The Will to Believe and “The Wizard of Oz”: Pragmatism and Progressivism along the Yellow Brick Road. It’s Really about the Wizard.

The Will to Believe and The Wizard of Oz:

Pragmatism and Progressivism along the Yellow Brick Road.  

It’s Really about the Wizard.

 Burton Weltman

“Do you believe in the magic in a young girl’s heart?…

If you believe in magic, come along with me.”

The Lovin’ Spoonful.

The Conventional Misreading of the Wizard of Oz as a Paean to Individualism.

“Oz never gave nothing to the Tin Man

That he didn’t, didn’t already have before.”

 America.

The Wizard of Oz has had a magical history.  The original version of the Wizard’s story, The Wonderful Wizard of Oz (1900), was a best-seller in its time, and L.Frank Baum, its author, subsequently wrote twelve other popular Oz books.  Baum also wrote a successful Broadway musical based on the story, and there have been several plays and movies based on it.  The movie The Wizard of Oz (1939) won two Academy Awards and continues to the present day to be the most watched movie of all time.  A second Broadway musical of the story, The Wiz (1978), was a hit, and it won a Tony Award as best musical of the year.  It was also made into a successful movie.  Many of the characters in the story, especially the Scarecrow, the Tin Man, the Cowardly Lion, and the Wizard, have continued over the years to appear in dozens of spinoff tales.[1]  What is it about the story of the Wizard of Oz that makes for its continuing popularity?

The conventional explanation for the story’s popularity is that it is a celebration of individualism, a characteristic upon which Americans ostensibly pride themselves.  “Is there any more prominent message of American individualism than this one?  We never get tired of hearing that we control our own outcomes.”[2]  The conventional view is based on the fact that in the story the Scarecrow, the Tin Man and the Lion were primed and ready to be smart, compassionate, and courageous, respectively, before they met Dorothy, let alone the Wizard.  In this view, the story is about ignoring what others think of you, and finding yourself in yourself.

So, for example, the Scarecrow was already smart before he met Dorothy, let alone got an ersatz brain from the Wizard.  He was just hanging on a pole, waiting for a chance to show off his intelligence.  His innate intelligence is demonstrated by the solutions he invented to the problems he and his comrades encountered en route to Emerald City.  The Scarecrow did not need any help to be smart.  He was already smart by himself.[3]

Likewise, the Tin Man was already innately compassionate.  He consistently demonstrated compassion from the start, even walking carefully so as not to step on ants.  The Lion was, in turn, already brave.  He repeatedly responded courageously to dangerous situations that the comrades faced on their way to Emerald City, and scared off threatening attackers.[4]  Dorothy’s colleagues were all already what they wanted to be before the story began, they just didn’t know it.  Once they were set in motion upon meeting up with Dorothy, however, they all realized their true natures as they responded to the crises they faced in the course of their adventures.

In this conventional view, the Wizard was merely a faker who, as the rock group America proclaims in the “Tin Man” song, contributed nothing to the wellbeing of the Scarecrow, the Tin Man, and the Lion.  They already had in themselves what they needed, without any help from the Wizard or anyone else.  In this view, the Wizard was useless.  He was such a humbug that he could not even control his balloon so as to take Dorothy home to Kansas.  Finally, in this view, Emerald City, over which the Wizard ruled, was merely an insignificant stage setting for the adventures of Dorothy and her companions.  It was not an important part of the story.

This conventional view places the story within the ideologically archconservative framework that was predominant in this country during the late nineteenth century, and that has been resurrected by rightwing ideologists in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century.  As promoted then by such prominent figures as the sociologist William Graham Sumner and the Supreme Court Justice Stephen Field, this ideology idealized laissez-faire capitalism and the supposedly self-made individuals, the Great Men, who ostensibly made possible everything worthwhile.[5]  In the conventional view of The Wizard of Oz, the United States was then, and is now, a land of self-made individualists, and the story promotes an ideology of individualism.  In this view, the success of the story, then and now, is based on its support for that ideology.  I don’t agree.[6]

Lost at See: Dorothy faces an Existential Crisis.

 “Existence precedes Essence.”

Jean Paul Sartre.

The Wonderful Wizard of Oz opens with a commonly used narrative device that is designed to inform readers that strange things are going to be forthcoming.  The device is to situate a character alone in an unknown and potentially hostile environment, often as the result of an accident such as a shipwreck at sea, and then see how the character makes out.  Examples of this device include Ulysses shipwrecked and stranded among the Phaeacians in the Odyssey; Viola in Twelfth Night shipwrecked and alone in Illyria; Robinson Crusoe shipwrecked on a deserted island in Robinson Crusoe; and, Oliver Twist orphaned and adrift in London in Oliver Twist.

All of these characters were wrenched out of the contexts in which they had lived, and were then faced with questions of how to see themselves and survive in their new environments.  They ask themselves: Where am I?  What am I doing here?  Who am I in this place?  What do I do now?  They are put into a predicament that is analogous to what is often called the existential situation of humankind.  We are all born into times and places not of our choosing, asking ourselves who we are and what we are doing here, and faced with the need to make something of ourselves and make our ways in the face of perplexity and adversity.

This is the situation of the main characters in The Wonderful Wizard of Oz, not only Dorothy, but also the Scarecrow, the Tin Man, the Cowardly Lion, and the Wizard.[7]  All of them have been displaced physically and psychologically, and have found themselves, through no fault of their own, stranded and alone in Oz.  Dorothy was the victim of a tornado.  The Scarecrow was stuck on a pole in a field by a farmer.  The Tin Man had rusted in an unexpected rain storm.  The Lion was chased out of the forest by the other animals.  And the Wizard was the victim of a wayward balloon in a storm.  The book is the story of five people, each facing an existential crisis, and struggling with the help of others to make a way in the world.  Each successfully makes it because of their belief in each other, and their support of each other.  That, I contend, is the moral of the story.  Rather than a conservative paean to individualism, and an admonition to believe in merely oneself, the story is a progressive testament to cooperation and the will to believe in each other.

Seeing the Wizard through Progressive Eyes as an Emerald City Manager.

 “If ever, oh ever a Wiz there was,

The Wizard of Oz is one becoz,…

Of the wonderful things he does.”

Lyrics by Yip Harburg.

Sung by Judy Garland & Ray Bolger.

In the progressive view of the story that I am suggesting, the Wizard was not intended by Baum to be dismissed as a marginal character or a mere faker.  The Wizard is a central and sympathetic figure in the story, even a hero of sorts.  And I think audiences feel this.  The book, after all, is named The Wonderful Wizard of Oz.  It is named after the Wizard, as are the movie and musical versions of the story.  It is not named after Dorothy or any of the other characters in the story, as are some of Baum’s later Oz books.  The Wizard is also merely called the Wizard.  He is given no other name, and this seems to attest to his special status in the story.  He is, in turn, called the Wonderful Wizard of Oz, not the Charlatan Wizard of Oz.

Significantly, when it becomes clear that the Wizard cannot perform the magic that Dorothy and her comrades expect, and Dorothy tells him “I think you are a very bad man,” he replies “Oh, no my dear; I’m really a very good man; but I’m a very bad Wizard.”  When the Scarecrow, in turn, accusatorily says “You’re a humbug,” the Wizard calmly replies “Exactly so,” and admits, with seemingly some relief, that “I’m just a common man.”[8]  That is a telling statement from the Wizard.  The phrase “common man” resonated deeply and positively with Americans during the twentieth century, most of whom thought of themselves as common people.  I think that audiences over the years have identified and sympathized with the Wizard, even if he was a humbug.  We are all, after all, humbugs in some ways and to some extent.

The Wizard justifies his pretending to be a wizard by pointing to what he has done in building and maintaining Emerald City, the city that he founded and administers.  The book was written at a time when progressives were starting to promote city managers as a supplement to the politics of governing cities.  City managers would provide expert administration as an alternative to the corruption of the political machines and the dominance of rich businessmen in city governance.  The Wizard claims that Emerald City abounds with “every good thing that is needed to make one happy,” and he contends that “I have been good to the people and they like me.”  I think that readers of the book and viewers of the movies agree with him, and feel that Emerald City is a wonderful, if somewhat weird, place.  I think that they also naturally empathize with the Wizard’s position, and feel that he, in fact, did wonderful things for Emerald City.

It is also the case that, contrary to the “Tin Man” song, the Wizard did give something to the Scarecrow, the Tin Man and the Lion.  The trinkets he gave them as surrogates for a brain, a heart, and courage were a confirmation to them of their most cherished qualities.  And they each felt much better for the confirmation.  They did not disparage the gewgaws or reject the Wizard for giving them mere trinkets.  The trinkets were proof that others believed in them, so that they could believe in themselves.  Baum seemed to be saying with this reaction that we are not self-made individualists.  We are social beings who need support from others, even in the form of symbolic placebos of no inherent value in themselves.

The Wizard was a faker but he was also a man of good faith.  When he asks Dorothy why he should help her, she replies “Because you are strong and I am weak.”  So, like Dr. Seuss’ elephant Horton, who says “I’ve got to protect them. I’m bigger than they” when he hears the tiny Whos calling for help, the Wizard does help her.[9]  Pace the conventional view of the story, the Wizard did, in fact, fulfill his promises to each of the four comrades.  He gave symbolic but satisfactory trinkets to the Scarecrow, Tin Man and Lion, and he was willing and capable of returning Dorothy to Kansas in his balloon.  It was not the Wizard’s fault that when his balloon began to ascend, Dorothy went chasing after her dog and, thereby, missed her ride.  Although the Wizard was just a common man, he did, on the whole, do good and wonderful things.

As a common man who achieved wonderful things, the Wizard is a source of inspiration and support to those of us who see ourselves as common people.  When Dorothy lands in Oz, she is astonished at being hailed as a heroine and a witch, both because she had not done anything extraordinary and because there were no such things as witches in Kansas.  In the book, the Good Witch of the North[10] explains to Dorothy that there are witches and wizards in Oz because “the Land of Oz has never been civilized.”  There are none in Kansas because it is civilized.

Baum seems to be saying here that with civilization comes what we would today call cultural disillusionment, that is, no longer seeing the world as full of spirits and spirituality.  By the turn of the twentieth century, when Baum wrote the book, the scientific explanation of things had largely replaced explanations based on magic or religion.  The supernatural had been naturalized, and the wonder taken out of wonderful things.  This is what the philosopher Nietzsche meant when he said at the time that “God is dead.”  Baum, who eschewed conventional religion and was a member of the Ethical Culture Society, supported this secular and scientific trend.

The implication of the Good Witch’s explanation seems to be that in an uncivilized society such as Oz, the Wizard had to pretend that he had magic as a means of gaining the status he needed to build and rule over the Emerald City.  But, and this is the key, he was able to build and administer the city without magic, because he actually had no magical abilities.  The conclusion that Baum seems to want us to reach is that common people can do this same sort of thing in Kansas and elsewhere in our mundane world.  They can build wonderful cities full of good things for all and sundry, even for immigrant scarecrows and tin men.  Baum was personally a political supporter of first Populism and then Progressivism.  He was a democrat and a social reformer.  He believed in the power of ordinary people to do good and great things.

The book exemplifies this belief.  Ordinary people in the book achieve extraordinary results through ordinary means.  Dorothy kills the Wicked Witch of the East, something the Good Witch of the North admitted she was not powerful enough to do, by accidentally falling on her in a house.  Dorothy kills the Wicked Witch of the West by accidentally spilling a bucket of water on her.  And the Wizard supervises the mundane construction and operation of a wonderful city.

In a civilized society, Baum seemed to be saying, there are no witches or wizards with supernatural powers, and no “Great Men” of the sort nineteenth century conservatives such as Thomas Carlyle and William Graham Sumner claimed had made society and make history.  Baum was saying that ordinary people are obliged to make society and history by caring for each other.  This is what Dorothy and her friends did in combating the Wicked Witch.  This is also what the Wizard had essentially done with the citizens of Emerald City in making their society.  He did not actually have any magic powers other than his caring for the people.  The city has been built through the cooperative efforts of the citizens, with the Wizard acting merely as city manager.  And that, according to Baum, is civilization at its highest.

Seeing Emerald City through a Utopian Lens.

“I once asked the Wizard of Oz

For the secret of his land.

He said ‘Just take a look around here.

Seven dwarves and Little Boy Blue,

Uncle Remus and Snow White, too.

(Now, just between us.

That’s what is known as integration.)’”

Chuck Mangione.

If the Wizard is the center of the story, then Emerald City is the centerpiece of the book.  Emerald City is described as an ideal society, almost a utopian cooperative community.  Baum was politically what we would call a liberal.  In his writings as a journalist and in his stage plays, he frequently criticized powerful capitalists and conservative politicians.  Although The Wonderful Wizard of Oz does not include any specific political references, it has been seen as a populist allegory (see Footnote #6 above) and, more importantly, it includes a progressive vision of society in the form of Emerald City.  It was a vision in line with other reformers in his time.

The period of the late nineteenth through the early twentieth century was an age of reform.  The country seemed to recoil from the crassness of the previous decades of rampant corruption and cutthroat capitalism, the so-called Gilded Age (Mark Twain) or Brown Decades (Lewis Mumford).  It was also an age of reaction against the right-wing Social Darwinian ideology that had been promoted by the business elites of the time. Social Darwinism, a misnomer and misuse of the theory of evolution that was rejected by Darwin, promoted the dominance of the fittest in society, with fitness mainly defined in terms of wealth.  Developed in England by Herbert Spencer and in the United States by William Graham Sumner, this theory idealized laissez-faire competitive capitalism in which winners, meaning the wealthy, should deservedly thrive, and losers, meaning the poor, should deservedly die off.[11]

The theory also promoted what we would today call a zero-sum approach to society.  It held that there is only a limited amount of wealth and well-being in the world, and one person’s gain is another person’s loss.  Social relations are invariably invidious because my success inevitably results in your failure, and vice versa.  If I win, you lose.  If you win, I lose.  We cannot both succeed.  The theory, thereby, promoted a Hobbesian war of each against all, and a Malthusian rejection of cooperation and compassion.  Social Darwinism was influential among the political and economic elites of the late nineteenth century, and was virtually written into the Constitution by a right-wing majority on the Supreme Court.[12]

Populism in the late nineteenth century and Progressivism in the early twentieth century emerged as political and social movements against the Social Darwinian political and social conditions of the time.  As part of this reform wave, there was a flood of utopian proposals, both theoretical and experimental.  Many of these proposals were in the form of novels.  Edward Bellamy’s utopian novel Looking Backward (1886) was the most popular book of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, other than the Bible.  Utopian novels were also written by William Dean Howells, the dean of American literature, Ignatius Donnelly, the Populist leader, and many other important writers.

There was also an upsurge in utopian community experiments.  These included the Equality Colony in Washington, founded in 1900, and the Fairhope Community in Alabama, founded in 1894 and still in existence.[13]  Many of these communities were racially and ethnically integrated, and were based on gender equality.  Many were made up of recent immigrants to America.

In his portrayal of Emerald City, Baum played into a genre of utopian literature with which readers in his time were very familiar.  It is significant that the citizens of Emerald City greeted and cared for Dorothy and her odd assortment of companions – a walking, talking scarecrow, tin man and lion; how weird must that have seemed – as though they were ordinary people and good friends. The story is infused with examples of immigration and cultural pluralism, with people and creatures of all sorts living together in the same community or in contiguous communities.

Dorothy and her companions were themselves all immigrants – strangers in this strange land – as was even the Wizard.  Their differentness was accepted in Oz, and even welcomed.  The citizens of Emerald City, in turn, had no problem with the Scarecrow becoming the head of their government when the Wizard left.  It is a vision of a cooperative and inclusive society to which I think readers of The Wonderful Wizard of Oz, and viewers of the movies based on the book, have responded positively from Baum’s time to ours.

Believing is Seeing: William James as the Wizard.

“Fairy tales can come true,

It can happen to you,

If you’re young at heart.”

Lyrics by Johnny Richards.

Sung by Frank Sinatra.

