of the narrators in the course of the books.  The result is often a misunderstanding of both the authors’ views and the narrators’ characters.

It is my contention that neither Meursault nor Harun has been intended by their creators as a hero or a role model, and that neither of them can be taken as either reliable narrators or spokespersons for their authors.  Meursault’s narrative is essentially an exercise in what existentialists call “bad faith.”[9]  Jean Paul Sartre, the existentialist-in-chief, described bad faith as dodging responsibility for the effects of one’s choices.  He claimed that one has to realize that when one chooses to do or not do something, one is choosing not only what one wants to be oneself, but also “choosing at the same time what humanity as a whole should be.”  People act in bad faith when they “believe their actions involve no one but themselves.”  For Sartre, “any man who takes refuge behind his passions, any man who fabricates some deterministic theory, is operating in bad faith.”[10]

Meursault fits this description.  He does not take responsibility for his actions or for the way his actions affect others, and he seeks to explain away the harms he has done to others.  The book begins with the excuse he gave when he asked his boss for time off to go to his mother’s funeral (“Sorry, sir, but it’s not my fault, you know”), and ends with him giving himself absolution for his actions (“I’d been right, I was still right, I was always right.”).[11]  His narrative is a sustained attempt to exonerate himself for his actions.

Harun’s story is essentially a guilt trip.  It is at first an attempt to avoid guilt, then a reluctant admission of guilt and, finally, an attempt to purge himself of guilt.  It is a circuitous narrative that starts with his blaming Meursault and the world at large for the death and indignity suffered by his brother, and the hardships suffered by him and his mother.  It ends with a confession and a mea culpa for committing the murder of a Frenchman.  He begins his story by distinguishing himself from Meurault and ends by identifying with him.  They are, he acknowledges, blood brothers under the skin.[12]

Harun is an alcoholic, a self-described blowhard, and a murderer.  He is no hero and he is not Daoud.  The consequences of misreading Daoud’s book have, however, been frightening.  As a result of things that Huran says about religion, a death sentence fatwa has been issued against Daoud by a radical Muslim cleric in Algeria.  Daoud has responded that “It was a fictional character in the novel who said those things, not me,” but to no avail thus far.[13]

The thesis of the present essay is that The Stranger has been widely misread and that The Meursault Investigation seems in danger of being similarly misunderstood.  With respect to The Stranger, I think that reviewers and readers often miss that Meursault is relating and reconstructing past events, not telling about things as they happen.  They also miss that Meursault is telling his story in the immediate aftermath of being condemned to death.  They mistakenly think that Meursault is speaking for Camus.  And, they mistakenly think that Meurault represents the absurd man that Camus promoted in his book The Myth of Sisyphus.

Critics often extol the at-best amoral Meursault as some kind of existentialist hero or romantic anti-hero.  This sort of misreading demeans the work of Camus who was, above all else, a passionate moralist.  In conflating Meursault with Camus, these critics have missed what seems to be Camus’ intent that readers empathize with Meursault and see something of themselves in him, even as they hopefully disagree with him and reject his behavior.  These critics effectively undermine the moral value of the book.

With respect to The Meursault Investigation, I think that reviewers are in danger of mistakenly treating Harun as a hero, a reliable narrator, and a spokesman for Daoud.  These mistakes would diminish the social and political meaning of the work.  And that matters.

B.  Meursault in the Face of Death: The Stages of Grief.

We live “as man condemned to death.”

Albert Camus. The Myth of Sisyphus[14]

“Aujourd’hui, maman est morte.”  These are the opening words of The Stranger.  They are generally translated as mother or mama died today.  The words seem to situate the narrator, Meursault, in the present, as though he is learning of his mother’s death at the time he is telling us about it.  The rest of that paragraph and the next also give the appearance that the narrator is describing what he is currently experiencing.  But then the narrative abruptly turns into what is clearly a description of the past, of thoughts, feelings, and events the narrator has previously experienced, and the narrative continues that way for the rest of the book.

Camus wrote The Stranger in the present perfect tense in which “etre” or “avoir” is added to the past participle of a verb in French, just as “have” is added to the past participle in English.[15]  The effect of using that tense is to produce the feeling of an indefinite past, as though the past continues into the present.  This seems to be part of what Camus is proposing in the book, that one cannot escape the past or responsibility for one’s actions.

Meursault’s story opens with a description of his mother’s death and her funeral.  These events are the alpha and omega of his story.  The facts he relates include that his mother died in a nursing home to which she had been sent by Meursault over her strenuous objections, and that he wandered about at her funeral without showing any interest or emotion.  The overwhelming importance of these facts to Meursault stems from his contention that the way he treated his mother and behaved at her funeral were the main reason he was convicted of first degree capital murder.

Meursault repeatedly complains that his murder trial seemed to be more about disparaging his character over the way he treated his mother and her death than about ferreting out the facts of the shooting.[16]  The prosecutor repeatedly railed against Meursault, insisting he was “morally guilty of his mother’s death,” and was “an inhuman monster wholly without a moral sense.”  The court was seemingly more concerned with Meursault’s mother’s death than with the Arab’s, and Meursault was apparently convicted of the premeditated murder of the Arab because he was found to have behaved badly toward his mother.[17]

Camus once facetiously said that the moral of The Stranger was that “In our society any man who does not weep at his mother’s funeral runs the risk of being sentenced to death.”[18]  And Camus’ narrator, Meursault, tries to use the absurdity of his trial to portray himself as the victim in his case.  Camus was not, however, justifying Meursault’s actions or criticizing Meursault’s conviction for murder.  Camus was criticizing a society that seemed more concerned with enforcing social conventions than with enforcing laws against murder, especially when the victims were Arabs.  And he was asking us to identify with Meursault, despite our objections to Meursault’s behavior.

Opinions of Meursault’s state of mind as a narrator, and as a character in his own story, have been varied over the years.  To some reviewers, he is the soul of objectivity[19], sensitivity,[20] and honesty.[21]  To others, he is “a clinical psychopath,”[22] who “cares about practically nothing.”[23]  But one thing these reviewers have had in common is that they treat Meursault as a reliable narrator and take his version of events on face value.  This is not plausible and does not seem to have been intended by Camus for at least two reasons.

First, Meursault is still in the process of appealing his death sentence as he is narrating his story.  He has a life-and-death interest in making himself look as sympathetic as possible.  We have to see his story as potentially self-serving, and as not necessarily reflecting events as they actually happened.  Camus portrays Meursault as an ingenious fellow, and Meursault tells what seems to be a tale designed to gain our sympathy and minimize our antipathy.  For example, he leaves out any account of what happened in the immediate aftermath of the shooting.[24]  The artfulness of his narrative is emphasized in The Meursault Investigation by Harun, who insists that Meursault’s story is a fiction designed to justify himself to posterity.[25]

Meursault comes across as a distressed person.  He repeatedly describes himself to the people around him, and portrays himself to us readers, as a person without deep emotions.  Most commentators take it for granted that Meursault was, in fact, that kind of person.  But we cannot take Meursault’s portrayal of himself as being the way he always was.  He may have been rendered emotionally numb by his recent experiences and his narrative may reflect that effect, or he may be dissembling for sympathy.

Second, Meursault had just been sentenced to death when he begins telling his story.  This is a key to his psychological state and his character development as he goes on.  His deadened picture of himself could be a result of shock.  He is seemingly in a state of shock as he begins the story, and his anxiety level increases toward the end as his execution date approaches.  As a result of his emotional wavering, Meursault’s story does not come out as well as he would have liked it.  He does not make his best case for himself, either for his appeal or for posterity.  This is seemingly part of the story that Camus is telling us, through Meursault, about humans facing death.