The Wonderful Wizard of Oz was written as a kids’ book for the young and the young at heart.  My father used to say that the key to staying young at heart was to avoid hardening of the arteries and hardening of the categories.  Hardening of the arteries results from a buildup of plaque in your blood vessels which blocks the flow of blood in your body, and can lead to heart attack.  Hardening of the categories results from a buildup of prejudice in your opinions which blocks the flow of new ideas in your mind, and can lead to heartlessness.  Hardening of the arteries can usually be avoided with proper diet and exercise.  Hardening of the categories can be avoided by keeping one’s mind open to new ideas and new people.  Closed-minded rigidity of any sort, whether ideological, philosophical, cultural, racial, religious, or otherwise, can lead to the hardening of one’s ethical categories, and to heartlessness.  The Wonderful Wizard of Oz is a book intended to keep the mind open and the heart healthy.

Baum said in his introduction to the book that he wrote it as “a modern fairy tale in which the wonderment and joy are retained and the heartaches and nightmares are left out.”  Traditional children’s stories were full of horrible things happening to children, sometimes because they did not obey the rules that their elders had laid upon them, other times because they were merely curious or adventurous, still other times just because they innocently happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time.  Most important, the stories often punished trustfulness.  Wicked witches, goblins, and other deceptively foul creatures were portrayed as everywhere out there seducing children to their doom.  “Want a nice piece of candy or bite of apple, dearie?”  That sort of thing.  These stories were intended to scare kids straight, and put them in fear of painful consequences if they did not follow the straight and narrow path laid out for them by their elders.

The Wonderful Wizard of Oz is a different sort of story.  There are plenty of evils to be avoided in the book, but curiosity and adventurous behavior are rewarded and, most important, the story rewards trustfulness.  Dorothy believes in other people, no matter how strange they may appear.  She trusts them, and she helps them to believe in themselves.  Other people, in turn, believe in her, so that she is able to believe in herself.  It is a virtuous circle, and it is the same with the Scarecrow, the Tin Man, the Lion, and the Wizard.  Others believe in them, they believe in others, and they believe in themselves.  They have the will to believe in each other, and that belief is fulfilled.  Help and be helped is the moral of the story.  And caring is the best magic.

This moral of Baum’s story ran directly counter to the precepts of the Social Darwinian and zero-sum thinking of the business elites, and to the conventional educational practices of the time which largely reflected that thinking.  Baum’s intentions were, however, directly in line with the progressive educational practices and pragmatic philosophical theories being developed at the turn of the twentieth century, especially those of William James and John Dewey.

Conventional teaching was based largely on rote memorization, harsh discipline, competitive testing, and student rankings.  Some students were, thereby, categorized and characterized as winners, with others as losers.  It was Social Darwinism in practice.  These zero-sum practices were being challenged by educators, such as James and Dewey, who wanted students to learn how to think critically and act creatively, and who emphasized learning through doing, rather than rote memorization.[14]  James and Dewey argued that the way people learn best, whether they be elite scientists or common people, is through experimenting, that is, through developing hypotheses and then testing them.  It is also, they claimed, the way people live best, that is, by deciding to believe in something, and then seeing if it works.

James and Dewey incorporated this progressive educational theory in a broader philosophy called pragmatism.  Both started as psychologists before turning to philosophy and education, and pragmatism was, in turns, an epistemology, an ontology, and a moral philosophy.  James was world-famous as the psychologist who originated of the “stream of consciousness” theory of thinking, before pivoting into theories of learning, education, and moral philosophy.  In 1896, he wrote an influential essay called “The Will to Believe.”  I have no idea whether Baum read the essay, but the essay reflected currents of thought with which Baum would have been familiar, and I think the themes of the essay are nicely reflected in the story of the Wizard of Oz.[15]

James outlines three key elements of pragmatism in “The Will to Believe” that are reflected in The Wizard of Oz and the actions of the Wizard.  These are that life is a participant experiment, that beliefs can be self-fulfilling, and that truth is established collectively.  First, life is a participant experiment.  In trying to resolve the problems with which we are faced, we are invariably faced with options from which to choose, and for which we never have sufficient evidence to make obvious what is the right choice.  So, we are obliged to martial the best available evidence about our options, develop a plausible hypothesis as to what might the best choice, and then make a leap of faith into the future.[16]

Second, the fact that we believe in something – with the emphasis on “we,” not merely “I” – can help make it so.  “Faith in a fact can help create the fact,” James claimed.[17]  He was not talking about miracles, or about a blind faith that eschews contrary facts, as some critics of James’ essay have claimed.  He was talking about acting in a way that can help create the facts that support our hypotheses.  Like “The Little Engine that Could,” if we believe we can, maybe we can.

Third, and most important, the verification of a hypothesis is a collective action, not an individual act.  It is not the case, as some critics have contended, that pragmatists hold that if something works for you, it is true for you, regardless of what others think.  Pragmatism is a collectivist and cooperative philosophy.  It holds that a person cannot know anything about himself or herself, or even that he or she is a self, without verification from other people.  In turn, a person cannot verify the validity of the choices that he or she has made without the supportive opinions of others.  “Our faith is faith in someone else’s faith,” James contended.[18]  There is no truth for oneself alone, only collective conclusions.  And the more extensive the collectivity that supports a conclusion, the more reliable the conclusion.

I think that pragmatism best describes the way that Dorothy and her companions made their way in the land of Oz, making choices, taking chances, and believing in each other and each other’s beliefs.  It is different than the philosophy reflected in conventional interpretations of The Wizard of Oz.  The conventional interpretations generally reflect a world view that can be characterized as “foundationalist” and “essentialist,” and that is “absolutist.”   In this world view, truth is something that is found.  That is, it already exists and has always existed, even if we don’t know it.  Each person and thing also has an essence, that already exists and has always existed.  And whatever is true, has always and absolutely been true, and always will be.

In this view, you are what you are, and that is that.  While you may find that you are different than the way you mistakenly thought you were, for example, the Scarecrow thinking he was stupid, you cannot change who or what you are.  The Scarecrow found that he was smart, the Tin Man found that he was compassionate, and the Lion found that he was brave.  But they already were those things, albeit they hadn’t realized it.  This essentialist and absolutist view dominated most philosophical and scientific thinking during the nineteenth century.

Pragmatism, in contrast, is a “constructionist” and “existentialist” philosophy, and is “relativist.”  That is, truth is something that is made, including truths about oneself.  In this view, the Scarecrow made himself smart with the help of Dorothy and the others.  Having been rescued by Dorothy from being stuck on a pole, he began to experiment with his intelligence, developing it in practice.  Significantly, some of his early hypotheses did not pan out, as when he walked into a big hole, and had to be rescued by the Tin Man.  Asked why he had not walked around the hole, the Scarecrow claimed that he did not know any better because he did not have any brains.  But very soon, he was figuring out clever ways for the comrades to get over big ditches, without falling in, and solving all sorts of other problems that they faced.  He was learning through experience, and making himself smart.[19]  The Scarecrow, and the other comrades as well, exemplified pragmatic philosophy and progressive education in action.

Pragmatism has been called America’s philosophy, both because it is the only major philosophical school made in America, and because it seems to reflect the way in which Americans have generally approached things when they are not afraid and are not reacting defensively.  Pragmatism is a flexible and tolerant way of thinking about things.  It is a philosophy of hope and hopefulness.  Fear can drive people to defensive absolutisms, and fear most often trumps/Trumps hope.  When Americans heed their better angels, they think and act positively and pragmatically.  When Americans are demagogued and frightened into following their darker angels, they think and act negatively and arbitrarily.  The Wizard of Oz is an invocation of tolerance, flexibility, hopefulness, and pragmatism.

Bringing Oz to Kansas: Pragmatism in Practice.

 “There’s no place like home.”

Dorothy in The Wonderful Wizard of Oz.

The Wonderful Wizard of Oz opens with Dorothy’s description of her home in Kansas.  Everything she sees is gray and grim.  The landscape is gray and sparsely vegetated.  The buildings and furnishings are gray and dilapidated.  Her Aunt and Uncle are gray-faced and grim, worn and oppressed by efforts to keep their farm going.  Dorothy complains that they never smile or laugh, and that they are all completely isolated from their neighbors.  Dorothy has no one to cheer her up, except her dog.[20]

When Dorothy gets to Oz, she finds that, despite the Bad Witches, there is dancing, singing, laughing, and lots of color.  After Dorothy meets the Scarecrow and describes Kansas to him, the Scarecrow cannot understand why anyone would want to live in Kansas, and why Dorothy would not want to stay in Oz, which is beautiful and filled with interesting people.  When she answers that “There is no place like home,” the Scarecrow replies facetiously, and with false modesty, “Of course I cannot understand it.  If your heads were stuffed with straw, like mine, you would probably all live in the beautiful places, and your Kansas would have no people in it at all.”[21]  That is, he facetiously claims, only brainless people like him would want to live in beautiful places.  Brainy Kansans like Dorothy would naturally choose to live in desolation.  This is a telling remark that almost certainly hits its mark with readers, and maybe with Dorothy as well.

Almost the first thing Dorothy says, when the Munchkins are celebrating her as a hero for killing the Wicked Witch of the East, is that she wants to go home because her aunt and uncle might be worrying about her.[22]  She cares deeply about her family.  An unanswered question in the story is what will Dorothy do when she gets back to Kansas.  Having seen Oz and Emerald City will she be content to leave things in Kansas as they are, with her gray-faced Aunt and Uncle slaving away so hard for so little, with her gray surroundings, and with her boring life?

Dorothy is like a student who has gone away to college, or a soldier who has gone off to other lands, and then comes back to see home in a new and critical light.  Having returned for the sake of her family, what might Dorothy do further for their sake?  There’s no place like home, but what should that home be like?  Most readers, I think, hope Dorothy will do something to improve her home and the society in which she lives.

The World in Our Minds: A Zero-Sum Game or a Mutual Aid Society?

“Come on legs keep movin’

Don’t you lose no ground

You just keep on keepin’ on

On the road that you choose.”

Lyrics by Charlie Smalls.

Sung by Diana Ross & Michael Jackson.

Why do some people feel threatened by immigrants, seeing them as competitors who will take their jobs and impoverish them, while others welcome immigrants as resources who will help enrich everyone?  Why are some people threatened by cultural pluralism as a dilution of their native culture, while others welcome diversity as a cultural enrichment?  Why do some people picture the world as a zero-sum game in which your advancement is inevitably at my expense, whereas other people see the world as a mutual-aid society in which the success of each is the basis for the advancement of all?  Why is the apt proverb for some people that a rising tide sustains some but drowns others, whereas for others it is that a rising tide raises all?

How we feel towards others must come, at least in part, from what we read, see and listen to, that is, the books, videos and songs from which we draw our picture of the world, and react to phenomena such as immigration and enculturation.  Some books, videos and songs portray aliens as inherently dangerous and cultural change as disastrous.  Many of the violent stories, songs and video games that appeal to adolescents have those themes.  They portray life as a zero-sum game, with every person for him/herself.

Most stories, songs and movies that appeal to younger and older audiences take a different tack, and portray change and diversity as constructive and cooperative.  The stories of Charles Dickens and the Harry Potter books by J.K. Rowling have that theme.  There is plenty of violence and there are evil characters in their books, but the emphasis is on the overriding value of trust and cooperation, rather than mistrust and conflict.  The Wizard of Oz is similar.  The contrast between most children’s literature and most adolescent media is stark and alarming.   

One of the reasons we read books and watch movies, and then reread and re-watch them, is because we feel comfortable in the worlds they portray.  Some people seem to feel more comfortable in imaginary worlds that are scary and reflect violent zero-sum societies.  Others seem more comfortable in mutual aid worlds such as that constructed by Dickens and Rowling.  How and why this is the case is a mystery to me.

This essay is being written on November 14, 2016 in the immediate aftermath of a recent presidential election in which the American people seem to be sharply divided between supporters of Donald Trump and his zero-sum view of the world, and supporters of Hillary Clinton and her mutual aid view.  Much to my regret, fear trumped and Trumped in this election.  She got the most popular votes, but he got the most electoral votes.  Supporters of Clinton are currently in despair at how to bridge the cultural gap between them and Trump’s supporters.  It may be that the continuing popularity among all segments of our population of The Wizard of Oz is an indication that we may have more in common, and that there may be a mutual aid ethic that underlies our differences and may provide a basis for future amity and agreement.

[1] The Wonderful Wizard of Oz   Wikipedia.  Accessed 11/14/16.

[2] Ilan Shira. “Why ‘The Wizard of Oz’ is the most popular film of all time.”  Psychology Today.  6/4/10.

[3] L. Frank Baum. The Wizard of Oz. Aladdin Classics: New York, 1999. pp.50, 54, 57, 139.

[4] L. Frank Baum. The Wizard of Oz. Aladdin Classics: New York, 1999. pp.50-51, 57-58, 63, 72.

[5] William Graham Sumner. Social Darwinism.  Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1963.

[6] There is a collateral interpretation of the story that it is a Populist allegory.  The Populists were a late nineteenth century reform movement of small farmers and workers against the big capitalists who were ostensibly oppressing them.  Baum supported the Populists.  In this interpretation, the witches represent the capitalists, the Scarecrow is the farmers, the Tin Man is the workers, and the Lion is William Jennings Bryan, who was called The Lion of the West and who coopted the Populists in his failed Presidential campaign of 1896.  I have no problem with this Populist interpretation.  It might help explain the story’s popularity in the early 1900’s, albeit, it does not explain its ongoing popularity.  I would object, however, to including in it, as some critics do, a picture of the Populists as individualistic small farmers, a picture that would lend support to the idea that the story promotes individualism.  I reject both the picture of Populism as individualistic and the idea that the story promotes individualism.

[7] Citations in this essay will be to the book The Wonderful Wizard of Oz, but they refer as well to the movie The Wizard of Oz with which readers may be more familiar and which essentially follows the book.

[8] L. Frank Baum. The Wizard of Oz. Aladdin Classics: New York, 1999. pp.142-143, 147.

[9] L. Frank Baum. The Wizard of Oz. Aladdin Classics: New York, 1999. p.96.

[10] In the book, there is a Good Witch of the North who greets Dorothy at the beginning of the story and sets her on her way to see the Wizard, and a Good Witch of the South who meets her at the end and sets her on her way home.  The North Witch puts the magic shoes on Dorothy, but tells Dorothy that she does not know how they work.  It is only the South Witch who seems to know how they work, and only she who can explain it to Dorothy when Dorothy finally meets up with her at the end of the story.  In the Judy Garland movie, the director merged the two witches into one witch, for some unknown reason, and it creates an unnecessary question of why the witch didn’t tell Dorothy how to use the shoes when she first met her.  She put Dorothy to a lot of unnecessary trouble, which was not a nice thing for a good witch to do.

[11] Richard Hofstadter. Social Darwinism in American Thought.  Boston: Beacon Press, 1955.

[12] Robert McCloskey. American Conservatism in the Age of Enterprise, 1865-1910. New York: Harper & Row, 1951.

[13] Robert Sutton. Communal Utopias and the American Experience: Secular Communities, 1824-2000.  

Westport, CN: Praeger, 2004.  “List of American Utopian Communities.” Wikipedia. Accessed 11/14/16.

[14] William James.  Talks to Teachers on Psychology. Mineola, NY: Dover, 2001.

John Dewey. The Child and the Curriculum. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1956.

[15] William James. “The Will to Believe.” Essays on Faith and Morals. New York: World Publishing Co., 1962.

pp.32-62.

[16] William James. “The Will to Believe.” Essays on Faith and Morals. New York: World Publishing Co., 1962.

pp.33-35,62.

[17] William James. “The Will to Believe.” Essays on Faith and Morals. New York: World Publishing Co., 1962.

p.56.

[18] William James. “The Will to Believe.” Essays on Faith and Morals. New York: World Publishing Co., 1962.

p.40.

[19] L. Frank Baum. The Wizard of Oz. Aladdin Classics: New York, 1999. pp.39, 54-58.

[20] In the book, there are no farmhands for company and diversion.

[21] L. Frank Baum. The Wizard of Oz. Aladdin Classics: New York, 1999. pp.28-29.

[22] L. Frank Baum. The Wizard of Oz. Aladdin Classics: New York, 1999. p.13.

Do unto others before they do unto you: The Devolution of Conservatism from Burke to Trump And the Evolution of Pragmatic Liberalism from Madison to Obama.

Do unto others before they do unto you:

The Devolution of Conservatism from Burke to Trump

And the Evolution of Pragmatic Liberalism from Madison to Obama.