Most reviewers treat Meursault’s narrative as being of a piece and his narrative tone as being uniform throughout.  This does not do justice to the psychological subtlety and complexity of Camus’ book.  The Stranger was Camus’ first published novel.  In his other works of fiction, the characters tend to be one-dimensional representatives of philosophical or social positions rather than complex persons. That is not the case with Meursault.   He is a complex character who morphs in the course of his tale.

Meursault’s narrative, in fact, seems to unroll in stages, almost like what have been described as the five stages of grief.[26]  He has just been told he is going to die, and his story seems to proceed from denial, which is ostensibly the first stage of grief, then to the next stages of anger, bargaining, depression and, finally, acceptance.  This is not to say that the book can be explained by some psychological formula, but that analyzing it in those terms can help illustrate the changes in Meursault’s narrative tone as he tells his story.

In the first stage of his story, Meursault essentially portrays himself as a victim of circumstances.  His mantra in this phase is “it’s not my fault.”[27]  He repeats this sentiment throughout the scenes of his mother’s funeral, which go on for many pages.  In a foreshadowing of his complaint about his trial, he complains that people at the funeral kept looking at him askance because he did not exhibit any emotion.  “I had an absurd impression,” he says, “that they had come to sit in judgment of me.”[28]  Meursault’s affect at this point is that of a pathetic person in a state of denial.

In the second part of his story and the second stage of grief, Meursault portrays himself as just an ordinary fellow who goes along to get along, and who follows the path of least resistance as he claims most people do.  He describes his relationships with his neighbors, his friend Raymond, and his girlfriend Marie in this segment.  Raymond is a pimp who beats up his Arab girlfriend, and who repeatedly says that he wants to be “pals” with Meursault.  Meursault claims that he does not know what that means.  But he hangs around with Raymond and helps him in his schemes, which eventually leads to Meursault shooting the Arab.  Meursault also repeatedly tells his girlfriend, Marie, that he does not love her, that the word love “had no meaning” for him.  But he also tells her that if she wants to marry him, “I didn’t mind.”[29]  The affect in this part of the story is defensive, as of a person who is upset at being picked on and just doesn’t want to be bothered.

It is at the close of this segment that Meursault commits the murder.  He, Raymond, and Marie are at the beach when they came upon “the Arab” and another Algerian Arab.  Meursault believed that the Arab was the brother of the girlfriend who Raymond had assaulted, and that the Arab had a knife and might be out for revenge.  Meursault was holding Raymond’s gun.  Meursault claims he was overpowered by the heat and confused by the glare of the sun so that, standing there with Raymond’s gun in his hand, “it crossed my mind that one might fire, or not fire – and it would come to absolutely the same thing.”  He had seemingly lost his sense of reality and self-control.  Later, when he shoots the Arab, he describes holding the gun in his hand and then “The trigger gave,” as though the shot just happened and he was not responsible for it.[30]  His attitude toward the murder is completely passive, a “things just happen” tone.  It is as though in describing the event, he is either still in a state of shock or he is trying to avoid responsibility for his action.

In the next stage of the story, Meursault describes the police interrogation and the trial, and the failure of his attempts to work things out with the authorities.  He begins to sound persecuted and even paranoid.  It is not only that the police and the prosecutor keep describing him as “callous” and “inhuman,”[31] but that “there seemed to be a conspiracy to exclude me from the proceedings.”  The lawyers, court officials, reporters, and spectators all seemed to know each other, and fraternized as though they were members of a club that excluded him.  He felt like “a gate crasher.”  He wanted to tell them that “I was just like everybody else, quite an ordinary person,” but they would not listen to him.  He says that he realized then “how all these people loathed me,” and were out to get him.[32]

Following the verdict and sentencing ,Meursault describes going into a state of anxiety and depression.  He is desperate to find a way out of being executed.  He says that to find “a loophole [in the law] obsesses me.”  Although he still has an appeal pending, and repeatedly expresses hope that the appeal will be successful, his tone is increasingly agitated.  He is assured by a visiting priest that “my appeal would succeed,” but he is, nonetheless, admittedly possessed by fear, and he goes into a rage at the priest when the priest suggests that he repent.[33]

Finally, on the last page of the book, Meursault says he has become “emptied of hope” and that “for the first time, the first, I laid my heart open to the tendre indifference of the universe.”[34]  This statement is generally taken by reviewers to mean that he has come to accept his fate and has realized the absurdity of life.  But, of course, he still has at this point an appeal of his sentence in the works, so it is not clear that he has really given up hope.  In addition, the French word tendre can be translated as “benign” or “tender.”  In using the word tendre to describe the universe, Meursault has essentially contradicted the idea that the universe is indifferent or that he has given up hope.  A benign or tender indifference is not indifferent.  It is sympathetic, caring, and agreeable.  The universe will, he seems still to hope, help him.

In sum, Meursault is a cunning but not entirely consistent apologist for himself.  My purpose in analyzing The Stranger in this way is not to reduce Camus’ complex novel to a series of formulaic stages.  It is merely to demonstrate that the emotional tone of Meursault’s story evolves as he narrates it, and that the narrator is not to be taken as totally reliable.  It is also the case that he is not a spokesperson for Camus nor is he intended as an existential hero.

C.  Meursault and the Myth of Sisyphus: Apathy versus Absurdity.

“To an absurd mind reason is useless and there is nothing beyond reason.”

Albert Camus. The Myth of Sisyphus.[35]

Meursault has been seen by most commentators as a spokesman for Camus, and as an ideal exemplar of the absurd person that Camus promotes in his philosophical work The Myth of Sisyphus. They see The Stranger and The Myth of Sisyphus, which were both published in 1942, as companion pieces, with Meursault representing Camus’ philosophy of absurdism.  Some of these commentators admire Camus’ philosophy and extend this admiration to Meursault as its exemplar.[36]  Others are appalled by what they see as Meursault’s callous and inhuman behavior, and extend this negative opinion to Camus’ philosophy.  Some have even accused Camus of racism based on Meursault’s attitude toward “the Arab” he has killed.[37]

Conflating Meursault with Camus and The Stranger with The Myth of Sisyphus began with an influential review of The Stranger in the mid-1940’s by Camus’ then friend Jean Paul Sartre.  Sartre, who was already a famous philosopher and novelist, gave the neophyte Camus and The Stranger a strangely ambivalent review.  In the review, Sartre repeatedly insists that The Stranger is a fictional rendering of the philosophy in The Myth of Sisyphus, with the message that life is absurd.  Along the way, he also comments that Camus “seems to pride himself on quoting” philosophers in The Myth of Sisyphus “whom he seems not to have always understood.”   And he says that Camus’ methods of writing can be best compared to those of Charles Maurras, who was a notorious anti-Semite and fascist.  Sartre concludes that The Stranger, as a novel about absurdity, “aims at being magnificently sterile,” and succeeds.  With friends like this… [38]

The problem with all of these opinions, from that of Sartre on down to the present, is that The Stranger and The Myth of Sisyphus do not function as companion pieces.  They deal with very different issues.  The Myth of Sisyphus opens with the declaration that “There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide.”[39]  The book is, thereafter, a sustained argument that although life is absurd, it is for that very reason worth living.  Life and living with others are all that we have for sure, so we ought to hang onto them.  The Stranger is not a novel about suicide.  It is about murder.  It deals with the reaction of a character to having committed a murder and to his impending execution.  In any case, Meursault is in no way an exemplar of Camus’ philosophy in The Myth of Sisyphus.  To the contrary, he is better seen as a negative foil to Camus’ ideal of the absurd person.

In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus describes and prescribes a philosophy of absurdity.  Absurdity is a “feeling of strangeness in the world” that results from the contradiction between our attempts to find transcendent meaning in the universe and our inevitable failure to do so.  The absurd person recognizes that “I don’t know whether this world has a meaning that transcends it.  But I know that I do not know that meaning and that it is impossible for me just now to know it.”  As a result, the absurd person tries “to live without appeal” to any higher authority, which includes God, the gods, or any metaphysical concepts, and to live without hope for life after death.[40]  This is not an easy thing to do.

Absurdity, according to Camus, is not a stable or secure position.  We are forced to live in a state of “permanent revolution” against ourselves because what we can rationally establish as truth conflicts with what we feel ought to be the case.  We are perpetually caught up in a contradiction between the inescapable conclusion that we cannot reasonably find any final answers, and our incorrigible feeling that they must exist.  “There is so much stubborn hope in the human heart,” Camus warns, “that hope cannot be eluded forever and that it can beset even those who wanted to be free of it.”  He concludes that “Absurdity, hope and death carry on their dialogue” in the mind of an absurd person, all of which makes for an impossible situation, but it is one the absurd person has to live with.[41]

The absurd person is best exemplified for Camus by the mythological figure of Sisyphus.  Sisyphus is variously portrayed in ancient Greek mythology as a villain and a hero, but all accounts agree that he was the craftiest of mortals, and that he frequently defied and outwitted the gods.  At one point, he even succeeded in enchaining Hades, the god of death, and thereby put a halt to humans dying.  Sisyphus was eventually defeated by Zeus, so that Hades was able to go back to work, and he was sentenced by the gods to eternally push a rock up a hill, only to have it fall back again so that he would have to push it up again.

Camus presents Sisyphus’ situation as a metaphor for the human condition.  We are all engaged in what seems like pointless activity.  But, Camus claims, Sisyphus does not despair.  Having defied the gods and rebelled against death on behalf of humankind, Sisyphus is actually happy in his perpetual toil.  In “his scorn of the gods, his hatred of death, and his passion for life,” Sisyphus epitomizes “the absurd hero.”  He is physically chained but metaphysically free.  And even as Sisyphus knows that the rock will roll back down each time he gets it to the top of the hill, he can feel that maybe this time it won’t.[42]

The Myth of Sisyphus opens with the question of whether suicide is warranted given the opacity of the universe.  Camus’ answer is an emphatic “No.”  An absurd person does not despair of his/her hopeless condition but, instead, revels in “my revolt, my freedom, and my passion” for life.  This is a passion that must includes others.  People, says Camus, have to make their own meaning in life, and that is a social and collective activity.  In an absurd world, he insists, there is one value that is certain and that is the value of “human relations,” “friendship,” and “fraternity.”  The isolated individual is an idiot and the isolated life is without value.  Meaning comes from solidarity.  We live with and for others, so that whatever the universe is, we are all in it and in for it together.[43]

Critics who portray Meursault as some sort of existentialist hero extol what they see as his honesty in admitting his indifference to the deaths of his mother and the Arab.  This, they contend, makes him a forthright nonconformist. [44]  They also admire what they claim is his sensitivity to those around him.  He does not deliberately offend anyone, with the exception of the dead Arab.[45]  And they commend his “emotional detachment” from the awful things he has experienced in his life.  He is in their eyes a genuine Stoic. [46]  In sum, they see his life story as a “tragedy of integrity” and a “tragedy of the ethical,” a man who was vilified at trial and convicted of murder because he failed to proclaim grief for his dead mother or love for his girl friend.[47]  Camus himself apparently once said that Meursault was condemned because “he does not play the game,” “refuses to lie,” and “agrees to die for the truth.”[48]  But none of these things make Meursault either an existentialist or an absurdist, let alone a hero.

Existentialism has been described as the doctrine that existence precedes essence, and that we are what we are not and are not what we are.  That is, it is a philosophy of becoming and change in which people are seen as having continually to go beyond themselves and make choices as to what they become next.  Existentialism insists that we must take responsibility for who we are and what we do.[49]  Given this description, Meursault is clearly not an existentialist because he continuously refuses to take responsibility for his actions, and particularly eschews responsibility for shooting the Arab.  He repeatedly describes his life as something that just came to pass, and describes the shooting as though the gun just went off almost by itself.  He also insists that he has always been the same, has never changed, and has rarely made a deliberate choice.

Meurault is also not an absurdist as Camus describes that doctrine.  Absurdism requires a person to be constantly at war with himself, looking for where and how he is starting to believe in transcendent ideas, and then rejecting them.  The absurd person has to be vigilantly self-reflective, watching what he/she thinks and feels, continually engaging in a vigorous  internal dialogue.  Meursault, to the contrary, is completely and admittedly unreflective.[50]  He is a creature of impulse, which is epitomized by his shooting of the Arab.

Some readers have mistaken Meursault’s complete absorption in the present as a sign of his existentialist and absurdist leanings.  But his self-absorption is merely a sign of selfishness and self-centeredness, which are contrary to the emphases of both existentialism and absurdism on our need to work with others to define and develop ourselves.  Significantly, Meursault is capable of sympathizing with others — he even feels sorry sometimes for his neighbor’s annoying dog — but he is incapable of empathizing with them.  He is emotionally and intellectually isolated, from others and even from himself.

Some readers have also mistaken Meursault’s unconventionality with Camus’ absurdity, but Meursault represents the apathetic person rather than the absurd person.   As he describes his life, what looks like nonconformity is really just indifference.  Deliberate rebellion is foreign to Meursault’s personality, as is passion.  He repeatedly tells his girlfriend that he does not know what love means, and he repeatedly says about choices he has to make, including the choice to shoot the Arab, that it makes no difference what he does.  The passion for life, the feeling of solidarity with others, and the revolt against injustice that characterize Camus’ absurd person are not sentiments that one could plausibly ascribe to Meursault.

Finally, while Camus emphasizes that the absurd person is energized in the face of death, defying its inevitability and gaining from it a passion for life, Meursault is depressed by his impending death and his narrative is a depressing tale told in a depressed voice.  In sum, Meursault is the opposite of the absurd person Camus is describing in The Myth of Sisyphus.

D.  Meursault and Murder: A Rebel without a Cause.

“I rebel – therefore we exist.”

Albert Camus: The Rebel.[51]

Camus’ next philosophical book after The Myth of Sisyphus was The Rebel, which was published in 1951.  It is an essay on “whether or why we have the right to kill.”  Camus says that the book extends to a consideration of murder the “train of thought which began with suicide and the absurd” in The Myth of Sisyphus.[52]  If one must not kill oneself, may one kill others?  Reviewers have generally construed The Rebel in light of the breakup of the political alliance and friendship between Sartre and Camus over the former’s support for revolutionary Communism and the latter’s support for reformist socialism.[53]

Camus argues that revolution, which tries to impose all at once a final regime of justice on society, inevitably leads to oppression and murder.  Only a reformist movement that recognizes limits on what it can do can move toward genuine social justice.  The anti-revolutionary position Camus takes in The Rebel is generally seen as a function of the end of alliances between socialists and Communists that formed during World War II and that broke up with the beginning of the Cold War.

But there is also a continuity in Camus’ thinking that goes back to the composition of The Stranger during World War  IIMost reviewers, having already taken for granted that The Stranger is a companion piece to The Myth of Sisyphus, have not made a connection between The Rebel and The Stranger.  But The Myth of Sisyphus is a book about suicide.  The Rebel and The Stranger are both books about murder.  In this light, The Stranger can be best seen as a fictional prologue to Camus’ philosophical speculations in The Rebel, not as a companion piece to The Myth of Sisyphus.  And in light of the precepts promoted by Camus in The Rebel, Meursault comes across as a negative foil to the ideal rebel.