 

Burton Weltman

 

“We’ve got what they want, and we aim to keep it.”

Vice President Spiro Agnew

 

Prelude: A Concern with Unintended Consequences.

My purposes in writing this essay are twofold.  First, I will outline what I see as the devolution of conservatism from its starting highpoint in the eighteenth century to its low point as blatant racism, ethnocentrism and mere obstructionism in the present day.  I will focus on the historic concern of conservatives with the potential for unintended negative consequences in undertaking social reform, and their claim that negative results invariably overwhelm any positive change.  Edmund Burke, the father of conservatism, voiced this concern during the eighteenth century as a legitimate question of whether and how we can predict the results of social reform.

What began as a legitimate concern about unintended consequences devolved over the years into an excuse by conservative politicians to oppose any change that might negatively impact their wealthy sponsors.  That practice eventually devolved into a justification for opposing any program that might help racial and ethnic minorities, a coded appeal to the racial fears of white people.  In the current election cycle, what had been a coded appeal to bigotry has become open fearmongering and hate peddling by Donald Trump.  I will argue that the turning point in the devolution of conservatism came with the advent of Social Darwinism at the turn of the twentieth century, and the acceptance of its basic premises by most conservative politicians.

Second, I will argue that the evolution in the early twentieth century of pragmatism as a comprehensive social theory and practice undermined the rationale for conservativism and transformed the rationale for liberalism.  Backed by the methods of the then newly emerging social and physical sciences, pragmatism offered a way for social reforms to be subject to experimental methods, ongoing evaluation, and continuous revision.  This pragmatic review process could effectively mitigate most legitimate concerns about the unintended consequences of reform, so that conservatism had been rendered obsolete.  Politics could safely become a realm of continuous social reform, which is the position represented by President Obama.

Act I.  Actions, Reactions, and Reactionaries: The Birth of Liberalism and Conservatism.

“To every action there is always opposed an equal reaction.”

                 Isaac Newton.

“Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”

               James Madison.

“We must all obey the law of change.  It is the most powerful law of nature.”

              Edmund Burke.

 

Setting the Scene: Let us reason together.

It was the turn of the eighteenth century.  Europeans had suffered through almost two centuries of political upheaval and religious wars.  The Protestant Reformation had precipitated the Catholic Counter-Reformation, which had led to Protestants and Catholics slaughtering each other, and to both Christian groups killing Muslims and Jews.  At the same time, the decline of feudalism had precipitated the economic upheaval of nascent capitalism, with land enclosures creating massive unemployment and unrest.

Europe was, however, about to enter a period that contemporaries called the Enlightenment in which prominent intellectuals and their backers tried to leave behind the superstitions, authoritarianism and violence of previous centuries.  And it was a period of relative calm compared to the recent past, despite the imperial rivalry of England and France, who engaged in a series of imperial wars from the 1690’s through the 1810’s.  During one of those wars, the French helped a group of North American colonies gain their independence from England, and establish the United States.  Calmness and control were watchwords in culture and society during the period.  These goals were reflected in the scientific and political theories and practices of the time, which included the rise of liberalism and conservatism as political philosophies.[1]

Isaac Newton’s World: Inertia, Friction and Orderly Change.

The eighteenth century marks the definitive opening act of modern science and politics.  By modern, I mean the theories and practices from which we most closely derive our own ideas today.  There are many people who can be cited as precursors of modernity, for example Bacon and Galileo in the physical sciences.  But their ideas were not given full exposition until the work of Isaac Newton at the beginning of the eighteenth century.  Newton established a framework that dominated the physical sciences for some two hundred years.  Most notably, in his Three Laws of Motion, Newton reversed scientific theories that dated back to Aristotle, and rejected common sense human experience as well.

In his First Law of Motion, Newton claimed that something in motion would continue moving in a straight line forever unless it was disturbed by some change in circumstances, some force that pushed it out of its inertial course.  That law was in direct contradiction to ancient Aristotle’s theory and to our common sense experience that a thing must be continuously pushed by a force in order to continue in motion.  In our common experience, things grind to a halt unless they are pushed.  That is mainly the result of friction, but since we live in a world of friction, we usually take it for granted, and do not factor it in as a countervailing force in our thinking about things.  Since we have little experience of things moving in a vacuum, in which there is no friction, Newton’s First Law is counter-intuitive to most of us.

Newton’s Second Law of Motion describes the change in circumstances, that is, the force, necessary to change the inertial course of something – to start it, stop it, or redirect it.  His Third Law emphasizes that for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction.  Push and you will be pushed back.  This also seems counter-intuitive to most of us, as we do not experience as pushback the inertial resistance of something we are pushing.  We merely think of it as the heaviness of the object, not that the object is pushing back at us.

In his Laws of Motion, theories of gravity, and other work, Newton described a mechanical universe of complementary and competing forces, in which things take their customary course ad infinitum, unless they are forced to change by natural or unnatural circumstances.  These Laws of Motion were not only counter-intuitive to common sense experience, they also described a more orderly picture of the world than was experienced by most people.  Most Europeans were still reeling from the consequences of the religious and political wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the social and economic upheaval of nascent capitalism.  Most ordinary people lived precarious lives in circumstances that seemed in constant turmoil.  In the religious and political beliefs of most people, the only thing that kept things going and kept them in order was the constant intervention of God, the King and/or some strong outside force.

Newton disagreed.  Although he was a deeply religious man, who spent more time and effort in his studies of religion and ethics than he did on science, Newton’s scientific theories delineated a universe that was very different than that portrayed in conventional religious and political theory.  Contrary to the conventional view of the world as constantly teetering on turmoil, he portrayed a universe which was essentially stable, and in which ordinary people could choose to keep things the same or change them.  He was, thereby, describing the essence of our modern world view.[2]

Newtonian Politics and The Rise of Conventional Political Ideology. Developments in political theory and practice during the eighteenth century followed a course similar to that of physics.  Sharing a Newtonian view of the universe, newly evolving political theories described a political world which operated mechanically and predictably, instead of on the edge of chaos, and in which people could choose their governments, being no longer tethered to Divine Right Kings.  In this political development, liberalism came first, and conservatism came in reaction.

The liberal and conservative ideologies that emerged during this time dominated political theory and practice in England and America for some two hundred years.  They are still influential today.  Aspects of these ideologies were developed by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke during the seventeenth century, Hobbes a conservative forerunner, Locke a liberal forerunner.  Their ideas were given full exposition during the eighteenth century in the theories and practices of the liberal James Madison and the conservative Edmund Burke.[3]

Liberalism: The Obvious Truth.  The term “liberal” began as an ethical concept that denoted generosity.  A liberal person was someone, usually a person of station and means, who gave generously to the less fortunate in society.  During the eighteenth century, the term was extended to politics.  In politics, a liberal was a social reformer and social planner, usually a person of station and with a formal education, whose proposals were designed to make society fairer and more efficient, and were generously intended to help the less fortunate and oppressed in society.

Political liberals, like most devotees of the Enlightenment, believed in the power of Reason (with a capital R).  They generally held that one could derive self-evident truths through reasoning, and then develop social policies based thereon.  They were planners, who thought that if something was wrong, they could rationally design a fix for it.  They were impatient with tradition, as the sepulchral grip of the dead hand of the past choking the present, and insisted on change as the function of reason.  Nature was, to them, something to be tamed and made to work for humans.  Finely landscaped gardens, neatly plowed and hedged wheat fields, and clearly mapped roads and routes were their ideal of nature.  Human nature had similarly to be tamed and bounded, even as social problems were being solved.

Most eighteenth century liberals assumed a social hierarchy in which the People would instinctively defer to their natural leaders, that is, to those in the social and educational elite of society, so long as those leaders fulfilled their natural obligations to rule on behalf of the People.  Government was the result of a contract with the People, and they acted as a check on the elite.  The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of our Founding Fathers exemplified eighteenth century liberal theories.  Based on “self-evident truths,” the Declaration outlines a philosophy of “liberty, equality and the pursuit of happiness” that is derived from Reason, and that balances the rights and duties of subjects with the powers and duties of their rulers.

The Constitution follows the philosophy of the Declaration in establishing a government of separate powers that were expected to check and balance each other, even as they worked together to “promote the general welfare” and provide other social goods for “We, the People.”  The Constitution describes a Newtonian political universe of actions and reactions.  Its original provisions even established different mechanisms and constituencies for the selection of members of the different branches of government.  The purpose of this complicated process was to ensure that no one group in society would dominate the government, and that the majority could not oppress minority groups.  It was also intended to facilitate the selection of members of the elite to most offices.

While the Founders were concerned with restraining politicians from running wild and ruining things, the Constitution also assumes an active government and continuous social reform.  It provides the federal government with powers to make changes in almost every area of society, including the government itself.  It is a short document short on specifics and, therefore, needs to constantly be interpreted and re-interpreted according to changes in society.  It also contains provisions for amending itself and, thereby, assumes that government must be changed as society changes.  Liberal social reform is incorporated into the fabric of the Constitution.

Critics of the Enlightenment have frequently contended that liberals of that time foolishly believed in the inevitability of progress.  That is not the case.  While many Enlightenment liberals, including Thomas Jefferson, the primary author of the Declaration of Independence, and James Madison, the primary expositor of the Constitution, may have in some ways been fools, they believed only in the possibility, and not the inevitability, of progress.  The weakness in their proposals was often in the paucity of evidence on which they were based.  Relying heavily on examples from ancient history, especially those of Greece and Rome, and on inevitably biased accounts of recent events, the Founding Fathers often rushed to judgments that proved wrong.  Although they relied on the best available evidence, that evidence was often not good enough.

The rationale for American Revolution was, for example, based on an inappropriate comparison of George III with Charles I, and on inaccurate reports from England about the doings and desires of the King.  The Revolution may have been a mistake.  The Founding Fathers were also seemingly mistaken in their expectations of the outcome of the Revolution, which is why they so quickly abandoned the Articles of Confederation for which they had fought, and established a very different government in the Constitution.  Government and politics under the Constitution, in turn, turned out to be very different than they intended and expected.[4]  This weakness in the predictive powers of liberal reformers opened the door for a conservative counterattack.

Conservatism: Old Truths are the Best.  Edmund Burke is almost universally considered the father of modern conservatism.  He was also almost universally considered by contemporaries to be a man of principle.  As an example, although Burke opposed the liberal philosophies embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, he supported the American revolutionaries in their battle for independence from British rule.  A conservative supporting a revolution, and bucking his own political party and party leadership to boot.  To most of us today, this seems like odd behavior for the ur-conservative.  But that is the difference between what most people think of as conservatism today; the way it is represented by most so-called conservatives of the Social Darwinian school; and what it represented in the past.

The term “conservative” began as an ethical concept that denoted caution and frugality.  The term was extended to politics during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as part of the Romantic revolt against the Enlightenment and against liberal rationalism.  It is popularly thought that conservatives have always opposed all social change, and that they have wanted everything to stay the same or even go back to way they were in the past.  This is not the case.  Conservatives have historically accepted cautious social change.  People who oppose any and all progressive social change are more accurately called “right-wingers.”   Right-wingers generally represent interest groups that benefit from the status quo, and that fear social reform would entail a loss of power, profit and/or status.  And it is so-called “reactionaries,” not Burkean conservatives, who peddle nostalgia for the so-called “good old days” (that usually weren’t so good), and who want things to go back to the way they supposedly were in the past.

In contrast to right-wingers and reactionaries, Burke believed in incremental evolutionary change.  He rejected planned change, but accepted adaptive change.  He believed that society is strongest when it changes so gradually that the changes are barely noticed from generation to generation, and may only be recognized from a long historical distance.  He believed that tradition was the distilled wisdom of the ages.  And he believed that human reason was too weak and short-sighted to safely predict the consequences of social planning.  Burke insisted that the unintended negative consequences of social reforms were almost inevitably going to be greater than the positive effects.  However bad things were now, they would likely be worse if people took action to remedy the situation.

Burke’s insistence on the limits of reason and concern with the unintended consequences of reform comprise the most powerful legacy that Burke left to conservatives.  These ideas have historically been conservatives’ strongest argument against social reform.  They constitute an almost universal argument that can be used against almost any proposed reform.  Burke did not, however, oppose all reform.  He would support social reform if the survival of the social system seemed to require it, and if conscience and human decency seemed to demand it.

Burke believed in a hierarchical society controlled by an elite upper class.  But Burke’s elite could not merely pursue their own self-interest, even if it was justified with some sort of trickle-down theory of social benefits, as right-wingers proclaim today.  Burke’s elite were burdened with the obligation of caring for society, which included the noblesse oblige of the upper class to take care of the masses, a sort of mandatory charitable giving.  He was a vehement opponent of democracy, which he warned would lead to the subjugation of society by an ignorant mass.  But he also opposed oppression of the masses and persecution of racial and religious minorities by the elite.  His insistence on treating people decently was considered a matter of honor among conservatives during the nineteenth century, even if it was a principle that was almost always more honored in the breach.  It is a legacy that is all but gone among so-called conservatives today.

It was based on what he considered respect for tradition and the demands of decency that Burke supported the American revolutionaries.  He claimed that the King and Parliament had taken advantage of the British victory over the French in America in 1763 to radically change the terms on which the American colonies were being governed, and that tradition was being violated.  He thought also that the British government was being too harsh in its treatment of the colonists, and that noblesse oblige was being violated.  As a result, he believed the Americans were justified in rebelling against British misrule.

Burke had a deep respect for the facts.  The historical facts, the facts of evolutionary social change, and the facts of present-day problems were the foundation of his conservative ideology.  He accepted what was, and he did not hanker after what could be or what had been.  He challenged both liberals and reactionaries with what he saw as the facts.  This respect for facts also made him flexible.  He disdained Reason (with a capital R), but attempted to be reasonable.  He was the founder of conservative ideology, but he was not a conservative ideologue.

Act II. Dogmatism versus Pragmatism: Ideologues versus Ideology.

“It is not the strongest of the species that survive, nor the most intelligent, but the most responsive to change.”

“If the misery of the poor be caused not by the laws of nature, but by our institutions, great is our sin.”

             Charles Darwin.

“The social order is fixed by laws of nature precisely analogous to those of the physical order”

“Millionaires are a product of natural selection…Poverty and misery will exist in society just so long as vice exists in human nature.”

            William Graham Sumner.

“Our institutions, though democratic in form, tend to favor in substance privileged plutocracy.”

“Selfishness is the outcome of limited observation and imagination.”

           John Dewey.

Setting the Scene: Trying to find order in the midst of disorder.

It was the turn of the twentieth century. Change was the order of the day.  The nineteenth had been a century of revolution.  Europeans and Americans had suffered through the beginnings of the industrial revolution, which had produced enormous wealth for plutocrats but misery for the working classes, huge cities ringed by wealthy suburbs but with slums in their center, an abundance of goods but want among the masses, powerful inventions but large-scale environmental degradation, and miraculous medical advances but widespread disease.  There had also been a host of political revolutions, civil wars and other upheavals, as democratic aspirations gradually overcame aristocratic opposition in Europe and America.

The intellectual world was upended by the emergence of the specialized physical and social sciences, with their empirical and statistical methods, replacing the traditional emphasis on the classics and on Reason.  A cultural revolution was instigated toward the end of the century by the publication of Charles Darwin’s The Origin of Species.  The book put the theory of evolution and the consequences of evolution at the center of moral, intellectual and political life, where they remain today.

Charles Darwin’s World: Pragmatism, Relativism, and Probabilities.

The turn of the twentieth century was the age of Darwin.  Evolution was both the rage and a source of outrage.  Agnostics and atheists saw it as vindication of their beliefs or non-beliefs.  Protestant fundamentalists and Biblical literalists, in turn, damned it as sacrilege.  Scientists saw it as encouragement to take a more probabilistic and relativistic view of their fields.  Philosophical positivists and intellectual absolutists damned that as nihilism.  And it led some leading liberals and conservatives to revise their respective political beliefs, much to the chagrin of purists in both camps who damned that as unprincipled and immoral backsliding.