Camus reiterates in The Rebel many key concepts from The Myth of Sisyphus.  He insists that absurdism means that “human life is the only necessary good” and that, therefore, murder, which like suicide destroys life, is wrong.  Murder splits the soul in two, which is a good description of Meursault in The Stranger, a person living a half-life.  Camus acknowledges that “The absurd is, in itself, contradictory” because it denies value judgments but judges life to be of value, which is a value judgment.  Absurdism is a prescription for contradiction because it requires us to continually rebel against beliefs that we inevitably fall into.  But these contradictions are life-giving, Camus contends, because stagnation is death.  Rebellion, which is a “protest against death” and which was Sisyphus’ crime and his glory, is life.[54]    

Camus also insists in The Rebel, as he did in The Myth of Sisyphus, that humans are social creatures, not isolated individuals, and that “Human solidarity is metaphysical,” not merely conventional.  The person who does not engage in collective activity, either rebelling against  social oppression or in favor of greater social justice, is a stranger to humanity and foreigner in the world.  The stranger is the self-imposed outcaste who does not recognize that “dignity is common to all men,” or acknowledge the ultimate truth that “I rebel – therefore we exist.”[55]  That is, Camus concludes, we only truly exist to the extent we engage in collective rebellion.

Meursault seems to think of himself as a rebel, and many critics have thought likewise, because he does not conform to social conventionalities.  But he is an unrepentant murderer who does not stand for anything or with anybody.  He has no cause to which he is dedicated.  He is merely an isolated individual, who is strange to others and strange to himself.  In Camus’ terms, a person like Meursault is not a rebel and has only a form of half-life.

E.  Brothers in Blood: Meursault and Harun.  Who is the Stranger of the two?

“The absurdity of my condition, which consisted in pushing a corpse to the top of a hill before it rolled back down again, endlessly.”

Harun, the narrator of The Meursault Investigation.[56]

The words L’Etranger, the French title of Camus’ novel, can be translated as the stranger, the outsider or the foreigner.  It is usually translated as The Stranger and most commentators see Meursault as the stranger.  He is a man estranged from himself and society.  But, the Arab he kills is also a stranger and a foreigner to Meursault, just as the Frenchman Meursault is a stranger and foreigner to the Arab.  So, who is the stranger?  Who is the foreigner?

That is a question that Huran, the narrator of Daoud’s novel The Meursault Investigation, repeatedly asks.  Both the French and the Arabs saw themselves as the genuine Algerians.  Each claimed the land was rightfully theirs, and saw the others as foreigners.  They also knew little about each other and were effectively strangers to each other in the same land.  With the independence of Algeria from France, Harun contends, this did not change.  “Independence only pushed people on both sides to switch roles,” with the oppressed becoming the oppressors and the oppressors becoming the oppressed.[57]

Harun tells his tale over the course of several days to an auditor in an Algerian bar.  He claims to be telling the story of his brother, Musa, and, thereby, reclaiming Musa’s dignity and the dignity of Arab Algerians as a whole.  His story is replete with critical comments about the French colonial regime and the current Algerian government and society.  He is himself an outsider or stranger to contemporary Algerian society.  Harun is particularly critical of the conservative Islam that has increasingly been dominating Algerian culture.  It is these latter comments that have sparked the enmity of conservative Muslims toward Daoud, as though Harun is speaking for Daoud.  Although Harun makes comments about society and religion with which apparently Daoud agrees, Harun is too unreliable and erratic a narrator to be considered Daoud’s spokesman.  He tends to discredit himself.

Harun’s narrative is more of a rant than a story, and the facts come out in dribs and drabs with lots of inconsistencies.  Ostensibly correcting Meursault’s narrative with the story of his brother, Harun’s narrative is actually a winding, whining, long-winded complaint about his own life.  His father abandoned the family when Harun was a small child.  Harun’s mother then favored Musa and neglected Harun.  When Musa was killed, Harun’s mother was inconsolable and, according to Harun, thereafter made him feel like she wished he had died rather than Musa.  Harun idolized his brother, but also feared him.  Musa seems to have been a bit of a brute who mistreated Harun.  Harun actually knows very little about Musa’s life except what his mother told him, and she was an unreliable narrator who constantly changed her stories and magnified Musa’s achievements.  She also was obsessed with getting revenge for Musa’s murder, and put the burden on Harun to achieve that.  In sum, he portrays his mother as a monster who has pushed him around all his life.

When the revolution of Arab Algerians against the French began, Harun did not join the rebels, and was subsequently scorned by his neighbors for being an outsider to their liberation struggle.  In the immediate aftermath of the revolution, at his mother’s instigation, Harun shoots and kills a Frenchman who was seeking sanctuary in their shed.  This man was a member of a neighboring family that had previously gotten Harun a place in a French school at which Harun gained the education that enabled him to get a good government job.

It is not clear exactly what was the relationship between the dead man and Huran’s mother, but the man may even have had some sort of sexual relationship with Harun’s mother.[58]  Harun was arrested by the new Algerian government for shooting the man, but was released and, as he puts it, was condemned to live rather than condemned to die as Meursault had been.  Harun seems incapable of having close relationships with anyone.  He is a very old man but in his long life he has had one girlfriend for one summer, and then she left him.

Although some reviewers have rushed to crown Harun as “an existential hero”[59] or the ideal of an honest man,[60] and others have proclaimed him a liberal social reformer,[61] Harun does not present himself as a social reformer.  Although he continually complains about the way Algeria was under the French and the way it is now, he has never done anything to change things.  One reviewer has aptly called him “a barroom kvetcher.”[62]  Like Meursault, he has been wandering through life without purpose, seemingly looking after only himself.  He is no hero and he is not Daoud.

Harun parades his alienation from society.  He is an atheist and an alcoholic in a deeply religious and abstemious society.  “I detest religions and submission,” he declaims.[63]  He is a stranger in an estranged land.  But he is no existentialist.  Like Meursault, Harun refuses to take responsibility for his actions, blaming everything on his mother, the French, his Arab neighbors, and circumstances out of his control.  With respect to the murder, he says “I blame my mother, I lay the blame on her.  The truth is, she committed that crime.”[64]

The underlying theme of the book is Harun’s feelings of guilt, which he seemingly tries to pass on to his auditor in the book and to readers of the book.  Like The Stranger, The Meursault Investigation is divided into two parts.  The Stranger is formally divided into two parts, punctuated by the murder of the Arab.  The Meursault Investigation is informally divided into two parts, with Harun’s admission that he murdered the Frenchman as the dividing point.  In the first part, Harun focuses on the murder of Musa and on his own survivor’s guilt.  In the second part, he focuses on his murder of the Frenchman and his efforts to deal with his feelings of guilt about that.

Harun’s diatribe has the superficial appearance of spontaneity, but seems really to be orchestrated.  He releases information in drips and in ways that seem calculated for maximum shock to the auditor, but also for maximum sympathy.  His is a strategy of ostensibly admitting the worst about himself as a way of pretending he is being honest, but he is really being manipulative.   When, for example, Harun finally admits his murder of the Frenchman, he at first claims that he did not know the man.  Eventually, however, he admits that he did know the man and, in fact, knew him well.  Harun first gets his audience used to the fact that he killed someone, and then gradually lets us know how awful his act really was.

Harun is an admittedly unreliable narrator.  At the close of the book, he even hints that he may be “just a compulsive liar.”[65]  In discussing The Stranger, for example, he talks at one point about “when the murderer leaves prison,” as though Meursault got the reprieve he had been seeking and was not executed.  But later in talking about Meursault, Harun refers to “after his execution,” as though Meursault had been executed.[66]  Harun also claims that this is the first time he has ever told his story, but he seems to be such a compulsive talker that this is hard to believe.

Harun’s story is laced with references to The Stranger, The Myth of Sisyphus and, significantly, The Rebel, and the word “absurd” abounds throughout.  I think the main point of Harun’s story is proclaimed midway through the book when he paraphrases the theme of The Rebel, saying that “whether or not to commit murder is the only proper question for a philosopher.”[67]  That is, when faced with the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, do we have the right to murder our way out of our troubles?  And I think that Harun’s answer is “No, because you can never live it down.”

Harun illustrates this in a paraphrase of an image from The Myth of Sisyphus, when he compares his situation to “pushing a corpse to the top of a hill before it rolled back down, endlessly.”[68]  Instead of the rock that Sisyphus had to push around, Harun has to deal with guilt for two corpses, those of his brother and the Frenchman.  He seems to need to tell his story as a way of relieving himself of his guilt feelings, and thereby getting the corpses to the top of the hill.  But the guilt feelings will inevitably return again, the corpses rolling back down upon him, so that he probably has been compulsively telling his story over and over again all his adult life.  The story ends with an almost complete identification of the murderer Harun with the murderer Meusault, and the last pages of the book consist of Harun telling about how he started yelling at an Imam just as Meursault did to a priest. Harun repeats virtually the same words that Meursault said at the end of his story.[69]

The theme of The Meursault Investigation was aptly stated by one reviewer as the importance of “individual responsibility,” which is something Harun does not display, nor did Meursault.[70]   In Meursault and Harun, we have characters pushed to the extreme of facing death as isolated individuals, Meursault through execution and Harun through old age.    They make some cogent social criticisms, because self-centered people are often acutely sensitive to slights and slight social injustices to themselves.  But they are also both selfish and at best amoral.  They are not held up by their creators as model citizens.  The moral of both books seems to be the need for human solidarity as a basis for individual responsibility.  Camus once commented that the trajectory of his work from The Stranger on was toward calling more insistently for human solidarity.  Daoud seems to be furthering that trajectory.

[1] Camus, Albert. The Myth of Sisyphus. New York: Vintage Books, 1955. p.73.

[2] As though any sane person during the 1780’s would want to keep a musket (the standard  gun at that time) in his/her house along with a bag of volatile gunpowder (needed for loading a musket) which could explode with the slightest change in humidity.  The reason the British were marching on Lexington and Concord during April, 1775, and fought the battles that are seen as the start of the American Revolution, was to confiscate the muskets and gunpowder Americans had stored in their militia armories that were located a safe distance from their homes.

[3] Daoud, Kamel. The Meursault Investigation. New York: Other Press, 2015.

[4]  Scherr, Arthur. “Camus’ The Stranger.” Baltimore Polytechnic Institute.bpi.edu  9/5/08.  Gnanasekarau, R. “Psychological Interpretation of the novel ‘The Stranger’ by Camus.” International Journal of English Literature and Culture, Vol.2(6). 6/6/14.  Charomonte, Nicola. “Albert Camus Thought That Life Is Meaningless.” The New Republic. newrepublic.com  11/7/14. John. “Algerian Writer Kamel Daoud Stands Camus’ ‘The Stranger’ on Its Head.” NPR Book Reviews. NPR.org. 6/23/15.

[5]  “The Stranger (novel). Wikipedia. 1/23/16.

[6]  “The Stranger.” Sparknotes.com. 1/23/16.

[7]   “The Stranger.” Amazon.com Review. 1/23/16.

[8]  Adler, Mortimer. How to Read a Book.

[9]  Although Camus worked with Sartre and other existentialists, he repeatedly rejected applying the label existentialist to himself.  Camus rejected what he saw as the radical skepticism bordering on nihilism of some existentialists.  But I think that some of the concepts developed by his one-time mentor and colleague Sartre can be legitimately used in analyzing The Stranger.

[10]  Sartre, Jean Paul. “Existentialism is a Humanism.”  Existentialism is a Humanism. New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2007. pp.25, 47.

[11]  Camus, Albert. The Stranger. New York: Vintage Books, 1946. pp.1, 151.

[12]  Daoud, Kamel. The Meursault Investigation. New York: Other Press, 2015. pp.137, 143.

[13]  Messud, Claire. “The Brother of ‘The Stranger.'” New York Review of Books. 10/22/15.

[14]  Camus, Albert. The Myth of Sisyphus. New York: Vintage Books, 1955. p.

[15]  Sartre, Jean Paul. “A Commentary on The Stranger.” Existentialism is a Humanism. New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2007. p.94.

[16]  Camus, Albert. The Stranger. New York: Vintage Books, 1946. p.123.

[17]  Camus, Albert. The Stranger. New York: Vintage Books, 1946. pp.121, 128.

[18]  Quoted in Gnanasekarau, R. “Psychological Interpretation of the novel ‘The Stranger’ by Camus.” International Journal of English Literature and Culture, Vol.2(6). June 6, 2014.

[19]  Gwyn, Aaron. “Albert Camus’ Poker-faced ‘Stranger’ Became a Much Needed Friend.” NPR Books, WBEZ.  August 10,2014.  Charomonte, Nicola. “Albert Camus Thought That Life Is Meaningless.” The New Republic. newrepublic.com  November 7, 2014.

[20]  Scherr, Arthur. “Camus’ The Stranger.” Baltimore Polytechnic Institute.bpi.edu  9/5/08.

[21]  Hudon, Louis. “The Stranger and the Critics.” Yale French Studies #25. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960. pp.62-63.  Gnanasekarau, R. “Psychological Interpretation of the novel ‘The Stranger’ by Camus.”  International Journal of English Literature and Culture, Vol.2(6). June 6, 2014.

[22]  Podhoretz, Norman. “Camus and his critics.”  The New Criterion. November, 1982. at newcriterion.com

[23]  Poore, Charles. “The Stranger.” Books of the Times. The New York Times, April 11, 1946.

[24]  Camus, Albert. The Stranger. New York: Vintage Books, 1946. pp.76, 89.

[25]  Daoud, Kamel. The Meursault Investigation. New York: Other Press, 2015. pp.2, 7-8, 53.

[26] [26]  See grief.com/the-five-stages-of-grief

[27]  Camus, Albert. The Stranger. New York: Vintage Books, 1946. p.1.

[28]  Camus, Albert. The Stranger. New York: Vintage Books, 1946. p.11.

[29]  Camus, Albert. The Stranger. New York: Vintage Books, 1946. pp.44, 52.

[30]  Camus, Albert. The Stranger. New York: Vintage Books, 1946. pp.72, 75, 76.

[31]  Camus, Albert. The Stranger. New York: Vintage Books, 1946. pp.79, 109-112, 120, 125, 128.

[32]  Camus, Albert. The Stranger. New York: Vintage Books, 1946. pp.104-105, 112, 124, 130.

[33]  Camus, Albert. The Stranger. New York: Vintage Books, 1946. pp.136, 141, 143, 146, 148.

[34]  Camus, Albert. The Stranger. New York: Vintage Books, 1946. p.154.

[35] Camus, Albert. The Myth of Sisyphus. New York: Vintage Books, 1955. p.27.

[36] Hudon, Louis. “The Stranger and the Critics.” Yale French Studies #25. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960. p.60.  Gnanasekarau, R. “Psychological Interpretation of the novel ‘The Stranger’ by Camus.” International Journal of English Literature and Culture, Vol.2(6). June 6, 2014.

[37] Podhoretz, Norman. “Camus and his critics.”  The New Criterion. November, 1982. at newcriterion.com  Ulin, David. “Review ‘The Meursault Investigation’ re-imagines Camus’ ‘The Stranger.'” Los Angeles Times. 5/28/15.