Theories of Evolution.  Darwin’s was not the first theory of evolution.  In the early nineteenth century, Jean-Baptist Lamarck had proposed what became a widely popular theory of evolution in which he claimed that creatures could genetically pass on to their progeny characteristics that they had acquired during their lifetimes.  Under Lamarck’s theory, for example, it could be said that giraffes acquired their long necks by dint of successive generations of giraffes stretching up to reach leaves at the tops of trees.  This theory implied that human families, ethnic groups, and racial groups could improve themselves through personal achievements that they then passed down to their descendants.  This seemed to mean that people were ultimately responsible for their own biological and social successes and failures.  A moral value could be attached to biological characteristics and to social success or failure.  People got what they deserved.

Darwin rejected Lamarck’s theory.  His theory was based instead on two key ideas, random variation and natural selection, that generated most of the opposition among religious fundamentalists to this theory.  Darwin claimed that new characteristics are not acquired through personal effort but through random genetic variation, essentially through what we would call mutation.  We cannot tell how or why these mutations occur.  It is pure happenstance to us.

This idea outraged many religious people and was greeted with glee by atheists.  It does not, however, necessarily mean that God is out of the evolutionary picture.  What is random to us humans could be planned by God.  It does not even mean that the creation stories in the Book of Genesis are invalid, if you read the stories metaphorically rather than literally.  The Catholic Church and most liberal Protestant groups read the Bible metaphorically and, therefore, have had no problems with Darwin’s theories.  But Protestant fundamentalists and Biblical literalists have rejected this view, and have rejected evolutionary theory.  They have, in turn, from that time to the present created havoc with the science programs in many American school districts.

Darwin also claimed that species survive and thrive based on their adaptability, which he called natural selection.  Natural selection is the ability of a creature either to successfully respond to environmental changes and challenges, or to fail and disappear.  Living things survive by trying to fit themselves into the existing environment.  They are assimilationists.  But they also try to better fit the environment to themselves.  They are social and environmental reformers.  The impetus for social reform is, thus, built into the structure of life.  Without it, we would die out.

Cultural relativism and ethical pragmatism are implicit in Darwin’s theory, and political and religious dogmatists have rejected Darwinian ideas for this reason.  According to Darwin the ability of living creatures to survive and thrive is based on the adaptability of their beliefs and practices.  If they adopt beliefs that do not work toward survival, they will disappear along with those beliefs.  If circumstances change and they are not willing or able to change with them, they will not survive.  Humans and other living creatures must take a tentative and probabilistic approach to beliefs and practices, willing and able to change them as circumstances require.

Darwin is popularly known for two main ideas, neither of which were his, but which were the foundation of Social Darwinism.  They are the idea of survival of the fittest, and the idea that there are inevitably losers as well as winners in evolution.  The latter idea derives from the population theories of Thomas Malthus.  Malthus claimed that population growth inevitably outpaces resources, and there are not enough resources to satisfy everyone.  In Malthus’ view, it is only through war, disease and famine that the human population has been kept under relative control.  And he opposed charity for the poor because it would only encourage them to have more children.

Malthus’ ideas are the inspiration for what is today known as the “zero-sum” theory of economics.  According to this theory, there is a limited amount of wealth in the world, not enough to make everyone well-off, and if some people get more, others must get less.  Darwin was inspired by Malthus’ population growth theory as an explanation for the rise and fall of the population of some species, but he did not use it as a general explanation of evolution.  Nor did Darwin think that human evolution was inevitably Malthusian.

Survival of the fittest was a term invented by Herbert Spencer.  Spencer had been a devotee of Lamarck’s evolutionary theory, and he believed that fitness was a moral achievement.  Social success as well as biological success were personal achievements that made a person fit to survive and thrive.  Social failure, according to Spencer, was a sign of genetic unfitness and unfitness to survive.  Darwin adopted the phrase “survival of the fittest” in his later works, but without any of the moral overtones that Spencer gave it.

Fitness did not mean for Darwin that one was the strongest, smartest, most powerful, most socially successful, or best in any other way except that one was able to fit oneself to the environment and fit the environment to oneself.  Spencer became a well-known supporter of Darwin’s biological theories, but used them to support his own so-called Social Darwinian social and economic theories, that neither Darwin nor Darwin’s theories supported.[5]

The Influence of Evolution on Philosophy and Science.  The theory of evolution ushered in a sea change in science from a positivist emphasis on finding absolute natural laws to proposing relativistic and probabilistic theories.  Mendel’s genetic principles in biology, Einstein’s theories of relativity in physics, and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics were among turn-of-the-twentieth-century scientific advances that promoted a relativistic approach to truth.  William James’ radical empiricism and John Dewey’s experimentalism were among the philosophical applications of evolutionary theories.  This turn toward relativism on the part of scientists and philosophers generated an emotional reaction against science and philosophy among religious fundamentalists that continues to the present day in the United States.

It is a reaction that is based on misunderstanding.  Relativism does not mean that anything goes, or that there are no standards.  Relativism is not nihilism.  In saying that something is relative, one must always be willing to respond to the question “Relative to what?”, and be able to delineate some stable benchmark that provides a standard for evaluating the relativity of the thing.  In evolutionary theory, for example, survival is the standard by which things are evaluated.  In pragmatist philosophy, whether something works as an answer to a question is the standard.[6]           

The Evolution of Evolutionary Politics: Pragmatist Action, Dogmatist Reaction.  During most of the nineteenth century, liberals and conservatives shared many basic ideas, and their programs often overlapped.  Both liberal and conservative movements were broad-based, with a wide range of beliefs within each movement, and with the left-wing of conservatism shading into liberalism and the left-wing of liberalism shading into socialism.  Both groups had to adapt to the democratic trends of the time, and both hoped to bring order to democracy through the leadership of a meritocratic elite, albeit they had different types of elite in mind.

Conservatives generally looked to the rich to lead society.  Thomas Carlyle, among others, eulogized capitalists as “captains of industry” who ought to take command of society.  Liberals generally focused on education as the primary criteria for leadership, as they for the most part still do today.  John Stuart Mill, the leading liberal of the nineteenth century, advocated that those with more formal education should get more votes than those with less education, and Karl Marx, the leading socialist, promoted leadership by political theoreticians such as himself.

Both liberals and conservatives sought to promote industrialization, but with different emphases on how wealth should be distributed, and what sort of role government should play in the economy.  Both groups believed that government should encourage growth, and discourage corruption and crass exploitation.  Conservatives generally favored government intervention in the economy only if a problem was so severe that it threatened the social system.  Liberals generally supported government action to deal with a wide range of social ills.  Conservatives did, however support reform on humanitarian grounds.  It was English conservatives in the early nineteenth century who first proposed labor laws to protect working women and children.  And Abraham Lincoln, the ur-Republican, was a corporate lawyer who also supported labor rights as well as an end to slavery.

During the last half of the nineteenth century, economic and political events challenged the ideologies of both liberals and conservatives in the United States.  Economic depressions, violent labor disputes, rampant infectious diseases, overcrowded cities, rising crime rates, and other crises upset the orderly ideas of both groups.  Darwinian ideas of evolution came along at a time when both liberals and conservatives were looking for explanations of what was going on.

Avant garde intellectuals and activists among both liberals and conservatives seized on evolutionary ideas, but with very different applications and very different results.  The application of Darwin’s ideas to politics produced major splits within the ranks of liberals and conservatives, with the old guard in both groups fighting rear-guard actions to the present day.  An ever-widening split also developed between the Darwinian liberals and Darwinian conservatives who increasingly came to dominate the Democratic and Republican parties.

Social Darwinism: Every Man for Himself.  Social Darwinism was adopted by many erstwhile conservatives at the turn of the twentieth century as a rationale for control of society by the wealthy, and as a strategy for convincing the masses to support rule by the rich.  Historians have debated exactly how many people used the term Social Darwinism to describe themselves.  It is clear, however, that the ideas and the strategy represented by the term became increasingly influential among conservatives starting in the late nineteenth century and continuing to the present, even as conservatives increasingly rejected Darwinian theories of evolution.

These ideas can be summed up in two phrases, Malthusian catastrophe and survival of the fittest.  The strategy can be summed up in one word, fear.  A Malthusian catastrophe is when the downtrodden masses rise up and use up all the resources that the rest of us need to thrive, so that we all go down to a hellish existence together.  Malthusianism is the prediction of dystopia unless the masses are kept strictly in check.  It is an idea that gained currency when the closing of the American frontier in the 1890’s seemed to presage the closing down of opportunity, and has gained traction in the present day, when globalization seems to have a similar import.

Survival of the fittest means the cultivation of wealth and a cult of the wealthy.  According to this theory, laissez-faire capitalism is the competitive law of nature translated into an economic system, and it is ostensibly the single greatest vehicle for human evolution.  The winners in cutthroat capitalism are the best specimens of humanity, and having won the economic race are the ones who should lead the human race.  The losers in the race should be left behind, lest they become a drag on the rest of us.  This winner-takes-most theory is sometimes rationalized as what has come to be called “trickle-down” economics and culture.  The claim is that when the rich get more of something, some collateral benefits will trickle down to the rest of society.

Fear-mongering was the strategy to implement this theory.  It was a means of convincing those people who have little to support the reign of those people who have a lot in order to protect themselves against those people who have nothing.  Social Darwinism was an ideology and a strategy that allowed conservatives to eschew concern for the welfare of the masses that Burke had considered a matter of honor.  The poor get what they deserve, which is nothing, as do the rich, which is a lot.  Those who have a little bit are frightened into aligning with the rich.

In this theory, the last shall stay last because they chose their own fate.  This view of the poor gave conservatives an even more powerful argument against social reforms than Burke’s concern with unintended consequences.  According to this theory, giving to the poor only wastes precious resources and threatens catastrophe for the rest of us.  As Vice President Spiro Agnew once opined, the downtrodden want what we’ve got, and we’ve got to make sure they don’t get it.  Fear trumps decency, and we have to do unto them before they do unto us, meaning the masses have to be tricked into compliance when possible, repressed into compliance when necessary.[7]

From Herbert Spencer, William Graham Sumner and Andrew Carnegie at the turn of the twentieth century, to William Buckley, Joseph McCarthy, Richard Nixon, and Spiro Agnew in the mid-twentieth century, to George Will, George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, and Donald Trump in the twenty-first century, the proponents of Social Darwinian ideas and strategies have gained increasing prominence among so-called conservatives, and especially within the Republican Party.  Some conservative followers of Ayn Rand, such as Rand Paul and Paul Ryan, have taken to calling themselves libertarians, but they are still Social Darwinians.  All of them should really be called right-wingers or reactionaries, not conservatives in the Burkean sense.

Whatever they call themselves, their ideology is based on the twin principles of zero-sum and laissez-faire economics, and on a strategy of fear.  The strategy promotes nativism, since only those like us can be trusted, and racism, since those unlike us must be feared, especially those who look different.  And Social Darwinian right-wingers are constantly looking for an enemy to fear.  Although Burke and his conservative descendants were by no means loathe to use extreme force and fierce repression against those they considered dangers to the social order, they did not work overtime to invent dangers in order to justify their rule, as have generations of Republicans in the United States.

From the swarthy tramps, immigrants and anarchists at the turn of the twentieth century, to the blacks and bearded Communists in the mid-twentieth century, to the blacks, Hispanics, Arabs, Muslims, and olive-skinned immigrants in the early twenty-first century, fear-mongering has increasingly been the primary strategy of Republicans.  The Other is the danger, and repression is the answer.

With the decline and fall in the late twentieth century of the Soviet Union and Communists as threats, conservatives were hard put to find an enemy with which to scare the public.  George H.W. Bush was so desperate that he invaded Panama to overthrow Manuel Noriega, a former CIA operative and well-known drug trafficker, who had somehow become a grave danger to America.  Noriega is still in jail today, and drug trafficking is more widespread than ever.  The desperation implicit in this type of scaremongering demonstrates the depth of the worry among right-wing politicians that without a dangerous Other to fear, the public might no longer support their retrograde policies.  In the same vein, George W. Bush invaded Iraq to destroy weapons of mass destruction that were not there, with disastrous consequences that continue to the present.

The history of the Republican Party during the twentieth century has been the gradual decline, and now almost complete fall, of Burkean conservatives within the party.  This is a development which is popularly characterized as the disappearance of so-called moderate Republicans.  From Teddy Roosevelt, to Wendell Willkie, to Nelson Rockefeller, the Republican Party had for much of the twentieth century a progressive wing that curtailed the extremism of Republican right-wingers, and was willing to work with moderate Democrats toward bipartisan policies.

But with the rise Newt Gingrich as Speaker of the House of Representatives in the 1990’s, who shut down the federal government rather than cooperate with President Bill Clinton, and with the advent of the current Speaker Paul Ryan along with Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, who have stonewalled every proposal of President Obama for the last seven and one-half years, right-wing Social Darwinians have taken over the Republican Party.  The recent nomination of Donald Trump for President only confirms what has been obvious for some time.

Darwinian Pragmatism and Progressivism.  The term Social Darwinism was a misnomer twice over.  It was not a social but an anti-social doctrine, a doctrine of selfish, self-centered individualism.  And it was not a Darwinian but an anti-Darwinian doctrine, that ran contrary to Darwin’s conclusion that humans have thrived because of their pro-social tendencies.  The pro-social implication of Darwinism was one of the reasons that conservatives increasingly came to reject Darwin’s actual theories of evolution over the course of the twentieth century, even as they increasingly embraced Social Darwinian ideas and strategies.

Darwin contended that socialization rather than individualism was the key to human success.  It was because of our cooperativeness, not our competitiveness, that we humans have done as well as we have.  And, Darwin complained, it is largely a result of competitiveness and our sometime selfish individualism that we have frequently done so poorly.  The pro-social implications of Darwinism were first given extensive treatment in 1883 in Lester Frank Ward’s book Dynamic Sociology.  In one of the first texts of the emerging field of sociology, Ward outlined a pragmatically socialist Darwinism as the genuine evolutionary theory.

Pragmatism was one of the outcomes of Darwin’s evolutionary theories, seemingly an unintended consequence, but one that was quite influential and helpful.  Pragmatism is a philosophy that describes the world as a succession of circumstances, actions and consequences, with the consequences of an action becoming the circumstances that lead to the next round of actions.  Pragmatism is a philosophy of action.  Pragmatists focus on the convergence of theory and practice into action, or what is sometimes called praxis, and they explain the world as a confluence of interconnected actions Pragmatism is a preeminently pro-social philosophy and it is an approach that can be applied to almost all human activities and fields of study.

Pragmatism developed from humble beginnings to become a comprehensive philosophy.  The term pragmatism was first proposed in the late nineteenth century by Charles Sanders Peirce as a contribution to lexicology, that is, a theory about the meaning of words.  Peirce claimed that the meaning of a word was our reaction to it and the action which it implies.  That is, what the word does to us and what we do as a result of the word.  A word, according to Peirce, is a call to action.[8]  Others took his concept of pragmatism as a call to action in a widening circle of fields.

William James took up Pierce’s ideas and applied them first to psychology.  His was a psychology of action, interaction and reaction.  Portraying the mind as “a stream of consciousness,” in which thoughts flow from one to the next in a constant interaction with each other and with the world, James claimed that the mind is neither a passive recipient of knowledge from the outer world nor an organ of logical conjugation.  Thinking is a dynamic activity in which the mind reaches out to the world, and interacts with it.  Thinking is a process of action and interaction.

James claimed, in turn, that our personal identities are defined by how we act toward people and things, and how they react to us.  We are our actions and interactions.  Contrary to Descartes’ claim that personal identity results from the reflection that “I think, therefore I am,” James proffered the explanation that “I think, therefore we are.”  That is, the only way I can know that I am, and who I am – the only way I can say “I” and be referring to my singular self — is through comparing and contrasting myself with others.  And the only way I can know who others are is by doing things with them.  Action, interaction and reaction are all we can know of ourselves.

James later extended these ideas to epistemology, that is, into a theory of knowledge.  Rejecting the Enlightenment idea of Reason (with a capital R) that ostensibly produced self-evident truths, he insisted that we know about things only from interacting with them.  We learn through doing, through action and reaction, precipitated by problems that we need to resolve.  Without the prod of problems, we would function solely on the basis of habit, and never think about anything in any significant way.  When problems arise that interfere with our habitual existence, we ask questions of the world, seek answers to those questions by looking for relevant evidence, and then either find answers or not.  Knowledge is a product of problem-solving, and expanding the realm of knowledge is a product of asking bigger questions and making wider and deeper connections among things.[9]

John Dewey took James’ idea of learning through doing and made it the cornerstone of his pedagogical theories.  It is a fact of life, he said, that we learn through what we do.  For example, a student who passively sits and takes notes about a subject in class is going to mainly learn how to sit still and take notes.  He or she is not going to learn very much about the subject.  It is only by actively engaging with the subject, and doing something with it, that the student will learn much of lasting value.  In formulating his educational theories, Dewey did something that pragmatists have frequently tried.  He took a fact of life and derived a proposed reform from it, in this case, a successful educational practice.