[38]  Sartre, Jean Paul.  “A Commentary on The Stranger.” Existentialism is a Humanism. New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2007. pp.76, 80, 81, 82, 84, 85.

[39] Camus, Albert. The Myth of Sisyphus. New York: Vintage Books, 1955. p.3.

[40] Camus, Albert. The Myth of Sisyphus. New York: Vintage Books, 1955. pp.11, 38, 39.

[41] Camus, Albert. The Myth of Sisyphus. New York: Vintage Books, 1955. pp.8, 22, 40, 76, 83.

[42] Camus, Albert. The Myth of Sisyphus. New York: Vintage Books, 1955. pp.89, 90.

[43] Camus, Albert. The Myth of Sisyphus. New York: Vintage Books, 1955. pp.41, 47, 66.

[44] Gnanasekarau, R. “Psychological Interpretation of the novel ‘The Stranger’ by Camus.” International Journal of English Literature and Culture, Vol.2(6). June 6, 2014.

[45] Scherr, Arthur. “Camus’ The Stranger.” Baltimore Polytechnic Institute.bpi.edu  9/5/08.

[46] Gwyn, Aaron. “Albert Camus’ Poker-faced ‘Stranger’ Became a Much Needed Friend.” NPR Books, WBEZ.  August 10,2014.

[47] Charomonte, Nicola. “Albert Camus Thought That Life Is Meaningless.” The New Republic. newrepublic.com  November 7, 2014.

[48] Quoted in Gnanasekarau, R. “Psychological Interpretation of the novel ‘The Stranger’ by Camus.” International Journal of English Literature and Culture, Vol.2(6). June 6, 2014.

[49]  Sartre, Jean Paul. Existentialism is a Humanism. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007.

[50]  Camus, Albert. The Stranger. New York: Vintage Books, 1946. p.127.

[51] Camus, Albert. The Rebel. New York: Vintage Books, 1956, p.22

[52] Camus, Albert. The Rebel. New York: Vintage Books, 1956. pp.4-5.

[53]  “Albert Camus.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. plato.stanford.edu  “The Rebel: Essay by Camus.” britannica.com.  “Camus: Portrait of a Rebel.” Socialist Standard. worldsocialism.org

[54]  Camus, Albert. The Rebel. New York: Vintage Books, 1956. pp.6, 8, 10, 281, 285.

[55]  Camus, Albert. The Rebel. New York: Vintage Books, 1956. pp.17, 22, 280, 297.

[56]  Daoud, Kamel. The Meursault Investigation. New York: Other Press, 2015. p.47.

[57]  Daoud, Kamel. The Meursault Investigation. New York: Other Press, 2015. pp.11, 34, 60.

[58]  Daoud, Kamel. The Meursault Investigation. New York: Other Press, 2015. pp.119,122.

[59]  Yassin-Kassab, Robin. “The Meursault Investigation by Kamel Daoud review – an instant classic.” the guardian. 6/24/15.

[60]  Messud, Claire. “The Brother of the ‘Stranger.'” New York Review of Books. 10/22/15.

[61]  Moaveni, Azadeh. “‘The Meursault Investigation’ by Kamel Daoud.” Financial Times. 6/10/15. Battersby, Ellen. “The Meursault Investigation by Kamel Daoud review: L’Estranger danger.” Irish Times. 6/27/15.

[62]  “The Meursault Investigation.” Kirkus Review.

[63]  Daoud, Kamel. The Meursault Investigation. New York: Other Press, 2015. p.66.

[64]  Daoud, Kamel. The Meursault Investigation. New York: Other Press, 2015. pp.77, 84, 88, 89.

[65]  Daoud, Kamel. The Meursault Investigation. New York: Other Press, 2015. p.143.

[66]  Daoud, Kamel. The Meursault Investigation. New York: Other Press, 2015. pp.53, 55.

[67]  Daoud, Kamel. The Meursault Investigation. New York: Other Press, 2015. p.89.

[68]  Daoud, Kamel. The Meursault Investigation. New York: Other Press, 2015. p.47.

[69]  Daoud, Kamel. The Meursault Investigation. New York: Other Press, 2015. p.140-142.

[70]  Powers, John. “Algerian Writer Kamel Daoud Stands Camus’ ‘The Stranger’ on Its Head.” NPR Book Reviews. NPR.org  6/23/15.

Revolt of the Minor Characters: A Suggestion for a Dickens Imitation

Revolt of the Minor Characters: A Suggestion for a Dickens Imitation

Burton Weltman

Dickens has frequently been criticized for the blandness and even insipidness of most of his major characters, especially his leading women.  It is his secondary characters who most readers find most interesting and who Dickens probably enjoyed the most.  His main characters were seemingly written to satisfy Victorian expectations.  His minor characters were written to satisfy his own tastes.

So, here is a suggestion for a writer with enough daring and skill to undertake a Dickens imitation: Have your novel revolve around a slew of Dickens’ minor characters.

The corpus of Dickens’ work essentially embodies a single universe.  Any one of his characters could plausibly appear in any of his stories.   On this basis, you could write a story that included, for example, Mr. Micawber, Mr. M’Choakumchild, Sarai Gamp, Uriah Heep, Sam Weller, Mrs. Jellyby, the Artful Dodger, Major Joseph Bagstock, the Reverend Chadband, Monsieur Rigaud, Rogue Riderhood, Bradley Headstone, and the Bagnet, Squeers and Smallwood families, just to name a few of the possible participants.  You could construct a wonderful story with a host of delightful and disgusting secondary Dickens characters all bouncing off of each other without the drag of those bland primary Dickens characters.

I think that most Dickensophiles would love to read such book.

 

Whalers, Whales and Morality Tales: Voyages of Discovery in Melville’s “Moby Dick.” What’s with all those boring whale chapters?

Whalers, Whales and Morality Tales:

Voyages of Discovery in Melville’s Moby Dick.

What’s with all those boring whale chapters?

Burton Weltman

“Over the years you have been

hunted by men who threw harpoons”

Crosby, Stills & Nash

Preface: Boring is as boring does.  

Herman Melville’s Moby Dick is often acclaimed as “the great American novel.”  But it is a book more honored than read.  People often say that it may be great, but it is boring.  And I think that if you take the conventional approach to reading the book, it may be a bore.  But it does not have to be that way.

History as Choice and Moby Dick

“And in the long run he will kill you to fed the pets we raise, put the flowers in your vase and make the lipstick for your face.”  Crosby, Stills & Nash

Call me Ishmael, says the narrator in the opening words of the book.  He is a self-described outcast, outsider, wanderer, and seeker.  He is a loner who needs continually to choose how to live with others and how to make a decent way through life.  A model for an existentialist hero from Sartre or Camus, he experiences life as a succession of voyages of discovery, both literally and figuratively.  Surviving the destruction of the whaling ship Pequod by the white whale Moby Dick, he lives to tell its tale and to retell his own history as a series of fateful choices.

Moby Dick is a history book.  It is also a mystery, a romance, a gothic story and many other things.  But it is first and foremost a history book that combines a fictional history of the Pequod’s last voyage with a factual history of whales and whaling as these things were known circa 1850.  The author, Herman Melville, has alternated chapters that follow the storyline of the Pequod Captain Ahab’s monomaniacal obsession with killing the white whale with chapters that describe and discuss whales and whaling in general.

The conventional approach to reading and understanding Moby Dick focuses on the Ahab storyline and essentially dismisses the book’s discussion of whales and whaling as some kind of extraneous complement to the Ahab story.  Approached in this way, the chapters on the whales seem to clog up the works and get in the way of the Ahab storyline, and the book as a whole may seem more tedious than it is worth.

In focusing so singularly on Ahab’s monomania, the conventional approach to Moby Dick is similar to most conventional approaches to history.  It is, like them, essentially a one-dimensional explanation of events based on a simple chain of causation and, like them, it is unsatisfactory.  But the book can also be approached through the lens of history as people making choices.  Taking this approach, we can look for the debates in the book, the alternatives available to the characters, and the choices they make.  And we can evaluate their options and choices compared with our own.  The book becomes like real life.

Instead of a one-dimensional narrative, the book becomes a multi-layered story portraying a multi-tiered series of choices, a voyage of discovery for the narrator, the characters, and the reader that dramatizes many of the social and intellectual issues of Melville’s time and ours.  Looked at as an example of writing, reading and thinking about history as people making choices, the book becomes, complex, enlightening and exciting, even including the chapters on the whales.

Competing Narratives: Whalers versus Whales. 

“Over the years, you swam the ocean following feelings of your own.”  Crosby, Stills & Nash

While the conventional approach to Moby Dick focuses almost solely on the Ahab narrative line, the book in fact consists of two equally important narrative lines.  One follows Ahab, Ishmael and his fellow whalers on the Pequod as they hunt for whales, especially for Moby Dick, and ends with Moby Dick’s destruction of the ship.  On the whole, this narrative line is almost always interesting and often exciting.

The other narrative line consists of a series of intermittent essays discussing whales and whaling.  Many of these essays, especially those in the first part of the book, are dry as dust and seem boring to most readers.  These essays are the primary reason why the book is more honored than read.  No sooner do many readers encounter the first such chapter entitled “Cetology” than they decide that this is not a book they want to continue reading.  But tedious as some of the early chapters on whales may be – and you can probably skim them if you want – they are not merely an extraneous add-on.  Rather, they are crucial to Ishmael’s voyages of discovery in the book and the reader’s as well.

The two narrative lines develop for the most part in opposite directions and often clash, reflecting Ishmael’s ambivalence and changing opinions with regard to his two main subjects, whalers and whales, as he narrates his story.  In the early chapters, whalers are idealized and idolized as heroic specimens of humanity.  Whales are presented as merely specimens of fish that are useful for commercial exploitation. (Ishmael insists on defining whales as “spouting fish with horizontal tales” and dismissing their resemblance to mammals such as humans.)  But as the book proceeds, the whales are described in progressively more humane and even human terms.  And the whalers are portrayed in an increasingly negative light, their skills and derring-do a mask for their brutality, until they are sometimes portrayed as inhuman killers of heroic whales.

In Chapter 87, “The Grand Armada,” for example, Ishmael describes a large congregation of whales.  When attacked by the Pequod’s crew, the whales arrange themselves into a series of concentric circles.  The adult whales swim furiously around and around in what seems to be an effort to expose themselves as targets for the whalers while protecting the baby whales and pregnant females sitting quietly in the middle.  In the next chapter, “Schools and Schoolmasters,” Ishmael describes the way in which female whales will stay with and nurse wounded whales despite the danger to themselves and the likelihood they will be attacked by whalers who take advantage of their vulnerability.  Although Ishmael remains ambivalent throughout in his own internal debate about whalers and whaling, readers might conclude that the whalers on the Pequod, as much as we like and admire most of them, got what they deserved in the end.

In the conventional approach, Moby Dick is the personal tragedy of Ahab, a man who blasphemously seeks vengeance against God through attempting to kill what he sees as God’s instrument, a white whale that bit off one of his legs.  Presented in this way, much of the book’s discussion of whaling and whales seems irrelevant and immaterial.  But the book can be seen more broadly as a tragedy of all the whalers on the Pequod and even humans in general, who may act godly toward each other and behave heroically in fulfilling their social obligations, but do evil in slaughtering whales and mistreating other sentient creatures of the Lord.  Looked at in this way, the whale chapters become important to the book and interesting to think about.

Competing Narrators: Ishmael the Sailor, Ishmael the Whaler, and Ishmael the Prophet.   

“Now you are washed up on the shoreline. I can see your body lie.  It is a shame you had to die to put a shadow on our eye.  Crosby, Stills & Nash

Melville changed his mind about the nature and direction of the book several times as he was writing it.  One of the ways this plays out in the finished work is in the way Ishmael displays different and changing attitudes toward whales and whalers in his various roles as a character in the story, a narrator who tells the story as it unfolds, and a commenter on the story after the fact.

We encounter him first as a naive sailor on his maiden whaling voyage, then as a participant observer of the activities on the Pequod, and finally, some years after the destruction of the ship, as a mature thinker about life and humanity and the narrator of the book.  In each of these roles, Ishmael debates with himself issues concerning whalers, whales and the world, and the choices he and we should make in our lives.  His views change and sometimes conflict with each other.  He is sometimes Sailor, sometimes Whaler, and, finally, Prophet.  And his roles shift and sometimes conflict with each other.  But in this way he is like a real person.

Ishmael the Sailor.  The book begins as a simple adventure story similar to Melville’s previously published novels that were based on his own seafaring voyages.  Ishmael tells us in the opening that whenever he gets fed up with the constraints of being a landsman, he takes to the sea for an air of freedom.  There is an irony to Ishmael’s claim that life as a sailor in cramped quarters under the dictatorial rule of a ship captain feels like freedom.  At sea, he is free from the social expectations that he experiences and the myriad of choices that he has to make as a landsman.  He merely has to follow orders and do his job, and he experiences this as freedom.

Ishmael tells us that he had formerly been a sailor on merchant ships, but that at the time the story in the book begins, he was looking for work on a whaling ship.  We are regaled in the early chapters with numerous pitfalls and pratfalls that he experiences as he makes his way to a job on the Pequod, including some high jinks when he befriends the cannibal Queequeg who becomes his shipmate and soul mate.  The book seems at this point to be a voyage of discovery for Ishmael and for the reader about whaling as a heroic enterprise and whales as a worthy and worthwhile object of that enterprise.

Ishmael’s naive joy and enjoyment of sailing appear throughout the book.  He is continuously bemused by the wonders of whaling and whales, and amused by the antics of his shipmates.  But he is also frequently struck by the brutality of whale hunting and the butchery of whales.  And he faces questions about the morality of the enterprise and the perennial question of whether and how to evaluate the relative goods, evils and overall worthiness of human enterprises.

Ishmael the Whaler. 

After the first few chapters, the tone of the book changes as we are introduced to the character of Ahab.  We are privy to forebodings about Ahab’s hubris and what soon becomes his misappropriation of the Pequod in his personal quest for vengeance against Moby Dick.  Ishmael begins to confront social and political questions that concern his life on the Pequod and ultimately determine the fate of the ship.  What sort of community does the Pequod constitute and what is and should be the relationship of its members?  By what rights and within what limits does Ahab as captain proceed?  What is the nature of the relationship of the Pequod’s sailors to their captain?  What rights and abilities do they have to resist him?

The book now takes on the aspect of a voyage of discovery through some of the social and political debates that were prominent in the mid-nineteenth century and are still important today.  Three main ideologies vied for acceptance at that time: the traditional republicanism of the founding fathers, a communitarianism derived from the Puritans and the practices of local communities during the eighteenth century, and a laissez-faire individualism which was a new idea at the time.

Traditional republicanism was a mercantilist philosophy of social control and economic development.  It promoted as society that was managed from the top down by elite leaders who would provide a government of the people and for the people but not, for the most part, by the people.  It was a philosophy of benevolent paternalism.  This program was promoted at the time by national leaders such as John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay and Daniel Webster.  It is represented in Moby Dick by the two retired ship captains who are the primary owners of the Pequod.