Dewey also extended the idea of learning through doing into an ethical theory which essentially embodies the Golden Rule that we should love our neighbors as ourselves, and we should do unto others as we would have them do unto us.  In formulating his educational ideas, Dewey took a fact of life and made it into an admonition.  In his ethical theories, he took an admonition and claimed it was a fact of life.  Dewey claimed that we do, in fact, love our neighbors in the way that we love ourselves.  The problem is that many of us do not think much of ourselves and, as a result, think the same of others.  People who think well of themselves will think well of others, Dewey concluded, and people who think well of others will think well of themselves.

Dewey claimed, in turn, that we do, in fact, treat others as we think they will treat us.  The problem is that many of us are afraid that other people will treat us badly, so we treat them that way first.  Too many people operate under the Social Darwinian principle of “Do unto others before they do unto you” with the meaning that you should get your goods first before others get them.  Dewey would reinterpret that mantra and have us do well to others before they do anything to us.  People who treat others well will likely be treated well by others, he claims.  He proposes this tactic as a means of establishing a virtuous cycle of people treating each other well, as opposed to the Social Darwinian vicious cycle of people treating each other badly.[10]

Pragmatism was a theory and practice that underlay the emergence of the physical and social sciences at the turn of the twentieth century.  Through most of the nineteenth century, most of what we today call the physical sciences were studied and taught under the umbrella of natural philosophy, and most of the social sciences were studied and taught as moral philosophy.  There was, however, an explosion in the number of academic fields toward the end of the century, with the rise of the multitude of specializations in the physical and social sciences that have produced most of the scientific advances of the twentieth century.  These scientific advances were powered by newly developed experimental and statistical methods, and pragmatism was a driving force in these developments.

Pragmatism was, in turn, a driving force behind the emergence of the Progressive movement in the early twentieth century.  Progressivism was a broad-based and multi-various social movement, encompassing politics, culture, education, and virtually every aspect of modern life, from fashion to the arts to social policy.  It was a movement, not merely a party or a faction, and, as such, it included many different tendencies, and even some conservatives who bowed to its popularity.  In the midst of the swirling trends, Dewey and other pragmatist scholars, journalists and politicians developed a progressive social theory that ran directly counter to the Social Darwinism that was gaining strength among conservatives.

They took as a main theme Hegel’s claim that the self-development of each person is dependent on the self-development of others, and Marx’s formulation of this as “the self-development of each is dependent on the self-development of all,” and vice versa.  That is, a person can only make something worthwhile of him/herself while working with others, so that each of them and the society as a whole prospers.  Social Darwinians claimed that we live in a top-down zero-sum world, and relied on fear to rally support among the masses.  Progressives countered that we live in a cooperative world in which all boats rise together.  They promoted hope as their means to gain popular support.  Theories based on cooperation and strategies based on hope underlay almost all of the progressive social, political, educational, and cultural developments during the twentieth century, and are the gist of pragmatic liberalism to the present.

Act III. The Obsolescence of Conservatism and the Birth of Fascism?

“We build too many walls and not enough bridges.”

            Isaac Newton.

“In republics, the great danger is, that the majority may not sufficiently respect the rights of the minority.”

            James Madison.

“The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.”

            Edmund Burke.

Where do we go from here?

Fast forward a hundred years from the turn of the twentieth century to the turn of the twenty-first.  Pragmatic liberalism has become the predominant philosophy of the Democratic Party.  The Progressive Era reforms under Woodrow Wilson, the New Deal under Franklin Roosevelt, the Great Society of Lyndon Johnson, and the healthcare reforms of Barack Obama have all been a product of that philosophy.  The fact of the matter is that pragmatic methods, backed by the tools of the social and physical sciences, can make social reform safe and successful.

Social reform in Burke’s time was a blunt instrument.  Social reformers conceived of a reform, and then tried it.  They had little ability to predict the consequences of a reform, or to monitor and reform the reform as it was being implemented.  If it worked, that was fine.  If it didn’t, that was too bad, and people had to live with the negative consequences.  With the specialization of the social and physical sciences that emerged in the late nineteenth century, social reform was revolutionized, and a pragmatic approach to social reform became possible.  Since that time, we have developed statistical methods, social and economic models, testing regimes of all sorts, and a myriad of ways we can evaluate whether or not a proposed social change is working.  The development of computers has enormously enhanced our abilities in this regard.  We can monitor the progress of a reform, see whether it is producing unintended negative consequences, and make adjustments accordingly.  We can protect ourselves against most of the unintended negative consequences that might arise from a reform.

The means and methods of pragmatic liberalism have absorbed and resolved the concerns of conservatives and the rationale for conservatism.  The flexibility that the new techniques and technologies bring to the process of social reform has undermined the core concern of conservatives about unintended consequences.  Conservatism has essentially become obsolete, and pragmatic social reform should be the order of the day.  Social reform can and should become the conventional wisdom of our society.  But only if the politics of our society will permit it.

Most of the problems that have developed in social programs over the last century have, in fact, been political problems, the result of either liberal proponents overselling their proposals or right-wing opponents obstructing the programs.  The present-day problems with Obamacare are only the latest example.  Burkean conservatives should have no big problem with Obamacare.  It is a market-based system that is motivated by common decency.  But Republican right-wingers have been determined to wreck the program, regardless of its successes, and irrespective of harm to individuals and society.  The program has, as a result, suffered from right-wing political obstruction, and reformers have been severely hampered in their efforts to revise and reform the program.

The Republican Party has, unfortunately, turned aggressively against the Progressive Republicanism that was promoted by Theodore Roosevelt and Bob La Follette in the early twentieth century, and the moderate policies of the so-called Rockefeller Republicans of mid-century.  The Party has turned, instead, towards a radical Social Darwinism that is today epitomized by Donald Trump.  Over the last six years, the right-wing Republicans who control Congress have stonewalled every pragmatic proposal from President Obama, while obstructing his work at every turn.  Meanwhile, Trump, the Republican presidential candidate, is flirting with fascism as his theory and practice.  We are a long way from the days of Newton, Madison and Burke, but their actions and their words still speak loudly, and they don’t speak well of Trump or the Republican Party.

Postscript.

Not the End of Ideology but the Beginning of Politics: Pragmatic not Technocratic.

In 1960, the sociologist Daniel Bell published a book called The End of Ideology in which he claimed that ideological conflicts were coming to an end, and were being superseded by the technocratic administration of things.  He claimed that the future society would be a managed capitalism, in which technocratic elites would administer things that needed coordinating, and in which conflicts would take place only among experts around the technical edges of things.  The grand battles over ideas and utopias that had previously occupied history were obsolete and over.

In this prediction, Bell, a one-time Marxist, had turned on its head one of Marx’s utopian hopes, that once capitalism was overthrown and a communist regime fully implemented, government would wither away, leaving only a minimal non-coercive administration of things that needed coordinating.  Bell, still a social democrat but no longer a radical, applied the idea to capitalism.

The possibility of a capitalist system managed by a technocratic elite was not a new idea in 1960.  Le Comte de St. Simon and August Comte had proclaimed similar things during the nineteenth century.  Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means had predicted the evolution of competitive capitalism into managerial capitalism during the twentieth century.  Francis Fukuyama has predicted similar things in more recent years.  I don’t agree, and I think pragmatic politics should not be confounded with technocratic administration.

The gist of my argument in this essay is that the knee-jerk conservative objection to social reform, that we cannot sufficiently predict the unintended consequences of a reform, has lost its legitimacy.  We can sufficiently monitor most social reforms to make sure they are working as they should, and adjust them if they wander off course.  But that does not mean we will be ruled over by apolitical technical experts.

Our ability to plan and monitor social reforms does not mean the end of ideology or politics.  To the contrary, there will always be differences among people as to values and goals.  These will almost inevitably take the form of ideologies, and lead to political debates and struggles.  Rather than ending ideology and politics, the new pragmatic liberalism opens the door to ideologies and politics that are not bogged down by the knee-jerk nay-ism of conventional conservatism.  We should all be pragmatic liberals of one sort or another, but the differences will still be significant.

[1] On the Enlightenment, see Peter Gay. The Enlightenment: An Interpretation. New York: Vintage Books, 1968.

[2] On Isaac Newton, see James Gleick. Isaac Newton. New York: Pantheon Books, 2003.

[3] On James Madison, see Garry Wills. James Madison. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2002.

On Edmund Burke, see Conor Cruise O’Brien. The Great Melody: A Thematic Biography of Edmund Burke.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.

[4] On the coming of the Revolution and the making of the Constitution, see Gordon Wood. The Making of the American Republic, 1776-1787. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1969.  I have written extensively on whether and how the Revolution and the Constitution may have been based on mistaken analyses and expectations in several posts on this blog and in my book Was the American Revolution a Mistake? Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2013.

[5] On Charles Darwin, see Loren Eiseley. Darwin and the Mysterious Mr. X. New York: E.P. Dutton, 1979.

[6] For the influence of Darwin on philosophy in general and pragmatism in particular, see John Dewey. The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1910.

[7] On Social Darwinism, see Richard Hofstadter. Social Darwinism in American Thought. Boston: Beacon Press, 1955.

[8] On Charles Sanders Peirce and the origins of Pragmatism, see Louis Menand.  The Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in America.  New York: Ferrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001.

[9] On William James, see Robert Richardson. William James: In the Maelstrom of American Modernism. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2007.

[10] On John Dewey, see Robert Westbrook. John Dewey and American Democracy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991.

 

Progressivism, Postmodernism and Republicanism: The Relevance of James Conant to Educational Theory Today

Progressivism, Postmodernism and Republicanism:

The Relevance of James Conant to Educational Theory Today

Burton Weltman

Recovering a long lost era in Republicanism

I am writing this preface during the spring of 2016 in the midst of the Presidential primary election season.  In the context of the Republican Party’s policies and politics of the last eight years, and especially during this primary election cycle, James Conant was a Republican of a sort it is almost impossible to imagine today.  He was a hawk on foreign policy, a Cold Warrior during the 1950’s and 1960’s, which is similar to most of the current crop of Republican Presidential candidates.  But he was a social democrat on domestic policy, taking positions not unlike those of the socialist Democratic Presidential candidate today, and a world away from those of the present day Republican Party.  The gist of this essay is that Conant has a lot to teach self-styled progressives about education, and that progressive educators should acknowledge Conant as one of their own.  But a subordinate thesis is that Conant has a lot to teach Republicans about making humane public policy and behaving in a sane and sensible way.

Recovering James Conant

James Conant was one of the most prominent scientists, political figures and educational leaders of mid-twentieth century America.[i]  A life-long Republican who was seriously considered for the 1952 presidential nomination, Conant was also a precursor of postmodernism, an avowed social democrat, and a professed progressive educator.  A self-proclaimed member of the Power Elite that ostensibly ran the country, he was at the same time a devotee of John Dewey, exclaiming in a parody of Voltaire’s comment about God that “if John Dewey hadn’t existed, he would have had to be invented.”  A traditionalist in science, politics and education at the start of his career, Conant evolved into a self-styled radical for whom “conservative” was a dirty word and who combined liberalism and Republicanism in ways that might seem oxymoronic today.[ii]

Conant was an innovative thinker in science and education who has for too long been a lost figure in progressive educational theory.  Highly regarded by many progressives during the 1950’s and 1960’s for his defense of comprehensive high schools,[iii] Conant’s reputation among progressives has fared poorly since.[iv]  Educationally, Conant is generally portrayed as an elitist who proposed tracking students according to the needs of the military-industrial complex.[v]  Politically, he is derided as either a one-time liberal turned conservative or a life-long conservative who sometimes pretended to liberalism.  Intellectually, he is discounted as an arch-empiricist whose statistical studies of high schools during the 1950’s and 1960’s have little theoretical value.  Conant, who died in 1978, is at this point almost routinely classified as a “conservative” who promoted “traditional schooling” based on disciplinary curricula and social control methods.[vi]

The thesis of this article is that Conant’s ideas have been widely misconstrued by critics who have focused on his later works written in the midst of the Cold War during the 1950’s and 1960’s, and who have failed to place those books in the context of his earlier works from the 1930’s and 1940’s.  Conant’s is a story about the interaction of politics, ambition and theory.  It is in part an all-too-common tale of progressive theory warped by conservative political pressures and personal ambitions.  It is also, however, an example of the importance of theory and the staying power of progressive educational theory.  It is my contention that in the midst of all his personal and political peregrinations, Conant’s core educational theories remained progressive.  The purpose of this article is to examine Conant’s educational theories in the context of his life and times with the goal of demonstrating their importance for educators today.

Conant and His Critics

Conant’s progressive critics have generally focused three charges against him which they think demonstrate his anti-progressive and anti-democratic tendencies.  First, they say, Conant was a petty-bureaucrat who sought to consolidate small community-based schools into centralized schools that reduce students and teachers to mere cogs in a giant machine.  Second, he was an elitist who promoted stratified schools that ignore slower students in favor of the faster.  Third, he was a Cold Warrior who favored repressing dissenters and subordinating schools to the military-industrial complex.  Conant’s response to these critics was to plead guilty to their premises – he was a bureaucrat, elitist and Cold Warrior – but to deny their conclusion that he was anti-progressive and anti-democratic.

With respect to school consolidation, Conant argued that community-based schools too often fostered racism and ethnic exclusion, and that small schools did not provide enough ethnic or intellectual diversity.  In his best known educational work, The American High School Today,[vii] published in 1959, Conant called for eliminating almost half of the nation’s high schools as part of what he considered a progressive defense of comprehensive high schools as the cornerstone of a democratic educational system.  Writing in reply to Admiral Hyman Rickover’s highly publicized call for the establishment of separate high schools for high-achieving students as a necessary means to fight the Cold War,[viii] Conant vehemently rejected Rickover’s proposal as undemocratic and unnecessary to achieve educational excellence.[ix]

Responding to Rickover’s attack on the intellectual deficiencies and administrative inefficiencies of the public schools, Conant contended that centralized schools would be more efficient and more likely to have diverse student bodies.  In turn, larger schools would be better able to offer more advanced courses for advanced students but would also be able to offer a greater variety of courses to meet the needs of a diverse student population.  Contrary to Rickover and other conservative critics of comprehensive high schools, Conant rejected any form of tracking students into separate programs according to ability or achievement and any ability grouping in general education classes.  Ability grouping was acceptable to Conant only in the most advanced and specialized courses and this would be achieved largely through self-selection by students for these courses.[x]

With respect to the charge of elitism, Conant contended that democracy required well-educated leaders, and that American schools were not providing enough leadership education.  Conant defined democracy as “government by and for the people” but not of the people,[xi] and believed in what could be called plebiscitary democracy or democracy from the top-down rather than the bottom-up.[xii]  Conant’s ideal was a society in which the best and brightest people propelled themselves to the fore and then pulled the masses along.  He rejected the idea of what today would be called participatory democracy in which leaders are ostensibly pushed to the fore and pushed along by the people.[xiii]  At the same time, he believed that democracy required well educated followers who could check and balance, support but also critique, their leaders.[xiv]  As a result, he advocated not only advanced programs of specialized education for those who would become the scientific and political leaders of the country, but also rigorous programs of general education in which all students would participate together, hoping thereby to establish a common understanding and basis for communication between the elite and the masses.

With respect to the Cold War, Conant argued that public service was the foundation of democracy and the goal of progressive education, and that in times of national crisis, it is necessary for people to support their leaders even if they do not entirely agree with their policies.  Conant had doubts about the Cold War from its inception, but suppressed his doubts to support America’s leaders against what they defined as the menace of Communism.  In so doing, Conant admittedly subordinated some of his progressive ideas to Cold War imperatives.  But he did not abandon them and believed that in supporting some repressive aspects of the anti-Communist crusade, he was preventing it from becoming worse and was saving a place for progressive values.