The owners of the ship are pacifist Quakers who have named their ship seemingly in honor of the native Indians of Massachusetts who were annihilated during the late seventeenth century by English settlers.  Ironically, the ship’s owners have no problems with slaughtering whales whom they consider to be beneath their concern.  They are, however, benevolently concerned that the ship should hunt whales safely and effectively so as to produce the maximum profit for both the ship’s owners and the crew. The crew of a whaling ship were paid a percentage of the profit produced by a ship’s voyage.  As such, everyone had a shared interest in the success of a voyage.  On board the Pequod, this traditional republican view is represented by the first mate Starbuck who presents the only opposition to Ahab’s mad pursuit of Moby Dick.

Communitarianism was a philosophy of social control and economic development managed from the bottom up by ordinary people in cooperative local communities.  Communitarianism fitted in well with the way that most Europeans settled in America.  From the Pilgrims and Puritans on, most immigrants from Europe had come in groups that had lived in the same locality in their old country and then settled together in the new country.  Likewise, when European-Americans moved westward across the continent, they generally moved in groups and first set up new towns and community institutions before attempting to attract more people.  The community came first, both chronologically and ideologically, and individual people came after.

This ideology was promoted nationally by Horace Greeley and Albert Brisbane who were disciples of the utopian socialist Fourier.  Communitarianism is represented in Moby Dick by the crew of the Pequod who work and live together cooperatively and, for the most part, without being ordered about by the ship’s officers.  Ishmael tells us that these sailors floundered on land as isolated individuals — “isolatoes” he calls them — but lived as a cooperative community on the ship.

Individualism was a philosophy of society based on the egoistic strivings of individual persons, leading to a competition of each person against every other and a struggle for mastery and dominance over one’s fellows.  It was represented by American leaders such as Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren.  They saw the enormous expansion of the territory and the economy of the United States during the first half of the nineteenth century as an opportunity to down-size the role of government and emphasize the aspirations of self-made heroic individuals.  This idea is represented on the Pequod by Captain Ahab.

Ishmael is initially impressed by the paternalism of the ship’s owners and by Starbuck’s good sense.  He is later carried away with the comradeship and cooperation of the ship’s crew and becomes part of their community.  But he is finally overwhelmed, along with the rest of the crew, by Ahab’s charismatic domination and determination to kill Moby Dick at all costs, a determination that costs the lives of all of them except for Ishmael.

In telling his story, Ishmael is impressed by the ability of the multinational and multicultural crew — sailors of all colors and religions from all over the world — to live and work together peacefully, but he is depressed by the way they and he were so easily cowed and manipulated by Ahab.  He thereby confronts the question of whether people can live together democratically and cooperatively or whether they will invariably fall prey to strong-willed demagogues and desperados, a question we still face today.

Ishmael the Prophet. 

“Maybe we’ll go.  Maybe we’ll disappear.  It’s not that we don’t know.  It’s just that we don’t want to care.”   Crosby, Stills & Nash.

By the end of Ishmael’s story, it seems clear that Moby Dick is merely a whale who has been minding his own business and who did not want anything to do with Ahab or the Pequod.  But when Ahab and his crew would not leave him alone and repeatedly attacked him, the whale finally does the only rational thing he could choose to do.  He destroys the ship and kills as many of the whalers as he can.

Ishmael tells us early in the book that he has been a school teacher so that we know he is book-learned man.  We see this book learning reflected in the erudition of his later philosophical discussions and his whale chapters.  Ishmael also indicates to us in several asides scattered throughout the book that he has been on several additional whaling voyages after the demise of the Pequod and has done considerable research and reflection on whales, whaling and the world.  It is this mature Ishmael who seems responsible for the insertion of the counter-narrative about whales and whaling that develops in the course of the book and the philosophical reflections that are scattered throughout.  Ishmael thereby takes himself and us on a voyage of discovery through competing theories and beliefs about man’s place in the universe.

The first signs of this theme appear early in the book at the end of a sequence of three chapters, “The Chapel,” “The Pulpit” and “The Sermon,” about a visit by Ishmael and his cannibal friend Queequeg to a church in New Bedford before shipping out on the Pequod.  The first two of these chapters are written in the whimsical tone in which the book begins, with this visit to the church as seemingly just another scenic episode in what is apparently going to be a lighthearted adventure story narrated by Ishmael the Sailor.  But the tone changes dramatically in the chapter on “The Sermon” in which Father Mapple, an old whaler turned preacher, gives a sermon from the Bible on Jonah and the whale that swallowed him.

For most of the sermon, Father Mapple concentrates on the consequences of Jonah’s defying the Lord, and Jonah’s travails with the whale seem to be a foreboding of Ahab’s blasphemous attack on God through Moby Dick and the demise of the Pequod as a consequence.  The sermon thus seems to serve as a prequel to the Pequod crew’s trials and tribulations and the narration of Ishmael the Whaler.

But at the end of his sermon, Father Mapple emphasizes a second lesson of the Jonah story which opens up a new theme.  He notes that Jonah’s initial sin was in refusing to give the inhabitants of Nineveh some bad news from God for fear of their reaction against him.  Father Mapple then emphasizes that a person must not fail to tell what he thinks is the truth for fear of what the reaction of others might be.  This lesson seems to serve as a prequel to Ishmael’s role as a Prophet in his narration of the book and especially in his counter-narrative on whales and whaling.  Ishmael has a message that he must deliver to the whalers with whom he has been living and working: that whales are intelligent and sentient creatures and that killing them for profit is immoral.  He leads us to that message gradually and through story form rather than thundering at us as Father Mapple does in his sermon.  But the message is clear.

Ishmael’s developing crisis of conscience reflects many of the religious and ethical debates that  occurred during the mid-nineteenth century and that are still with us today.  The United States was in the midst of what has been called the Second Great Awakening.  This was an evangelical Christian upsurge that turned many people toward abolitionism and other humane reform movements and led many to rethink the place of humans in the universe.  They engaged in controversies over the nature and historical accuracy of the Bible, including debates over the Biblical Creation story versus pre-Darwinian theories of evolution, and whether God and God’s commands can ever be truly known by man.  Many of them spoke out despite the adverse and sometimes violent reactions of their fellow Americans.

As the sole survivor of the Pequod’s destruction, Ishmael seems to feel that, like Jonah, he has been chosen to deliver a message to his fellow whalers and to humankind as a whole.  Ironically, Ishmael has gone to sea in order to avoid the social obligations and moral choices that he had to face as a landsman but finds that, like Jonah, he cannot run away from his obligations and must make the moral choice to deliver a message that his hearers might not like.

The message he delivers through his narration and comments on the story of Ahab and Moby Dick is that God is unfathomable but His creation is sacred.  That Biblical literalism will not get you to the Word of God.  That the difference between humans and other sentient creatures is not as great as it seems in the Bible and does not justify the oppression and murder of them.  That defying God through attacking His creatures is vain and self-destructive.  And, finally, that we must all learn to live together or we will perish together.  This message continues to be poignant, pertinent and controversial today.

Postscript: Finishing the book. 

Moby Dick is a book that is easy to pick up, but then easy to put down.  And I think most readers do just that, initially entranced by the antics of Ishmael and Queequeg, and then bored to death by the whale chapters.   So, I think that a key to finishing the book is to skim your way through the boring whale chapters.  Don’t get bogged down in the details of whale skeletons and whatever.  I don’t think, in any case, that you are expected to dwell on the whale chapters.  They are mainly symbolic and strategic.  They are part of the overall plan and arc of the story, and it is important to know what is their gist, but they are not important in themselves.  

BW  6/14