The premises that led Conant to support centralized schools, elitist programs and Cold War repressions are very different from the more egalitarian, participatory democratic premises of most present-day progressives, including the author of this article.  It is my contention, however, that Conant’s primary concerns – with promoting ways that individuals and institutions can transcend and transform themselves – do not depend on these premises.  In turn, Conant’s core theories – models of science as social studies in a pluralistic universe, politics as social democracy in a multicultural world, and education as social problem-solving in a diverse community – remain relevant to theorists today.

Social Studies and Postmodern Science

Conant was a peripatetic polymorph who took on many different roles, and enjoyed a career that moved successfully from science to administration to politics to educational policy.[xv]  He was an openly ambitious person who sought power and status as a means of doing good for himself and for the world.  Born in 1893 to a middle class family in Dorchester, Massachusetts, Conant attended Roxbury Latin School and Harvard University, gaining a B.A. in 1913 and a Ph.D. in 1916.  He then worked as a chemistry professor at Harvard, becoming President of the University in 1933 and serving in that capacity until 1953.  From 1941 to 1946, Conant was also Chair of the National Defense Research Committee and overall coordinator of the effort to produce an A-bomb.  He continued as an advisor on atomic weapons until 1953.  From 1953 to 1957, he was first the U.S. High Commissioner and then Ambassador to Germany.  From 1957 until his death in 1978, he worked primarily on educational research and writing.

Conant was first and foremost a scientist and continued working on science even as he did other things.  During the 1910’s and 1920’s, he was a laboratory chemist doing pure research.  In the 1930’s, he turned to the history and theory of science.  During the 1940’s, he worked in applied science, mainly on building the first A-bombs and other nuclear weapons projects.  Finally, in the 1950’s and 1960’s, he returned to the history and theory of science.  During his career, Conant’s theories of science evolved from the positivist philosophy that characterized most of his colleagues to what could be described as a post-modern relativism.  Conant described the evolution of his philosophy as “a mixture of William James’ Pragmatism and the Logical Empiricism of the Vienna Circle with at least two jiggers of skepticism thrown in.”[xvi]  Becoming less sure about science as he became more powerful as a scientist, Conant eventually came to the conclusion that scientific theories were influenced by social circumstances as much as empirical evidence.  And he argued that studying social science was almost as important to understanding physical science as studying physical science itself.[xvii]  The development of Conant’s scientific ideas greatly influenced his educational theories.

Conant’s scientific interests began in his childhood home.  His parents were devotees of the eighteenth century scientist and theologian Emanuel Swedenborg.[xviii]  Swedenborg argued that matter and mind are two sides of the same spiritual coin.  He sought to extend the physical theories of Newton and the psychological theories of Locke, and to solve the spirit/body problem posed by Descartes, through what was essentially a pantheistic explanation of the universe.  Although ostensibly a Christian, Swedenborg claimed that different cultures have different ways of explaining the universe and each may be valid in its own way.  Rather than demanding doctrinal purity or ritual uniformity, God, according to Swedenborg, wanted humankind to cooperate in socially useful work.[xix] Although Conant eventually joined the Unitarian Church, his interdisciplinary approach to science, trying to consolidate the various physical sciences and combine the physical and social sciences, and his pluralistic and social democratic approach to society were similar to Swedenborg’s views.

Conant’s interest in science was given direction by his high school chemistry teacher, Mr. Black.  Conant greatly appreciated the teacher’s hands-on methods and personal concern for students, and Mr. Black often served as an example of a good teacher in Conant’s later educational writings.  At Harvard, Conant pursued a double undergraduate major and did a dual doctoral thesis in physical chemistry and organic chemistry, considered an innovative combination at that time.  Mentored by Theodore Richards, who was one of the most prominent chemists of the day and whose daughter Conant later married, Conant was initiated into the American scientific elite at Harvard.[xx]

Upon earning his doctorate, Conant was encouraged by Richards to work in what was then considered an area of vital national interest: developing poison gas.  Making his first essay into weapons of mass killing, Conant worked initially with colleagues on some private research and then spent World War I working for the Army.  He was highly praised for his work and was well regarded within high-level military circles.[xxi]

After the War, Conant returned to Harvard and during the 1920’s undertook “pioneering efforts to apply the techniques of physical chemistry to the study of organic reactions.”[xxii]  In 1933, he published a textbook, The Chemistry of Organic Compounds, which became the “standard work in the field” during the 1930’s and 1940’s.[xxiii]  He was frequently consulted by major corporate and government officials and thereby gained entre to the industrial and political elites of the day.

Conant left his laboratory in 1933 to become President of Harvard and turned to working in science on a more theoretical level.  Influenced by his contact as President with scholars from the humanities and social sciences, Conant began to develop a humanistic approach to science, taking what was then the radical step of using case histories in teaching physical science courses.  Conant was worried during the 1930’s about what he saw as the debasement of science by ideologically driven scientists, and particularly the environmental genetics being promoted by the Soviet scientist Lysenko and the racist genetics of the Nazis.  He was also concerned that ignorance of how science and scientists actually work left ordinary people open to the pseudo-scientific charlatanism of ideologues such as Lysenko and the Nazis.  Conant hoped that a historical approach to science, one that examined the relationship between social and scientific developments, would help both budding scientists and the general public to appreciate the nature of science and the need for enlightened scientific leadership.[xxiv]

Conant’s work on scientific theory was cut short by the start of World War II and his work on the A-bomb.  It was a project Conant undertook with typical thoroughness but also characteristic ambivalence.  Fearing that nuclear weapons would lead to a nuclear holocaust, Conant fervently prayed until the moment the first A-bomb was successfully tested that it would not work.[xxv]  At the end of World War II, Conant hoped that he could atone for the A-bomb by working on peaceful uses of science and atomic energy.  But with the advent of the Cold War, he was asked to advise the government on building newer and better atomic weapons.  Although he answered what he saw as the call of duty, the nature of the work affected his thinking.  He could no longer accept the positivists’ beliefs in the inevitability of progress through science and science as progress, or in the neutrality of scientists.[xxvi]

Continuing his work on the history of science, Conant developed innovative ideas that anticipated and coincided with the theories of Thomas Kuhn, who worked with Conant as a graduate student at Harvard during the 1940’s and whose work became a foundation of much postmodern theory.  Postmodernism has been described as a revolt against the positivists’ doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, that facts speak for themselves and that the more facts you have the better your conclusions.[xxvii]  Like Kuhn later, Conant claimed that science develops through paradigm shifts rather than incremental changes and that these shifts result mostly from cultural changes rather than new evidence.  New evidence, Conant contended, leads merely to the amendment of old theories.  New theories result from new questions, questions that reflect changes in social structure, problems and philosophies.  In Conant’s view, scientists are “revolutionists” who arise out of the prevailing culture, transcend it, and then pull the culture up with them.  Scientific revolutions, in turn, require a high level of popular education so that the public can intelligently support the work of creative scientists.[xxviii]

In his historical case studies, Conant contrasted the social and intellectual circumstances under which scientists worked before a new scientific discovery and after, focusing particularly on the questions they asked.  Based on his method, the successful overthrow of Aristotle’s theory of motion (that things will stop moving unless force is continuously exerted on them) by Newton’s theory (that things will continue moving forever unless a force is exerted to stop them) could, for example, be explained in part as a result of differing social circumstances: Aristotle lived in a traditional society in which stasis was the norm and the primary question was how anything changed; Newton lived in a dynamic society in which change was the rule and the primary question was how anything stayed the same.  Ancient and modern scientists asked different questions and got different answers, but both were useful to the societies in which they were conceived.  Taking this argument even further, Conant contended that people no longer believe in Homer’s myths because Greek gods are not useful in answering present-day questions, not because the myths are untrue.  Conant claimed that there is no reason to think that Zeus and the other gods did not in some sense actually exist for the people for whom Homer’s myths were useful answers to important questions.[xxix]

Rejecting the idea of a universal science which is good for all people at all times, Conant tended toward what might be called a soft postmodernism grounded in relativism rather than nihilism.[xxx]  Picking up on William James’ notions of an open universe and the effects of theory on reality,[xxxi] he promoted a vision of scientists transcending their cultures and transforming the world thereby.  At the same time, continuing his debate with Lysenko, Conant insisted there is a vital difference between partisanship and objectivity – that while scientists cannot be neutral, they can be objective and need not be mere propagandists.  Scientists can and must fairly consider all of the relevant evidence and pertinent points of view on a subject.  They can and must consider opponents’ arguments in ways that the opponents would recognize, and not merely set up straw men to knock down.  In sum, while there may be more than one right answer to any important question, there are also wrong answers, answers that do not fit the evidence or meet opponents’ arguments.  While there may be no final Truth, scientists must cooperatively strive for the broadest working consensus on what may be right and what is wrong under the prevailing circumstances.[xxxii]  In a pluralistic universe, Conant concluded, the goal of science is not certainty but contingency, not merely answers to questions but also new questions to answer so that the quest for a better life can continue.[xxxiii]

Conant’s iconoclasm extended to rejecting the prevailing notion that the physical sciences were radically different from and inherently superior to the social sciences.  Conant indicated that they were essentially the same and that there were only two main differences between them.  The first difference lay in the range of choices that their subjects enjoy.  Physical scientists study things that have relatively little variation or choice as to what they will do.  An electron might, for example, at any given moment act like a particle or a wave, or go through one hole or another in a screen, so that the individual electron’s behavior cannot be predicted.  But electrons have relatively few options, so that their behavior is for the most part a matter of simple probabilities that can be accurately predicted in the aggregate.  Humans are not so simple and neither their individual nor group behavior is easily predictable.  The choices that humans can make and the variations in their behavior are enormous, making social science more complex but also more important to study than physical science.[xxxiv]

The second difference between the physical and social sciences lay in the role of politics in their workings.  While physical science is fraught with political issues, social science deals with political issues per se.  As a consequence, social scientists have historically been less willing and able than physical scientists to agree upon common frameworks for research and development, and to work cooperatively within those frameworks.  In turn, while clear-cut paradigm shifts have occurred in the physical sciences, so that it is possible, for example, to say that the Copernican view of the universe has replaced the Ptolemaic view, such shifts have not been as clear cut or conclusive in the social sciences.  This greater degree of cooperation among physical scientists – their willingness to work together and to accept each other’s findings and conclusions – is a major reason for the greater success and public acceptance of the physical sciences.  It is something that the social sciences need to develop and that schools could help foster with a more pro-social, social problem-centered curriculum.[xxxv]

Conant’s concerns about the interplay of the social and physical sciences, and the relationship between scientists and the general public, were not merely academic matters for him.  Although he was himself a member of the scientific policy elite, he worried about the tendency of scientists to become “exalted and isolated” to the detriment of democracy and their own best judgments.[xxxvi]  In the wake of the astonishing development of the A-bomb, Conant warned that science was being glorified as magic and scientists as demigods.  He fretted that lay people could not understand the scientific issues of the atomic age and that decisions involving science would by default be made by scientists alone.  Conant worried that unchecked power and popular adulation could corrupt science and scientists.  These concerns are reflected in his curricular proposals for a program of general education that connects scientists and laypeople.[xxxvii]

Conant’s concerns were exacerbated during the Cold War by the unparalleled secrecy imposed by the government on scientists who in any way worked in areas that might have some military application.[xxxviii]  The troublesome consequences were exemplified in Conant’s own flip-flopping positions on the H-bomb.  Conant initially opposed the production of an H-bomb on the moral grounds that it was a genocidal weapon.  He also initially supported his friend Robert Oppenheimer when Oppenheimer spoke out publicly against the H-bomb.  But Conant backed off when Edward Teller and other H-bomb proponents accused Oppenheimer of being a national security risk and effectively destroyed Oppenheimer’s career.[xxxix]  Conant refused to make public either his concerns about the H-bomb or his support for Oppenheimer, seemingly for fear of jeopardizing his own standing within the inner circles of power.

Conant has been accused of hypocrisy and cowardice for these actions,[xl] but I think the roots of his contradictions are more subtle.  On the one hand, Conant was genuinely concerned for the security of the United States if the Soviets forged ahead in the development of nuclear weapons.  On the other hand, he was fearful of what might happen to the world if nuclear militants such as Edward Teller ran things unchecked.  Given what had happened to Oppenheimer when he dared to speak publicly about nuclear policy, Conant decided that the best thing he could do for humankind was to stay silent and stay part of the Power Elite, hoping thereby to exert some salutary influence on American policy.  The exigencies of the Cold War plus his own top-down view of society arguably led him to choose power over principle in these matters.  A prime architect of atomic weapons, Conant could, nonetheless, sincerely yearn for the simpler world of his youth and exclaim: “I do not like the atomic age or any of its consequences.”[xli]

Social Democracy, Republicanism and the Cold War

Conant’s youth was spent in Massachusetts at the turn of the twentieth century, living in a region and household in which the Civil War was still a current event, Republicanism was synonymous with patriotism and progress, and Democrats were considered traitors and reactionaries.  To the young Conant, Republicans stood for enlightenment and industry, Democrats for racism and feudalism.[xlii]

For most of his career, Conant portrayed politics in fairly simple terms: liberals were the good guys and conservatives were not.  Conant rejected what he saw as the conservative ideal of a laissez-faire economy in which every person must fend for him/herself and government exists to protect private property.  He supported, instead, the liberal idea of a regulated economy in which government guarantees each person a decent job and standard of living.  Conant also decried what he saw as the conservative ideal of a traditional culture enforced through censorship to ensure that each generation follows blindly and blandly in the footsteps of the last.  He supported, instead, the liberal idea of a laissez-faire culture in which each generation develops its own way of life and the government encourages diversity and creativity.[xliii]

Citing Jefferson as his mentor, Conant combined meritocratic views of leadership with social democratic views of public policy.  Politics, Conant claimed, is social science in action, a process in which officials experiment with hypotheses as to what will best serve the public interest and the people register their support and dissent at the polls.  Democracy is a form of permanent revolution in which enlightened leaders with the support of educated followers continually transcend the status quo and continuously move the country toward a more creative and cooperative society.[xliv]

In the early stages of his career, Conant found a relatively comfortable home for these political views within a Republican Party that harbored such liberals as Robert La Follette, Sr., Robert LaFollette, Jr. and Henry Wallace, Sr.  As time passed, liberals were more likely to be found in the Democratic Party, but Conant stayed a Republican.  He seemed more comfortable with the Republican constituency of business people and others who identified with the upper classes than with the Democrats’ primary constituency of small farmers, workers and those who identified with the lower classes.[xlv]  He sought to fight on behalf of the masses, but wanted to work primarily with his own kind within the elite.[xlvi]  As the Republican Party became more conservative, Conant tried to guide the party to the left while fighting the increasing power of the Right.[xlvii]

As a young man, Conant believed that Weimar Germany might provide a model for American development.  Supported by scientific and educational systems that were the best and most meritocratic in the world, German institutions during the 1920’s were governed by social democrats and led by a technocratic elite.[xlviii]  The rise of the Nazis in Germany was a great shock to Conant.  He reluctantly conceded that science and education do not guarantee political rationality, and concluded that fascism underscored the need for a pro-social democratic education for both the elite leaders and the masses in a liberal society.[xlix]

Conant’s revulsion toward the Nazis led him to buck the prevailing isolationism within the Republican Party during the late 1930’s, and he became a fervent advocate of military preparedness and militant action against fascism.[l]  With the coming of World War II, Conant supported the most vigorous prosecution of the war by any means available, even to the point of suppressing civil liberties at home and using weapons of mass killing abroad.  His view of Nazism as fundamentally evil led him to conclude that in times of war, liberal measures must be suspended: “All war is immoral” and, therefore, all is fair in war.[li]  He later applied this same doctrine to the Cold War.  At the same time, Conant saw the social cooperation required for prosecuting World War II as an opportunity to advance social democracy[lii] and he called for an upsurge of radicalism in the United States.[liii]

As World War II ended, Conant believed that conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union could be avoided.  While he thought the U.S. and U.S.S.R. would inevitably compete, he believed the Soviets wanted to win ideologically and economically, not militarily.  Once again bucking mainstream opinion within the Republican Party, Conant proposed sharing A-bomb secrets with the Russians to forestall a nuclear arms race,[liv] and as late as 1948, he was still forcefully arguing that “there is little or no analogy between the Nazi menace and the Soviet challenge.”[lv]  Conant similarly argued that the challenge of domestic Communism should be met through intellectual competition, rather than repression.  In Conant’s view, Communists were wrong but not evil, their methods misguided but their goals relatively benign.  Conant warned that “reactionaries” will try to use anti-Communism “as an excuse” to attack liberals.  Citing the attacks on Alger Hiss as an example of this tactic, Conant initially came out strongly in Hiss’ defense when Hiss was accused of being a Communist spy.[lvi]

But by the end of 1948, Conant was taking a very different stance.  Under intense pressure from his colleagues within the foreign policy elite, and under the pressure of events such as the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Blockade, Conant joined the Cold War and anti-Communist crusades with the fervor of a convert.  Seemingly concerned with protecting his status as a member of the Power Elite, he acted like someone who felt the need to prove his loyalty.  Rewriting his own history, Conant retrospectively claimed that he was “one of the first of the Cold War warriors” when in fact he did not join their ranks until late 1948.[lvii]  He also retroactively chastised those who had in 1948 “still clung to the belief in cooperation” with the Soviets, when he had done so himself.[lviii]  In any case, Conant now portrayed Communism as a fundamental evil and significant threat.[lix]

Abandoning his previous analysis, Conant fell into line with the prevailing Cold War analogy between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia.  While he still did not think the Soviets posed any immediate military threat, neither, he said, had Nazi Germany in the early 1930’s.  Conant concluded that it was the failure of the West to challenge the fascists militarily when they were weak during the 1930’s that had emboldened and enabled them to start World War II.  Elected officials in the West, faced with strong pacifist sentiments amongst the public, had lacked the will to undertake a military buildup, thereby encouraging the fascists.  Similarly, Conant believed, it was necessary to challenge the Soviets militarily before they could move toward conquest.  Toward that end, Conant founded in 1950 the Committee on the Present Danger, an organization of political, business and educational leaders, for the purpose of propagandizing the public and lobbying Congress in favor of a peacetime draft, an expanded nuclear arsenal, and a large-scale military buildup.  Abandoning objectivity as well as neutrality on this issue, Conant joined with other Cold Warriors in deliberately exaggerating the immediate threat from the Soviet Union.  He rationalized this deception on the grounds that scare tactics were necessary to build public support for a show of military force that would forestall the Soviets and prevent another world war in the long run.[lx]

Conant also fell into line on the prevailing opinion of domestic Communism.  In the wake of Alger Hiss’ perjury conviction and Senator Joseph McCarthy’s assault on Communist sympathizers, Conant took a strong anti-Communist stance.  Contradicting his previous statements that attacking Communists would open the door to attacks on liberalism, he rationalized his cooperation with McCarthy and other anti-Communists as a means of protecting liberals from attack.  Despite his previous opposition to loyalty oaths as a violation of free speech, Conant became a firm supporter of loyalty oaths.  And, contrary to his previous support of academic freedom for all political opinions, Conant campaigned for a ban on Communist teachers in the public schools.  While privately dismissing any threat from domestic Communism, he publicly contended that Communists had abdicated their intellectual freedom in becoming mouthpieces for the Communist Party and agents of the Soviet Union, and therefore had no place in a free marketplace of ideas.[lxi]

The Cold War strained Conant’s liberal commitments more than any other crisis in his life.  He seemed at times during the 1950’s and 1960’s to abdicate his own judgment in favor of automatically rejecting anything Communists might support or might be construed as pro-Communist.  While Conant predictably liked Ike but not Goldwater or Nixon, he was a strong supporter of the Vietnam War after most liberals, including many Republicans, turned against it.  Publicly condemning the anti-war movement and New Left as traitorous, Conant in effect practiced McCarthyism beyond the McCarthy era.[lxii]  Privately, however, he criticized the war and voted for the anti-war presidential candidate George McGovern in 1972. [lxiii]

Conant has been condemned as a hypocrite and coward for his political actions.  From issues of anti-Semitism and free speech for radicals at Harvard during the 1930’s to McCarthyism and the Cold War during the 1950’s to student radicalism and the Vietnam War in the 1970’s, Conant held private views that were more liberal than his public positions.[lxiv]  But Conant’s problem was neither cowardice nor hypocrisy but social theory.  Conant believed that if you were not a member of the Power Elite, your principles were impotent and irrelevant.  This was a pragmatic judgment from one who contended that liberal values could only be implemented from the top-down.  So, when it came to risking his status within the elite for his principles, Conant generally found a way to rationalize his principles.

Meritocracy, Democracy and Public Education

Consistent with his training as scientist during the early 20th century, Conant began his career as a staunch traditionalist in education, favoring a strictly disciplinary curriculum, teacher-centered teaching methods, and rote learning and testing.  He came to the presidency of Harvard in 1933 with a low opinion of the university’s School of Education as a den of progressive anti-intellectuals.  In Conant’s view, teaching was something any well-educated person could do and he initially hoped to abolish the School but was convinced otherwise because it was a moneymaker for the University.  He decided, instead, to try to reform the School and in the process was converted to progressivism.[lxv]

Conant described progressive education as a system of student-centered pedagogy with teaching methods that focus on students’ interests and activities; social-centered curricula based on interdisciplinary subjects that focus on social problems of concern to students; and practical forms of evaluation, or what today would be called authentic assessment.  Progressivism was a means of encouraging students to transcend their backgrounds, engage in critical and reflective thinking, and transform themselves and their society.  Consistent with his top-down vision of democracy, Conant promoted a top-down version of progressivism.  He projected four main educational goals: (1) a high level of civic education to prepare every student for the rights and duties of a social democracy; (2) a high level of specialized education for those who will be the elite scientists and leaders of tomorrow; (3) a high level of general education to prepare the masses to evaluate the work of their leaders; and (4) a high level of vocational education to prepare non-elite students for gainful and socially useful employment.[lxvi]

Although Conant is best known for his empirical studies of schools from the 1950’s and 1960’s, he claimed four “inventions” from the 1930’s and 1940’s as his primary contributions to the field of education.  These were: initiating the Masters of Arts in Teaching (MAT) degree at Harvard in the mid-1930’s; supporting standardized testing in the late 1930’s, which led to the foundation of Educational Testing Service (ETS); organizing the Harvard report on General Education in a Free Society (GEFS) in the mid-1940’s; and participating in the National Education Association report on Education for ALL American Youth (EAAY) in the late 1940’s.[lxvii]  The MAT, GEFS and EEAY represent progressive innovations that have not yet had the impact for which Conant hoped.  ETS is an innovation that Conant thought would be progressive, later concluded was not, and has had a far greater impact than he desired.

The MAT was for Conant a model of progressive teacher education.  Jointly developed and administered by academic and education professors, it divided prospective teachers’ coursework evenly between academic subjects and pedagogy.  Working on the MAT brought Conant a new respect for teaching as an art that needed to be taught by professional educators.[lxviii]

ETS was for Conant a vehicle for establishing what he thought would be progressive means of assessment.[lxix]  Standardized testing appealed to Conant’s democratic, meritocratic and scientific orientations.  Testing, he claimed, is democratic because it is the same for all.  It is meritocratic because it aims at identifying the best students.  And, it is scientific because it is quantifiable and ostensibly objective.  Conant hoped that standardized testing would undermine the advantages that wealth and cultural background give to students from upper class families, and would open the doors of higher education and higher social position to middle and lower class students.  He also hoped that standardized testing would encourage progressive methods of teaching.  Conant’s support for testing rested, however, on two assumptions that he later questioned: that standardized aptitude tests measure some sort of generalized intelligence common to everyone, and that standardized achievement tests measure genuine knowledge of a subject.[lxx]

By the 1950’s, Conant had concluded that there is no such thing as a singular intelligence or a singular measure of intelligence, but that people are endowed with what today would be called multiple intelligences, and there is no universal way to measure these aptitudes.  He also seemed to conclude that achievement tests are self-defeating and self-invalidating, seeming to presage present-day concerns about standardized testing.  To be valid, an achievement test must be based on a random sample of knowledge from a generalized subject.  Standardized testing, however, leads schools to teach to the test, narrowing their curricula to the questions that are most likely to be asked on the test.  The results are that students no longer get the benefit of a general education and standardized tests no longer measure the general education they were intended to evaluate.  Students end up merely learning how to take the test and the test merely measures that ability.  While continuing to support testing as an adjunct method of evaluation, Conant became a proponent of what would today be called authentic assessment – observing students perform real world activities – as the best measure of aptitude and achievement.[lxxi]

GEFS and EAAY were essays in social democratic curricula.[lxxii]  Although GEFS was produced by an elite corps of professors and EAAY was produced largely by a group of schoolteachers, Conant claimed that the core recommendations of the two reports were essentially similar.[lxxiii]  Both proposed that schools focus on “life education” rather than merely the academic disciplines.  Both proposed that schools develop diversified curricula to meet the needs of diverse students and diversified extra-curricular activities to encourage students toward progressive social change.  And both proposed that the primary goal of education be “cultural literacy,” defining that goal in pluralistic and pragmatic rather than mono-cultural and absolutist terms.[lxxiv]  Cultural literacy is the understanding of different cultures through comparing and contrasting each with the others, transcending your own culture, and working with others toward common social goals.[lxxv]

GEFS argued that schools should help students transcend their everyday experiences and environments, deal with a diverse and changing world, and transform themselves and their society.  The report recommended a curriculum based on the “five fingers of education:” Language Arts, or transcending oneself through communication; Fine Arts, or self-transcendence through self-expression; Mathematics and Science, or transcending common sense through scientific methods; Social Studies, or transcending the here and now through history, geography and the social sciences; and the Vocations, or “putting into practice the bookish theory of the classroom.”[lxxvi]  While rejecting any standardized national curriculum, the report recommended a common core curriculum for students within each school so that every student “should be able to talk with his fellows…above the level of casual conversation” and students will be better able to organize themselves for social action.[lxxvii]

EEAY proposed to supplement the traditional academic curriculum with courses that start with everyday problems and then proceed to more complex intellectual issues, serving as an introduction and inducement to academic work by adapting the academic disciplines to everyday life.  Under EEAY, all students would take a “common learnings core” consisting of cultural education dealing with issues of family life, health, consumerism, and leisure, and citizenship education dealing with social problems, human rights and civic responsibilities.  All students would participate in community service to develop pro-social attitudes, vocational work to explore career choices, and political campaigns to “develop competence in political action.”  EEAY rejected educational tracking and ability grouping of students, proposing, instead, that students be placed in heterogeneous classes in which they would work on individual and group projects that reflect their varying interests and abilities.[lxxviii]

EEAY was intended as a proposal for continuous educational reform.  Calling for a “grass roots approach to improving programs in local schools,” the report proposed an ongoing series of community-school surveys of parents, teachers, students and community members that would help determine how schools operated and what should be included in the school curriculum.[lxxix]   The surveys asked adults what they thought they needed to know to be successful as adults, and asked children what they thought they needed to know to be successful as children.  This procedure was used with success in many school districts during the late 1940’s and early 1950’s.  It was a method of creating what today could be considered an authentic curriculum.[lxxx]

From the mid 1940’s through the early 1950’s, Conant vigorously campaigned in support of the proposals in GEFS and EAAY.  With his friend Dwight Eisenhower as a member of the EEAY board that Conant chaired,[lxxxi] Conant argued that education must focus on “the study of the economic, political, and social problems of the day” and promote the principles of liberal democracy.  To develop a social democracy, Conant insisted, you must have a social democratic educational system.[lxxxii]

With the advent of the Cold War and the McCarthy era in the early 1950’s, progressive educators came under withering attack as part of an overall assault on liberals and liberalism,[lxxxiii] and progressive education was maligned as an anti-intellectual and even subversive scourge on American education.[lxxxiv]  During this period, Conant never went back on his support for GEFS and EAAY and repeatedly cited them as curricular models.  But, under the pressure of the Cold War, he subordinated these proposals to arguments that the first priority of American schools must be “the education of their gifted students,” those who will become the scientists and leaders needed to defeat the Soviets.[lxxxv]

It was in this context that Conant produced his three best known reports on education, The American High School Today in 1959, Slums and Suburbs in 1961, and The Education of American Teachers in 1963.  They are empirical studies of social problems affecting schools – inadequate staffing and curricula in small schools, poverty and racial segregation in inner city schools, and inadequately educated teachers – in which Conant ties social policy recommendations to the progressive educational theories of GEFS and EAAY.  While the reports are distinctly elitist in tone, they emphatically reject the even more elitist proposals that were popular at that time.

In The American High School Today, Conant was concerned that Americans, particularly those in the middle and upper classes, suffered from delusions of self-sufficiency, unable to see the connections between themselves and other people, especially the less affluent.  As a result, Americans are often unable to see why they should support social institutions that benefit others, especially at expense to themselves.  Conant thought that heterogeneous classes and general education courses in comprehensive high schools would help remedy this problem.[lxxxvi]  He naively underestimated the invidious effects of social class and academic competition on school life, and overestimated the democratizing effects of heterogeneous homerooms and general education classes.  While school consolidation was widely undertaken during the 1960’s and 1970’s, few of the newly consolidated schools promoted the pluralism or adhered to the restrictions on ability grouping that Conant proposed. [lxxxvii]

In Slums and Suburbs, Conant rejected the idea that black schoolchildren were genetically inferior to whites in intelligence and called for expanded jobs programs, better social service programs, and greater spending on inner city schools.[lxxxviii]  In The Education of American Teachers, Conant repeated arguments he had previously made in favor of the MAT program, proposing that prospective teachers take a relatively equal number of courses in pedagogy and academic subjects, and insisting that in order to obtain permanent certification, teachers should demonstrate their knowledge of the social and cultural backgrounds of the students in their schools. [lxxxix]

While the tone of Conant’s educational writings changed during the Cold War, the substance did not.  As a top-down democrat, he consistently throughout his career placed greater emphasis than would participatory democrats on the education of higher achieving students, and this emphasis was even greater during the 1950’s and 1960’s.  But Conant continued during this period to promote progressive principles of interdisciplinary and problem-solving curricula, student-centered teaching methods, pluralistic schools and heterogeneous classrooms, and greater equality in both educational opportunities and outcomes.

Conant’s Educational Legacy

Although Conant was widely considered to be successful at almost everything he did, he did not agree.  Commenting in 1977, a year before his death, on trends in politics and education, Conant complained that “Everything I’ve worked for has been rejected.”[xc]  He had good cause to lament.

Politically, liberal Republicans were a dying breed by the late 1970’s[xci] and Conant was having second thoughts about the Cold War.[xcii]   By his own standards, many of Conant’s actions during the Cold War were not exemplary.  He frequently said one thing privately while publicly doing the opposite, and orchestrated a massive campaign of deception in order to gain popular support for the government’s Cold War policies.  His behavior seems even more reprehensible to those, like the author of this article, who are old enough to have lived through the Cold War and who viewed it as Conant initially did in the 1940’s: that the Soviet Union did not pose a military threat sufficient to warrant an all-out arms race and the militarization of American foreign policy; and that domestic Communists were a relatively benign group – sometimes helpful in the labor and civil rights movements, sometimes harmful, mainly to themselves, in their blind support for the Soviet Union.  To those who see the breakup of the Soviet empire and the historical revelations of the last ten years as further confirmation of this view, the Cold War was a terrible mistake, a mistake for which Conant bears significant responsibility as I think he began to see toward the end of his life.  In education, Conant was not doing much better.  Shopping mall high schools, racial segregation, standardized testing, traditional curricula and mechanical teaching methods – all of which he had opposed – were the norm in the late 1970’s, as they still are today.

In evaluating Conant’s failure to achieve his goals, or even sometimes to practice what he preached, I think that the major flaw in his theories and practices was his elitist concept of leadership.  Conant’s belief that social transformation comes from the top down, and his determination to stay within the policy elite at almost all costs, forced him into all sorts of theoretical and practical contradictions.  Conant expected from his Power Elite the sort of long-term thinking and pro-social consciousness that may have been realistic to expect from the Bob LaFollettes and Henry Wallaces of his youth, but were not very evident by the 1970’s and have not been since.  Conant’s peers let him down, but so did his premises.  Because there is strong reason to believe, and I would argue strongly, that the sorts of progressive educational and social reforms Conant wanted can only be achieved from the bottom up.[xciii]

I conclude, nonetheless, that Conant’s ideas can be purged of their elitist undertones and still resonate with progressive theorists today.  Among other things, General Education for a Free Society and Education for All American Youth remain two of the most interesting and promising proposals of the last hundred years.  Moreover, Conant faced during the 1940’s and 1950’s the same sorts of questions about school choice, privatization, tracking, standardized curricula and standardized testing that educators are facing today.  At a time when standardized curricula and testing have become the rage, and technology and quantification have become the standards for all knowledge, having opinions to the contrary from someone like Conant – a founder of ETS, world-renowned scientist, and Republican stalwart – constitutes important support for those who would buck the current trends.

Finally, Conant represents a time, not so long ago, when progressive reform was at least on the left bank of the mainstream, and a broad coalition of educators rallied around a common program of reform, even if from somewhat different perspectives – top-down for those like Conant, bottom-up for others.  A reconsideration of James Conant recovers a time when “radical” was even for many Republicans an ideal, “liberal” a term of praise, “conservative” a dirty word, and social democracy the goal of education.  This should be considered a valuable legacy for educational theorists today.

[i] Gordon Swanson, “The Hall of Shame,” Phi Delta Kappan, Vol.74, 10 (June 1993): 797.

[ii] James Conant, The Child, the Parent and the State (New York: McGraw Hill, 1959), 94; James Conant, Scientific Principles and Moral Conduct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 37; James Conant, My Several Lives: Memoirs of a Social Inventor (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 536; James Hershberg, James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1993), 9, 13, 120, 512.

[iii] Daniel Tanner, Secondary Curriculum (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1971), 17.

[iv] Diane Ravitch, The Revisionists Revisited: A Critique of the Radical Attack on the Schools (New York: Basic Books, 1978); Walter Feinberg, Harvey Kantor, Michael Katz & Paul Violas, Revisionists Respond to Ravitch (Washington, DC: National Academy of Education, 1980).

[v] For example, see Edgar Gumbert & Joel Spring, The Superschool & the Superstate: American Education in the Twentieth Century, 1918-1970 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974), 40, 78-79, 137-139; David Tyack, The One Best System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), 276; Walter Feinberg, Reason and Rhetoric: The Intellectual Foundations of 20th Century Liberal Educational Policy (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975), 153-155; Paul Westmeyer, A History of American Higher Education (Springfield, IL: Charles Thomas, 1985), 102; Joel Spring, The American High School, 1642-1985 (New York: Longman, 1986), 287; Clarence Karier, The Individual, Society and Education (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 255; Swanson, “The Hall of Shame,” 797-798; Peter Hlebowitx & Kip Tellez, American Education: Purpose and Promise (Belmont, CA: West/Wadsworth, 1997), 257; Dean Webb, Arlene Metha & Forbes Jordon, Foundation of American Education (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2000), 220; but, to the contrary, some recent appreciations of Conant are: Fred Hechinger, “School for Teenagers: A Historic Dilemma,” Teachers College Record, 94, 3 (Spring 1993): 522-539; Jurgen Herbst, The Once and Future School: Three Hundred and Fifty Years of Secondary Education (New York: Routledge, 1996), 181; John Brubacher & Willis Rudy, Higher Education in Transition (New Brunswick, NJ: Transactions Press, 1997), 424-426.

[vi] Larry Cuban, “Managing the Dilemmas of High School Reform,” Curriculum Inquiry, 30, 1 (Winter 2000): 106.

[vii] James Conant, The American High School Today (New York: McGraw Hill, 1959).

[viii] Hyman Rickover, Education and Freedom (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1959).

[ix] Conant, American High School Today, 37, 63.  He later raised his proposed minimum school population to 750 students in James Conant, The Comprehensive High School (New York: McGraw Hill, 1967), 2.

[x] Conant, American High School Today, 20, 37, 46, 48, 63.

[xi] Conant, Education in a Divided World, 234.

[xii] See Benjamin Barber, A Passion for Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 95-110; Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984).

[xiii] Barber, Strong Democracy, XIV; Barber, A Passion for Democracy, 6, 10.

[xiv] James Conant, Slums and Suburbs (New York: McGraw Hill, 1961), 109.

[xv] Paul Bartlett, “James Bryant Conant,” Biographical Memoirs (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1983), 107.

[xvi] Quoted at Hershberg, James B. Conant, 578.

[xvii] James Conant, Two Modes of Thought: My Encounters with Science and Education (New York: Trident Press, 1964), 13-14.

[xviii] Conant, My Several Lives, 10; Hershberg, James B. Conant, 13.

[xix] Gregory Baker, Religion and Science: From Swedenborg to Chaotic Dynamics (New York: Solomon Press, 1992), 13-14, 21-25; Inge Jonsson, Emanuel Swedenborg (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1971), 14, 40, 72, 79.

[xx] Conant, My Several Lives, 15, 19; Hershberg, James B. Conant, 27.

[xxi] Conant, My Several Lives, 44; Hershberg, James B. Conant, 38-39, 48-49.

[xxii]  Martin Saltzman, “James Bryant Conant and the Development of Physical Organic Chemistry.” Journal of Chemical Education, 49, 6 (June 1972): 411; Hershberg, James B. Conant, 55-56.

[xxiii] Harry Passow, American Secondary Education: The Conant Influence (Reston, VA: National Association of Secondary School Administrators, 1977), 3; George Kistiakowsky, “James B. Conant, 1893-1978,” Nature, 273, 5665 (June 29, 1978): 793.

[xxiv] James Conant, Germany and Freedom (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958), 26-27; Conant, My Several Lives, 140-145, 373.

[xxv] James Conant, On Understanding Science: An Historical Approach (Hew Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1947), XII; Conant, My Several Lives, 236, 242, 272, 274, 298; Hershberg, James B. Conant, 157, 170, 325.

[xxvi] James Conant, Anglo-American Relations in the Atomic Age (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), 17-18; James Conant, Modern Science and Modern Man (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), 12-16.

[xxvii] Stefan Morawski, The Trouble with Postmodernism (London: Routledge, 1996),

2; Stanley Grenz, A Primer on PostModernism (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans

Publishing Co.), 7, 34, 40-46.

[xxviii] Conant, On Understanding Science, 25, 36, 91; Conant, Science and Common Sense, VIII; Hershberg, James B. Conant, 410, 860-footnote 84; Thomas Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), IX.

[xxix] Conant, On Understanding Science, 11-12; Conant, Science and Common Sense, 8, 10, 15, 25-26; Conant, Modern Science and Modern Man, 19, 22, 23, 54, 58, 62; Conant, Two Modes of Thought, 13, 14,15-17, 18, 83; Conant, Scientific Principles and Moral Conduct, 15-16, 25; Philip Kitcher, “A Plea for Science Studies,” in A House Built on Sand: Exposing Postmodernist Myths About Science, ed. Noretta Koertge (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 34, 36; Bruno Latour, Science in Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 2-4, 12.

[xxx]  S. Morawski, The Trouble with Postmodernism (London: Routledge, 1996), 2; Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), XXXIX; P. Feyerabend, Against Method (New York: Verso, 1988), 189.

[xxxi] William James, “The Will to Believe,” in Essays on Faith and Morals, ed. R.B. Perry  (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1962), 32-62.

[xxxii] Conant, On Understanding Science, 30; Conant, Science and Common Sense, 10, 17, 30-31; Conant, Modern Science and Modern Man, 82, 88; Conant, Two Modes of Thought, 33; Conant, Scientific Principles and Moral Conduct, 38.

[xxxiii] James Conant, Science and Common Sense (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1951), 25-26; Conant, Modern Science and Modern Man, 54, 62; James Conant, Scientific Principles and Moral Conduct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 8, 29.

[xxxiv] Conant, Anglo-American Relations in the Atomic Age, 32, 37-38; Conant, Scientific Principles and Moral Conduct, 34-35; John Gribbin, Almost Everyone’s Guide to Science (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2000), 45-47.

[xxxv] Conant, On Understanding Science, 22; Conant, Science and Common Sense, 38-39; Conant, Two Modes of Thought, 82-83; Garvin McCain & Erwin Segal, The Game of Science (Belmont, CA: Brooks/Cole Pub. 1969), 80.

[xxxvi] Conant, Modern Science and Modern Man, 66-67.

[xxxvii] Conant, On Understanding Science, l1; Conant, Modern Science and Modern Man, 66-67.

[xxxviii] Conant, Anglo-American Relations in the Atomic Age, 17-18, 23; Conant, Modern Science and Modern Man, 12-13, 16, 30.

[xxxix] Hershberg, James B. Conant, 466, 474, 482.

[xl] Hershberg, James B. Conant, 82, 93, 325, 404.

[xli] Conant, Modern Science and Modern Man, 6.

[xlii] Conant, My Several Lives, 11; Hershberg, James B. Conant, 14.

[xliii] James Conant, Education in a Divided World: The Function of Public Schools in Our Unique Society  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1948), 30-31, 172-173, 178.

[xliv] James Conant, “Wanted: American Radicals,” The Atlantic Monthly, 171, 5 (May 1943) 43; Conant, Education in a Divided World, 4-7; James Conant, Germany and Freedom (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), 67-69.

[xlv] Conant, “Wanted: American Radicals;” D.W. Brogan, Politics in America (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1960), 37-54; Clinton Rossiter, Parties and Politics in America (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1960), pp.107-151; Joyner, The Republican Dilemma; Rae, The Decline and Fall of the Liberal Republicans.

[xlvi]  Conant, The Child, the Parent and the State, 102.

[xlvii] Conrad Joyner, The Republican Dilemma: Conservatism or Progressivism (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1963); Nicol Rae, The Decline and Fall of the Liberal Republicans: From 1952 to the Present (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

[xlviii]  Conant, My Several Lives, 41, 68-69, 71; Hershberg, James B. Conant, 38, 42, 61.

[xlix]  Conant, Germany and Freedom, p.4.

[l] Conant, My Several Lives, 212, 308, 320-322.

[li] Conant, My Several Lives, 49; Hershberg, James B. Conant, 120.

[lii] Conant, My Several Lives, 364, 374-381.

[liii] Conant, “Wanted: American Radicals;” James Conant, General Education in a Free Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1945), 34.  Conant claimed for himself a somewhat larger role in GEFS than some historians have described for him.  For purposes of this article, the exact extent of Conant’s role in producing the report is not as important as the fact that he continuously thereafter supported the recommendations of the report.  Hershberg, James B. Conant, 236.

[liv] Conant, My Several Lives, 300.

[lv] Conant, Education in a Divided World, 21, 24, 218.

[lvi]  Conant, Education in a Divided World, 172-173; Hershberg, James B. Conant, 435.

[lvii]  Quoted at Hershberg, James B. Conant, 322.

[lviii] Conant, The Child, the Parent and the State, 33.

[lix]  Hersherg, James B. Conant, 360, 462.

[lx]  Conant, 1970, My Several Lives, 506, 509, 512; Hershberg, James B. Conant, 384, 390, 493, 498, 521, 674.

[lxi]  Conant, My Several Lives, 456; Hershberg, James B. Conant, 431, 435.

[lxii]  Conant, My Several Lives, 640-642; Hershberg, James B. Conant, 746, 751.

[lxiii] Hershberg, James B. Conant, 752.

[lxiv]  Hershberg, James B. Conant, 82, 89, 93, 276, 404.

[lxv] Conant, My Several Lives, 137, 189.

[lxvi]  James Conant, “Education for a Classless Society,” The Atlantic Monthly, 165, 5 (May 1940): 596.

[lxvii] Conant, My Several Lives, XV-XVI.

[lxviii] James Conant, The Education of American Teachers (New York: McGraw Hill, 1963),1-2; Conant, My Several Lives, 181, 185.

[lxix] Conant, My Several Lives, 417, 419.

[lxx] Conant, My Several Lives, 417, 424, 432: Nicholas Lemann, The Big Test: The Secret History of the American Meritocracy (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1999), 3.  Conant claimed for himself a bigger role in the founding of Educational Testing Services than described by Lemann in his seminal book.  For purposes of this article, the exact extent of Conant’s role is not as important as the fact that Conant initially supported standardized testing and then questioned it, citing what he considered to be progressive educational principles in both cases.

[lxxi]  Conant, The American High School Today, 62; Conant, My Several Lives, 419; Robert Hampel, “The American High School Today: James Bryant Conant’s Reservations and Reconsiderations,” Phi Delta Kappan (May 1983): 608-609; Lemann, The Big Test, 38, 78-79, 228..

[lxxii] James Conant, “American Remakes the University,” The Atlantic Monthly, 177, 5 (May 1946): 41-45; Patricia Graham (New York: Teachers College Press, 1967), 136.

[lxxiii] Conant, General Education in a Free Society; Educational Policies Commission, Education for ALL American Youth (Washington, DC: National Education Association, 1944); Paul Elicker, Planning for American Youth (Washington, DC: National Association of Secondary School Principles, 1951); Conant, Education in a Divided World, VII.  While some historians have characterized General Education in a Free Society as a conservative defense of the traditional academic disciplines – for example, Paul Westmeyer, A History of American Higher Education (Springfield, IL: Charles Thomas, 1985), 102 – most have described it as a progressive proposal for interdisciplinary and student-centered education – for example, Daniel Tanner & Laurel Tanner, Curriculum Development: Theory into Practice (New York: Macmillan, 1980), 445.

[lxxiv] Conant, General Education in a Free Society, pp.IX, 135; Educational Policies Commission, Education for ALL American Youth, 21, 102, 225-226; Elicker, Planning for American Youth , 19.

[lxxv]  Conant, General Education in a Free Society, 4, 58; Conant, My Several Lives, 366, 368.

[lxxvi]  Conant, General Education in a Free Society, 10, 32, 33, 118, 128, 139, 153, 171.

[lxxvii] Conant, General Education in a Free Society,  33, 77, 114, 171, 192.

[lxxviii] Educational Policies Commission, Education for ALL American Youth, 71-71, 85-87, 234-238, 299; Elicker, Planning for American Youth, 8-9, 19; Harold Hand, “The World Our Pupils Face,” Science Education, 31, 2 (Summer 1947): 55-60; Harold Hand, “The Case for the Common Learnings Course,” Science Education, 32, 1 (Spring 1948): 5-11.

[lxxix] Educational Policies Commission, Education for ALL American Youth: A Further Look (Washington DC: National Educational Association, 1952), 88-89, 380.

[lxxx] Harold Hand, “Local Studies Lead to Curriculum Change,” Educational Leadership, 8 (January 1951): 240-243; Harold Hand, “Making the Public School Curriculum Public Property,” Educational Leadership, 10 (January 1953), 261-264.

[lxxxi] Educational Policies Commission, Education for ALL American Youth: A Further Look, V.

[lxxxii] Conant, Education in a Divided World, VII, 100, 106, 110.

[lxxxiii] Cremin, The Transformation of the School, 348-351.

[lxxxiv] Mortimer Smith, And Madly Teach (Chicago, Henry Regenery Co., 1949), 90; Albert Lynd, Quackery in the Public Schools (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1950), 35; Arthur Bestor, Educational Wastelands (Urbana IL: University of Illinois Press, 1953), 81-100.

[lxxxv] James Conant, The Citadel of Learning (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1956), V, 40, 42; Conant, The Child, the Parent and the State, 16, 34, 48, 76, 94; Conant, Slums and Suburbs, 136, 140; Conant, The Education of American Teachers, 6; James Conant, Shaping Educational Policy (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964), 4, 21-24.

[lxxxvi]  James Conant, Thomas Jefferson and the Development of American Public Education (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1962), 61; Conant, The American High School Today, 7.

[lxxxvii]  Landon Beyer, “The American High School Today: A First Report to American

Citizens,” Educational Studies, 27, 4 (1996-1997): 319-337.

[lxxxviii]  Conant, Slums and Suburbs, 3, 4, 12, 36-37, 39; Hershberg, James B. Conant, 726-727.

[lxxxix] Conant, The Education of American Teachers, 7-8, 15, 71, 113.

[xc] Quoted at Hershberg, James B. Conant, 754.

[xci] Rae, The Decline and Fall of the Liberal Republicans, 155-156.

[xcii] Hershberg, James B. Conant, 752.

[xciii] For example, John Goodlad, Educational Renewal (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass,

1994). Goodlad, nonetheless, regards Conant as “one of my mentors” (29).  Also, Barber,

Strong Democracy.